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Tho' much is taken, much abides; and tho'
We are not now that strength which in old days
Moved earth and heaven, that which we are, we are;
One equal temper of heroic hearts,
Made weak by time and fate, but strong in will
To strive, to seek, to find, and not to yield.
~Ulysses, Alfred, Lord Tennyson, 1842
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ABSTRACT
Reviewing  inter-state  warfare  literature,  I  observe  a  correlation  between  the
growth of international institutions, economic interchange, and levels of democracy, and
corresponding decreases in incidents of international war.  Conversely, internal conflicts
comprise most conflicts in the post-1945 world, compared to inter-state conflicts. 
Within the larger intra-state literature, I note an underlying lineage to concepts
evolving  from  Kant’s  writings,  specifically  Kantian  democratic  peace  theory  (DPT)
literature  posited  by  Russett  and  ONeal  (2001),  and  the  informal  social-juridical
relationship within Metaphysics of Morals. 
From that pedigree, could a deeper understanding of internal political risks gained
through  application  of  Kantian  DPT,  interpolating  Putnam’s  (2002)  Social  Capital
Theory  (SCT)  hold  potential  to  provide  researchers  and  policy  makers  insight  into
propensity for descent into conflict early enough to implement corrective actions? 
This investigation initially questions existence of intra-state processes performing
similar  ameliorating  or exacerbating  functions  observed at  inter-state  level.  Assessing
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that intra-state dynamics exhibit  an elevated dependence on social  factors necessitates
adjustments to DPT to accommodate the adaptable nature of social constructs, leading to
the designation of my theory as Kantian Adaptable Networks Theory (KANT).
To test hypotheses, I start with DPT, incorporate elements of SCT, and identify a
hybrid combination presenting greater explanatory power than either DPT or SCT factors
alone. Fund for Peace’s Fragile State Indices (FSI) for 2005-2013 provides the dataset to
conduct regression analysis  to determine significance of DPT and/or SCT elements in
static and time-series. Initial results indicate DPT/SCT provides explanatory value at the
intra-state level with the Group Grievance factor generally presenting the most significant
effect on probability of conflict.
To assess resilience  to  intra-state  conflict,  I  then explore brittleness  of social-
contract  dynamics  through  the  lens  of  Clausewitz’  center  of  gravity  theory.  In  my
exploration of applicability of KANT at the case level, I analyze FSI data for Syria and
Kenya  to  determine  resilience  to  shocks and ratcheted  pressures,  and explanation  for
differing outcomes. 
Based on the results of quantitative and case analysis, I present policy prescription
considerations. Finally, I discuss additional avenues for follow-on research of issues and
opportunities identified during the course of the investigation.
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PREFACE
In  this  Preface,  I  discuss  the  inspiration  for  this  investigation  into  Kantian
Adaptive Network Theory (KANT), from career experiences to academic pursuits and the
introduction to democratic peace theory.
Inspiration:
In the mid-1990's, a company specializing in international medical and political
risk hired me as one of two security managers. My colleague Frank, a retired FBI agent,
and  I  were  responsible  for  keeping  the  company’s  portfolio  of  clients  safe  from
disturbances across the globe. 
Walking into this job as an early-career naval officer separating from an active-
duty  tour  analyzing  the  Bosnian  War,  I  was  familiar  with  the  basic  principles  of
“indications and warning” to predict impending crises. However, in that military capacity
I possessed access to the full  resources of the US government.  At this company,  my
resources included day or week-old newspapers, dial-up Internet, and the nascent data
resources of CompuServe and AOL. 
Although we did not lose any clients to the crises of the day (Liberia, Taiwan,
Cambodia, etc.), it occurred to me that there had to be a better way for two analysts with
computers to gain a better picture of the world, especially of impending civil wars – and
process this information early enough to intervene to save lives. 
Over the following years, during military and civilian employment opportunities,
one of my persistent peripheral work projects involved investigating different tools and
theories  for  automating  the  indications  and  warning  process.  These  efforts  generally
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involved investigating various methods and tools for ingestion and analysis of multiple
data streams to determine trends. 
Moving  forward  to  2006,  during  my  MA  studies  at  Boston  College,  our
coursework  encompassed  the  concept  of  democratic  peace  theory  (DPT)  (Russett  &
ONeal, 2001). During my further readings on the subject, few, if any, researchers applied
the  full  theory  (democracy  +  economic  interchange  +  institutional  participation)  to
intrastate conflict, and yet it seemed (Sullivan, 2007, unpublished) that such an avenue of
research might  be of value  with the potential  to  save lives.  The problem perseveres:
intrastate conflict,  albeit down from the post-colonial height of conflicts, still  persists,
with an average of 31 conflicts  each year  in the 2008-2012 period.  During this span,
Uppsala’s UCDP (2014) reports at least 136,000 persons lost their lives in the course of
these conflicts.
Relevance: 
Building upon my career experience as a naval officer, government civilian, and
defense contractor participating in most of the major crises of the last 30 years, I note the
iterative nature of political science research feeding into of the policy process. 
During development  of an introductory international relations (IR) course, one
learning objective critical  to the placement of IR in the broader field necessitated de-
constructing political science for my students. Similarly, working closely with a variety
of  colleagues  from  the  wide  spectrum  between  policy,  praxis,  and  theory  often
necessitates establishing a common ground upon which to build analysis of international
events and forecasts.
x
The further  question  then  arises  of  how we,  as  political  scientists,  utilize  our
ability  to  quantify,  explain,  or  anticipate  changes  to  preserve,  revise,  or  just  simply
remain neutral  in the larger scheme of reaching decisions,  distributing resources,  and
ostensibly working to improve the general welfare of the country and global community.
Lives  do,  ultimately,  depend on our  ability  to  research,  analyze,  and disseminate  the
insights gleaned from our research. Toward that goal, I intend to shape this dissertation to
maintain  a  level  of  accessibility  with  policy  makers  who  may  find  this  research
illuminating.
xi
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1CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
In this chapter, I discuss risk to global stability presented by intra-state conflict, 
which  develops  into  the  argument  for  a  hybrid  theory  that  I  designate  as  Kantian 
Adaptive Network Theory (KANT) as a diagnostic ontology for indications and warning 
of conflict.
The etymology of  KANT evolves  from two permutations  of  Kantian  thought,
specifically focusing on the formal  iterative  networks illuminated in  Perpetual  Peace
(1795), and the dynamic between formal juridical networks in tension with each other as
well as against and in concert with the informal social networks described in Metaphysics
of  Morals (1797).  These  networks  then  operate  within  a  complex  adaptive  network
construct (Holland, 1992; Cilliers, 1998) framework of interactivity and feedback such
that discrete elements within the larger network cooperate, compete,  or confront other
discrete  elements  at  varying network distances  to  exchange information  or  maximize
goals. 
In the praxis of intra-state governance, these dynamic tensions both reflect the
zeitgeist of the societal quantum state across the series of moments, and, iteratively evoke
adaptations  by  the  participants  to  changing  circumstances  and  opportunities;  further,
these  adaptations  affect  and  operationalize  across  the  formal  and  informal  networks
formed by an elastic mesh of interests and alliances. The theory then attempts to provide
explanatory power for measuring the impetus for preservation or revision of the intra-
state equilibrium through focused analysis of specific datasets. 
2In the first section, I set the stage for the investigation through a discussion on the
risk presented by the ongoing epidemic of intra-state conflicts. To examine the theoretical
underpinnings of the relationship of political science to policy recommendations, in the
second section I open the aperture to lay the groundwork for this investigation in terms of
the trajectory of political philosophy leading into political science. 
Moving  further  from  philosophy  toward  operationalizing  results,  in  the  third
section I then demonstrate a process to connect the insights gained through the political
science processes to policy implications. Finally, I detail the remaining chapters of this
investigation to illuminating proposals to distill KANT into policy implications.
3Section I: The Intra-State Conflict Problem 
Intra-state conflict persists, albeit at reduced levels compared to the post-colonial
height of conflicts, with an average of 14 new conflicts sourcing a steady state of ±30
enduring  conflicts  per  year  in  the  2008-2012  time-frame.  During  this  span,  Uppsala
Conflict Data Project (UCDP) (2014) reports at least 136,000 persons lost their lives in
the course of these conflicts, not counting 2nd and 3rd order effects such as the millions
affected by internal and external displacement, disease, social upheaval, rape, threats to
food security, etc. (Gray, 2015). 
The  rich  and  significant  collection  of  literature  on  the  subject  of  civil  war
provides a diverse range of explanatory arguments concerning the initiation, continuation,
and  cessation  of  intra-state  conflict,  a  discussion  explored  in  greater  granularity  in
Chapter  2.  Yet,  that  spectrum of  literature  exhibits  a  void  in  terms  of  exploring  the
mutually related concepts of social capital theory (SCT) (Putnam, 2002) and tri-partite
democratic  peace  theory (DPT)  (Russett  and Oneal1,  2001)  within  the  context  of  the
impetus for, conduct of, and resolution of civil war. 
Adopting  a  historiographical  archaeological  approach,  we  can  observe  that
contained within the philosophical tradition of SCT and DPT lies a foundational structure
radiating from the writings of Immanuel Kant. Russett and Oneal explicitly acknowledge
this  lineage,  whereas  the  SCT literature  incorporates  it  more  implicitly.  Likewise,  a
paucity of researchers  discovered to date  investigated  the applicability of the broader
Kantian  visualization,  integrating  elements  of  both  Perpetual  Peace (1795)  and
1 Yes, that is the correct spelling of his name. http://psc.ua.edu/profiles/john-r-oneal/
4Metaphysics  of  Morals (1797)  across  an  interrelated  system  of  formal  juridical  and
informal networks responding to and affecting intrastate conflict. 
When interpolated,  Kant’s theme weaves the informal social  network of rights
and obligations at the autonomous individual level (Rauscher, 2012), manifested within
social capital theory, with the formally networked proposition of a DPT (democracy +
economic  interchange  +  institutional  participation)  interlaced  within  juridical-based
governance structures. Yet one gains the impression (Sullivan, 2007, unpublished) that
such an avenue of research holds explanatory value at the indications and warning level
with the potential to save lives should significant results emerge and then brought to the
attention of policy makers.
This  investigation thus tenders  the proposition that  society/states  comprised  of
increasing adaptive Kantian formal structured and informal  networks (communities  of
interest  and/or communities of practice)  acquire increasing resilience to stressors, and
thereby possess increasing resistance to impulses leading to intra-state conflict. From that
proposition, we then examine whether this Kantian Adaptive Networks Theory provide
significant indications and warning of intra-state conflict. 
5Section II: The Philosophy-Science-Policy Trajectory
Consistent with the historiographical archaeological approach, we initialize this
inquiry through assessment of the modalities of the broader political science milieu in
which this investigation resides. This discussion provides placement within the extensive
context  and grounding within the  raison d'être of  political  science.  In  this  section,  I
highlight the linkage detailing the effects of political philosophy and theory inspiring and
shaping the political science processes. 
These processes presents direct bearing on the salient aspects of the following
quantitative  and case  analyses,  with  particular  attention  to  the  development  of  social
contracts,  the  interlaced  nature  of  the  transmission  of  demands  within  the  socio-
governance  matrix,  and  the  grievance-demand-security-conflict  spiral.  Insights  from
political science then inform policy development; therefore, I tie my investigation into
KANT into a similar trajectory.
Political Philosophy Driving Political Science:
Reviewing  the  rich  literature  of  political  philosophy  publicists,  particularly
Strauss (1989) and Comte (1830:34-35), clearly that epistemic community presents an
endeavor to place political science in perspective of relevance to the social matrix and the
civic art,  not simply beholden to science and scientific method. However, they do not
discount the value of the scientific method as a means of analysis, just not an end in and
of  itself.  Later,  Almond  and Genco  (1977:490)  reinforced  this  concept  through their
analysis  of  Karl  Popper’s  essay (1972),  adding their  own description  of  the  political
6system  as  one  of  choices  and  decisions  formulated  in  the  context  of  memories,
experiences, expectations, constraints, and opportunities. 
Each of these contextual  vectors  induces  effects  in the cognitive and physical
domains through transmission via the information domain (Arquilla, 1997; Romanych,
2005). Yet, as Strauss and Weber (1949) noted, strict adherence to a scientific perspective
is  insufficient  to  create  a  framework  capable  of  analyzing  the  moral  and  ethical
benchmarks that drive choices and decisions, especially compared with a framework that
takes  an  ecumenical  approach.  Comte  strengthens  this  by  highlighting  the  dynamic
balance evident between the “imaginations” of theory compared with the “observations”
of science.
Schram’s (2005) refinement of the perestroikan2 emphasis on a “problem-driven,
contextually  sensitive”  approach  or  Flyvbjerg’s3 development  of  “phronesis”  to
emphasize the multiple dimensions of political contexts are arguments toward such an
ecumenical approach that incorporates the best of imagination and observation. 
Amorphous  moral  and  ethical  benchmarks,  such  as  good,  truth,  beauty,  and
justice (Lave and March, 1993:73-74) bedevil  the political philosophers. Both Strauss
and Weber struggle with the paradox that science cannot prove the existence of “good”
without delving into metaphysical realms; however, Strauss acknowledges the possibility
of establishing arbitrary benchmarks fashioned through a collective negotiating process
among interested parties, which constitutes a more heuristic approach.
2 Scott Heller and D. W. Miller, "Hot type: (The Mr. Perestroika rebellion)," The Chronicle of 
Higher Education 47, no. 12 (2000): A28.
3 Bent Flyvbjerg, as noted in both Schram (ibid, p. 109) and David Laitin’s “The Perestroikan 
Challenge to Social Science,” p. 121.
7For example, at a basic level of political analysis, the process of negotiating an
agreement – a social contract - as well as the agreement itself, between two adjacent
farmers (or tribes) to respect each other’s property and their right to raise sheep on one
farm and cattle on the other without interference can set an ethical benchmark. Elevated
to a macro scale, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (United Nations, 1948)
performs and codifies a similar function. The Declaration sets a benchmark, albeit
one that may contain scientifically unprovable moral guidelines, but due to its essence
as a commonly accepted frame of reference, it provides an arbitrary starting point by
which political processes, actions, and institutions may be analyzed.
Metaphysical texts may influence cognitive process behind such an agreement;
however, by reaching an agreement in the cognitive realm and creating effects in the
physical realm, the benchmark becomes secularized. Such a negotiated consensus may
not achieve what the Athenians acclaimed as “the good” by Platonic standards, but
for the farmers faced with an emergent property dispute, a negotiated consensus
achieves the necessity and sufficiency of “good enough” to work until a more elegant
agreement is developed,  negotiated,  implemented,  and  enforced.  An  important
distinction,  aligned  with Strauss’ concerns, clarifies that such a system of
benchmarks is not contiguous with relativism, which holds that all ethical positions are
equally valid. Setting a benchmark by a negotiated settlement, such as the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights sets high enough standards that truly egregious behavior
potentially triggers corrective action.
8Therefore,  political  science  develops  the  mission  to  examine  the  political
complex, its  elements,  and  relations.  The  task  of  examining  the  ∆  (delta)  between
benchmarks and practices, changes to the benchmarks, trends of the ∆ (delta) over time,
explanation of past benchmarks and past practices, and merits of different benchmarks;
and finally, to develop the prescriptions that informs policy decisions for the next step of
the process. 
Expanding on the opening paragraphs, we observe major trajectories of
thought concerning methodologies- quantitative methodologists employing the scientific
method to formulate questions, collect data, and test hypotheses; political philosophers
and  publicists  utilizing philosophy,  history,  culture,  and  logic  to  conduct  analyses;
qualitative and ethnographic research into specific experiences and opinions; finally,
the myriad of diverse hybrid fusions of methodologies. The products of these epistemic
communities form the tools by which political scientists conduct their examinations of
the political complex.
Political Science Driving Policy:
Before delving into quantitative and case analysis methods, we further examine
the purpose of political science in relation to politics and policy. Przeworski (1970:17)
noted that the goal of social science is to explain social phenomenon. Strauss similarly
placed political  science in the framework of civic art,  those relations between people,
shown to be composed of multiple domains and to incorporate the simultaneous actions
of analysis, description, process, and praxis. 
9As noted in previous paragraphs, political scientists occupy a variety of positions
with varying degrees of political responsibility, ranging from passive to active. We can
now further  probe into range of  political  science’s  responsibility  by utilizing  another
concept  noted  by  Comte4 and  updated  through  application  to  business  and  military
strategies, that shows the intertwining nature of facts to theory. 
As  we  may  perceive,  facts,  observations,  imagination,  and  theories  inform
policies and actions, which in turn trigger effects in the physical or cognitive domain.
Then the cycle or spiral initiates its next iteration; however, all that precedes it, as well as
the dynamic vectors of the theoretical imaginings, seeking to either preserve or revise,
also inform that next iteration.  This spiral nature of the political  process replicates  in
business and the military arts.5
As proposed by Colonel Boyd (1987), an analyst may de-construct all actions and
processes  into  four  elements  of  Observe,  Orient,  Decide,  and  Act  (OODA),  thereby
forming  an  interactive  loop,  complete
with feedback cycles and outputs (Figure
1,  Coram,  2002:342  from  Boyd’s
original). Although originally conceived
to  better  prepare  U.S.  fighter  pilots  to
defeat  other  fighter  pilots  in  aerial
4 Auguste Comte, ibid. “the necessity that always exists for some theory to which to refer our 
facts, combined with the clear impossibility that, at the outset of human knowledge, men could have 
formed theories out of the observation of facts…If it is true that every theory must be based upon observed 
facts, it is equally true that facts cannot be observed without the guidance of some theory”
5 I do have a point to this political philosophy exercise. We will see this iterative spiral concept 
again in Chapter 3 when it drives the Vector Auto Regression and Structural Equation Modeling analysis.
Illustration 1: Col Boyd's OODA Loop
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combat through efficient allocation of resources, energy, and time, it is clearly analogous
to the relationship between political  science and policy,  which we view as a series of
social processes competing over allocation of resources and time. Of interest, Collier et.
al., (2004) utilized a similar loop to describe the research inquiry process. 
Stated briefly,  Observation is the collection of data; Orientation is the analysis
and synthesis of data to form a perspective; Decision is the determination of a course of
action based on that now a-priori perspective; and Action is the physical enactment of
those decisions. The important consideration for political  science lies in knowing that
each  phase  of  the  cycle  requires  some  form  of  participation  by  individual  political
scientists from data collection, to analysis, to decision-making, and decision execution,
all  within the context  of integrating  relevant  amplifying,  contradictory,  or deviational
vectors received through the feedback mechanisms.
Contentiously reinforced in political science’s discipline-wide “Mr. Perestroika”
controversy a few years later, King, Keohane, and Verba (1994:4) tender the argument
that political science lost its institutional awareness of its pervasive presence horizontally
through the political process. The community, or portions of it at the least, lost focus on
its responsibility to not simply spotlight the facts and observations, the “Observe” portion
of the loop, but also remember that it has a place in the imagination, decision, and action
that comprise the “Orient,” “Decide,” and “Act” portions as well. 
Indeed, in this investigation I will,  to borrow a phrase from so many political
science publications, attempt to “bring the “OODA Loop” back in.”
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Nevertheless, there is also a “meta” aspect to political science as a science and a
social  science,  as  a  component  of  humanity’s  ongoing  quest  for  understanding  and,
ultimately, wisdom. This other aspect requires recognition of the capabilities of political
science in making progress along the path to wisdom. Wisdom is the culmination of a
process  that  starts  with  data  collection,  information  and  knowledge  management  to
answer Lasswell’s (1950) “who, what, when, where, and how” questions; continues with
the development and appreciation of understanding that answers the “why” question; and
finally,  leads to achievement  of  wisdom through evaluation of our understanding.  As
noted by Ackoff (1989) only wisdom, of the “meta” processes, is truly forward-
looking as it incorporates aspects of vision and design.
One might contend that while war is  an option (Baratta, 2004) for achieving a
decision concerning control of territory, governance processes, philosophical/ideological
dominance, or extraction and distribution of resources, this investigation proceeds from
the precept, more consistent from Kant and Locke rather than Foucault (Kelly 2009:50),
that the noblest war is the one that never occurs. Should this investigation reveal policy
options that lie within the capabilities of the aspects of national power6 at nominal cost -
compared  with  the  costs  that  conflict  or  intervention  would  entail  -  is  it  not  in  the
country’s preeminent interest to invest those nominal expenditures of time and treasure
before the scales demand payment in blood?
6 Expressed as Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic (DIME) or Political, Military, 
Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure (PMESII) capabilities "Joint Warfighting Center Joint 
Doctrine Series Pamphlet 3, Doctrinal Implications of the Standing Joint Force Headquarters (SJFHQ) - 
a423985.pdf " [cited 2015]. Available from http://www.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a423985.pdf
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Section III: The Course Of The Investigation: 
This investigation encompasses five total chapters. 
Chapter 1:  In this chapter, I first set the stage for the investigation through an
examination of the risks to the global community posed by persistent intra-state conflict. I
then  transition  to  a  discussion  on  the  trajectory  of  political  philosophy  leading  into
political science. Moving further from philosophy toward operationalizing results, I then
connect  the  insights  gained  through  the  political  science  processes  to  policy
recommendations. 
Chapter 2 covers the configuration space and the development of the conceptual
underpinning of  this  investigation,  which I  designate as Kantian Adaptable  Networks
Theory (KANT). We start with a discussion of Russett and Oneal’s evolution of Kantian
DPT, incorporate Putnam’ Social Capital Theory, and discuss their potential relevance to
intra-state  conflict.  Additional  discussions  on related  literature  provide supplementary
perspective  to  place  this  investigation  with  the  larger  intra-state  conflict  teleological
schema.  Finally,  I  establish  the  methodology  for  the  remainder  of  the  investigation,
including data selection, analytical design, and theoretical validity testing.
Chapter 3 provides discussion on hypotheses and the quantitative datasets and
statistical methodologies applied to the data to highlight the explanatory value of KANT,
operationalized through DPT and SCT, toward indications and warning of potential intra-
state conflicts.
Chapter 4 provides a discussion concerning application of results from Chapter 3
toward  the  particular  cases  of  Syria  and  Kenya.  Additionally,  I  place  additional
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perspective lenses from social contract and center of gravity theory across the cases to
examine case level variations. 
Chapter 5 reviews the findings, discusses conclusions and policy implications,
discusses  whether  KANT  achieves  validity  as  a  theory,  and  highlights  avenues  of
potential for further research.
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CHAPTER TWO: ARCHAEOLOGY OF THE CONCEPT
This chapter establishes the configuration space7 and the development of the
relevant conceptual underpinning of this investigation, designated as Kantian Adaptable
Networks Theory (KANT).
We commence with a discussion of the focus of this investigation, and describe
the exclusion of topics tangentially related but outside the focus of this investigation. We
then briefly discuss Kant’s exposition on formal iterative networks illuminated in
Perpetual Peace (1795) and the dynamic between formal juridical networks in tension
with each other as well as against and in concert with the informal social networks
described in Metaphysics of Morals (1797).
We add a brief discussion of the complex adaptive systems concept and illuminate
criteria through which social elements within these Kantian networks cooperate, compete,
or confront other elements for information or goal maximization. 
From that point, we examine Russett and Oneal's evolution of DPT as a
permutation of the Kantian formal network argument. We then follow Kant’s informal
network concept to incorporate Putnam’s Social Capital Theory, and discuss their
potential relevance to intra-state conflict. Additional discussions on related literature
provide supplementary perspective to place this investigation with the larger intra-
state conflict teleological schema.
7 "Classical Configuration Spaces - Less Wrong " 15 April 2008 08:40AM [cited 2015]. 
Available from http://lesswrong.com/lw/pi/classical_configuration_spaces/.,  Overriding Flyvbjerg’s 
concerns, you will notice a few conceptual crossovers from the physical sciences throughout this 
investigation.
15
Section I: Defining The Configuration Space
This section reviews a sampled archaeology8 of some of the works of interest to
this field, provide relevance to this particular investigation, and then, highlight areas of
departure.
Included within the scope: The focus of this investigation necessitates limiting
exploration to the following factors to maintain clarity. The scope includes surveying the
explanatory power regarding:
• DPT: democracy, economic interdependence, and institutions
• SCT: social relationships, trust vectors, and pressures
• DPT/SCT represented through the 12 vectors of the FSI
• DPT/SCT expressed through KANT to extract indications and warning of 
impending conflict
• Focus on intrastate conflict reaching the level of civil war
• Use of the UCDP definitions and dataset for intrastate conflict variables
As noted in the next chapter, the Foreign Policy Fragile States Index (FSI) factors
provide analogous proxies for the component DPT and SCT factors.
Excluded outside the scope: Although the lure of the vast bounty of interesting
related topics and tangents dangles enticingly, this investigation, of necessity for clarity
of focus, excludes examinations on the follow topics:
• Deep examination of the broader interstate conflict literature
• Examination of intrastate fractures and clashes not reaching civil war status (e.g., 
coups, nonviolent rebellions, etc.) and associated literature
• Examination of non-DPT/SCT causes of intra-state conflict
• Examination of DPT/SCT in context of perpetuation or cessation of intra-state 
conflict
• Investigations utilizing FSI for non-intrastate conflict scenarios
• Use of any other conflict definitional model or dataset, including Correlates of 
War or Project Ploughshares, etc.
8 Intended as an tip of the hat to the Foucaultian historiography concept
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Any of these offer opportunities to develop into investigations in their own
right for interested researchers, however, due to time and focus restrictions on the
scope of this investigation, I stipulate their existence and tangential relevance, and opt
to defer those investigations to a later time. Please see Chapter 5 for a brief review of
additional research opportunities revealed during this investigation.
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Section II: Foundation
The foundation of KANT and, by extension, the theoretical underpinnings of SCT
and DPT evolves from two permutations of Kant’s political writings. This investigation
specifically focuses on the intra-state conflict effects created by the formal iterative
networks illuminated in Perpetual Peace (1795) and the dynamic between formal
juridical networks in tension with each other as well as against and in concert with the
informal social networks alluded to in Metaphysics of Morals (1797).
In the praxis of intra-state demand vectors and governance, these dynamic
tensions both reflect the zeitgeist of the societal quantum state observed in a series of
moments, and, iteratively evoke adaptations by the participants to changing
circumstances and opportunities; further, these adaptations affect and operationalize
across the formal and informal networks  formed by an  elastic mesh of interests and
alliances.
Russett and Oneal explicitly acknowledge this lineage (2001:29), whereas the
general SCT literature, with key exceptions of Nawrath (2005) and Small (2009:235),
incorporates it more implicitly.
When interpolated,  Kant’s theme weaves  the informal  social network of rights
and obligations at the autonomous individual level (Rauscher, 2012), manifested within
social capital theory, with the version formally networked proposition of the DPT
(democracy + economic interchange + institutional participation) interlaced within
juridical-based governance structures to intrastate conflict.
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In the following two sections (Sections III & IV), I examine the Kantian formal
network concept at the interstate and intra-state levels, with particular attention to their
contribution to Russett  and  Oneal's democratic peace theory argument, and by
extension, relevance to the indications and warning of intra-state conflict. Likewise,
Section V examines the Kantian informal networks, operationalized as social capital
theory, again, focusing on the relevance to illuminating the indications and warning of
intra-state conflict.
Section III: Kantian Formal Networks At The International Level
This  investigation  proceeds  to an  examination of  an  application of  Kantian
Formal Networks, derived from Perpetual Peace, and operationalized as Democratic
Peace Theory (DPT) to determine whether the theory – specifically, concepts of a
particular version of that theory - provides explanatory value at the intrastate level in a
similar manner to the interstate level.9
Democratic peace as originally conceived by Immanuel Kant and further refined
by Russett and Oneal investigates a calculated equilibrium at the international level
formed by three critical factors,10 expressed as
• Level of internal democratic institutions, such as republican governance structure,
multiparty contested elections, broad opportunities for electoral and civic 
participation, and peaceful transitions of power
• Level of external economic interdependence
9 As detailed in Section I above, the scope of this investigation in no way encompasses an attempt to perform
an exhaustive examination of the merits of DPT in the macro interstate realm. These next few pages present a brief 
discussion to pin DPT in its place in the literature and stipulate the controversies concerning the permutation of DPT as
an IR theory. Section III discusses the applicability of DPT to intrastate conflict.
10 This is critical. Many other writers use only the “democracy” portion of DPT as the foundation 
for their analysis. I use the Russett–Oneal tripartite definition.
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• Level of participation in international institutions, such as international law and
international governmental and nongovernmental organizations
Note that this investigation builds off – but is not limited to - a particular variation
of DPT. Numerous other authors (Waltz, 1959; Small and Singer, 1976; Bremer,
1992; Russett, 1993) investigated other variations of DPT, generally focusing strictly
on the democracy aspect or the core contention that democracies almost never go to war
with each other.11 This epistemic stream devotes considerable resources in developing
arguments over whether democratic states all possess within their polities the
mechanisms and the experience of resolving disputes peacefully, contrasted with the
contention that authoritarian (autocratic) states intrinsically lack this capability to
achieve a sufficient degree of successful demand negotiation without devolving into
repression or conflict.12 Evolving Russett’s (1993) theory, the Triangulating Peace
version evolves and expands on the earlier singular DPT paradigm. Russett and Oneal
add Kant’s additional dimensions of economic interdependence and institutions,
generally unaccounted for within mainstream (non-tripartite) DPT.
The Russett–Oneal argument proceeds beyond simple scaled
democracy/autocracy, elevating to the equilibrium between relative levels of democracy,
economic interdependence, and  institutions all combined to ameliorate the drive for
conflict—and strength in one area can balance a weakness in the other. An autocratic
state may exhibit exceptional economic performance or a remarkable civil society
11 Russett, ibid.
12 Michael Corgan (Jan 28, 2015), based on a summary within email correspondence.
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construct that also  contributes  offsetting  vectors  to  ameliorate or  resolve  factional
grievances.
Using the tripartite vector model, we can assess each country in terms of its
relationship to other countries in both dyadic and systemic arrangements to determine the
likelihood of conflict. From there we can calculate the probability of mitigating conflicts
that invoke the lowest possible levels short of military involvement. Naturally, the dyads
and systemic analysis can also include commonsense factors, such as “are the countries in
the dyad actually connected in some way to present method, motive, and opportunity for
conflict?” In this manner, a dyad formed of Uganda and New Zealand presents a
prima facie presumption of peace as neither country lies within power projection
distance to the  other (Russett, 1993), nor do they tend to work within contiguous
systems for economic activity, unlike Israel and Syria, for example.
As described by Russett and Oneal, assessing each country according to the three
factors and in combination with the other countries assists determining the likelihood of
conflict, noting the reciprocal relationship between dyad scores and likelihood of conflict.
Although it is possible for a given country to score high enough on the economic
interdependence and international law factors to offset internal autocracy (e.g.,
China), evidence indicates that higher levels of democracy across both dyads and
systems reduce the chance for conflict due to the higher conflict thresholds inherent in a
democracy.
Russett and Oneal, building on Kant’s analysis, highlight the interwoven nature of
democracy to economic integration and institutional participation and the relationship to
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defining the ground state of the international system tending toward peace rather than
conflict. When a declaration of war requires 51% or more of a country’ voting population
or representatives to agree, the bar to entering into interstate conflict sits far higher than
for a singular dictator, or relatively small cabal to enter into a military conflict.
Further, a democracy also provides a mechanism to demand a quick resolution to a
conflict by the simple expedient of voting out the incumbent.
This does not imply that the other two factors create less impact on the
equilibrium; however, the theory at hand encompasses “democratic peace,” not
“economic peace” or “international law peace.” Indeed, Russett and Oneal go to great
lengths to demonstrate how economic interdependence and international law contributes
to the overall equilibrium in an interconnected and self-supporting model. Economic
interdependence lessens the  likelihood of conflict, as the business community is
unlikely to support military action against the other member of the dyad due to the
potential economic costs. Should the elites contravene the public  will or  fail to  meet
negotiated social contract expectations, democratic processes voice the expression of
constituents’ disapproval at the next election.
Further, greater participation in international institutions and international law
provides a multitude of avenues for both economic cooperation and conflict resolution
through formal and informal organizations at the lowest possible level, as well as
normalized social interactions that tend to increase recognition across countries. One only
need observe recent events to perceive international organizations enter the public
consciousness as valid arbiters of interaction, such as the North American Free Trade
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Agreement (NAFTA), World Trade Organization (WTO), International Criminal
Court (ICC), and notable international sporting authorities such as the World Baseball
Classic and International Federation of Football Association (FIFA) World Cup.
One of the strengths of democratic peace as an IR theory exemplifies the dialectic
evolution from predecessor theories such as the realism/neorealism of Machiavelli,
Morgenthau (1957*), Waltz (1959), and Krasner (1999). From that basis, DPT adds
Liberalism  or Complex Interdependence (Keohane and Nye, 1987) and incorporates
aspects of Structuralism (Martin and Simmons, 1998), culminating with elements of
Social Constructivism (Wendt, 2003; Reshaur, 1992).
While unlikely that an analytical construct such as DPT constitutes the “end of
[political]  history”  as  Fukuyama  (1989,  interpolating  Hegel)13 describes,  nor  quite  a
unified field theory of IR, by incorporating the strongest aspects of the precursor theories,
political scientists have a stronger tool to model empirical reality and provide sounder
policy advice to policy makers.
Conversely, as a relative newcomer onto the IR theory playing field, DPT remains
less accepted among policy makers, and faces opposition from scholars (Layne, Spiro,
and Owen, 1994) entrenched in other theories, thereby making application from theory
into policy problematic.
Of note, many countries do not score well on the democratic peace scale due to
one or more deficient factors, which drives up the probability of conflicts between
dyadic or even systemic members. As noted above, China scores well on economic
13 F. Fukuyama, "THE END OF HISTORY?" NATIONAL INTEREST 16 (1989): 3-18.
23
interdependence and support for international institutions; however, it is still a fairly
autocratic and repressive governance regime, as recent  events in Tibet and Hong Kong
demonstrate.
As noted in Russett and Oneal, the number of democracies, the global economy,
and proliferation of international institutions rose dramatically since 1945. Concurrently,
the number of international conflicts decreased while the number of civil wars increased,
resulting  in  countries  still  working  out  their  identity  and  grievances.  The  few
international  conflicts  that  recently  erupted  generally  lie  at  different  ends  of  the
democratic spectrum.
Examination of the Polity-IV data (CSP, 2014) indicates the international system
continues  to  evolve,  with  some  occasional  retrograde,  toward  democratic  parity.
Concurrently, “partly free” countries inject a level of uncertainty into the international
dynamic—in this manner, the security dilemma rears its ugly head.
Uncertainty breeds insecurity, which injects a tendency to revert to military means
of conflict resolution, which in turn prompts a mirrored response. As noted above, higher
levels of democracy provide a higher military threshold and a greater likelihood of
finding alternate crisis management options that can be reassuring to other dyad or
system members. By exercising democratic peace calculations, a political scientist can
evaluate the indications and warnings of potential conflict across a dyad or system
that contains “partly free” countries.
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Policy implications from DPT models may wield greater explanatory value and
provide more efficacious policy options toward the task of decreasing regional and global
conflicts.
Projecting forward, a political scientist in the western or OECD countries
applying a democratic peace model might advocate the following to create the
conditions for, or emphasize the comparative advantages of, democratic peace ideals
in the “partly free” countries,  and reinforce the  gains  already  accomplished in the
OECD countries:
• Increased reliance on the nonmilitary aspects of national power (i.e., P(m)ESII 
capabilities)
• Normalizing capabilities of international institutions in those same areas as agents
and external validations
Naturally, it follows that as the number of countries scoring well on the
democratic peace equilibrium rise, the web of interconnected and interdependent
economies lash their economic fates together and the international institutions filling
the seams and gaps between nations proliferate, and the nations of the world may
discover advantage in revisiting Kant’s idea of a global governance model. Such a
governance model provides the final spike in the heart of the realist’s treasured belief
concerning the anarchic (Wendt, 1992) nature of the international system.
The term degree merits additional exploration. Not all countries are equal to the
same level at each nexus; however, gains in relative strength of a given nexus may offset
the deficit in another. For example, compared with the United States, China displays
relatively low degree of democracy and a high degree of authoritarianism; however,
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it presents offsetting factors of institutional participation and economic interdependence
that tend to indicate that a China–US war is extremely unlikely now. However,
Russett and Oneal's research indicates that countries composed of mixed systems tend
to exhibit the highest degrees of instability and insecurity, which in turn increases the
probability of conflict.
The relationship of security and insecurity provides an interesting social and
political view of the causes of conflict when scrutinized for aggravating factors:
economic, ethnic, territorial, power, social, political, revenge, etc. Each of these factors
contributes to a polarizing effect on the security equilibrium. When appraising intrastate
security, one can use these factors to  examine whether internal faction A assesses the
security symmetry about their relationship across economic, security, grievances, etc.
with internal faction B.14 How secure or insecure are the factions across the multitude of
factors? What is the trend of the levels of security in that particular case? I can then
estimate that if the dynamic tension between the level of security as perceived by
faction A and faction B heads toward or reaches untenable levels, a crisis point
emerges, creating pressure for mediation from internal or  external mediators—or the
escalation toward conflict.
Given the expansion in the number of countries that score high on the democratic
peace scales since World War II, it is natural to wonder whether a correlation exists
between increases in these numbers compared with the reduction in the number of
14 For the purposes of most of my analyses, I define “security” as the difference “delta” (∆) 
between perceived current level of DIME/PMESII equilibrium compared with a collectively defined 
arbitrary benchmark of desired or acceptable levels of danger/safety, fear/calm, anxiety/tranquility, and 
despair/hope. We then observe the movement of that equilibrium, “theta” (θ), of that equilibrium over time 
(past to present, present to future) closer or farther away from that benchmark. 
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international conflicts. Likewise, if factions achieve high scores on the Kantian nexuses,
and the other factions indicate equivalent evolution in their nexuses, it follows that there
is greater security in the system as a whole; therefore, those aggravating factors have a
greater probability of finding resolution through the elements of democratic peace:
democracy, institutions, and economic interdependence. Studies by the Center for
International Development and Conflict Management tend to support this assessment.15 
Clearly, the data shows a telling correlation between the increase in the pervasive
nature of international institutions and the other elements of democratic peace as well as
the corresponding decrease in the incidents of international war. It certainly appears that
international decision points increasingly achieve arbitration through the democratic
peace mechanisms long before the use of force even develops into a course of action
seriously considered.
To illuminate the transition zone between interstate and intrastate, Buzan et.al.,
(1998) develop their Levels of Analysis concept that synthesizes across the spectrum, not
just relying on any single layer, whether state, institutions, or individuals.
Global Structures and Institutions
Regional and multinational Structures and institutions Inter-state
States/governance structures
Group/civil society, informal structures and sub-state institutions
Individuals
Intra-state
15 “CIDCM | Peace and Conflict | Home” [cited 2012]. Retrieved from 
http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/pc/.
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By expanding the focus dialectically, we perceive a richer horizontal and vertical
field of analysis to track changes in identity, preferences, norms, and demands, each
simultaneously resident within a layer, yet also generating effects vertically.
Now clearly there are initial parallels between this list and some aspects of
Skocpol’s (1979) Historical Structuralism, or Wallerstein’s (1998) World Systems
Analysis concepts, further intertwined with elements identified in experiential learning as
“Systems of Systems Analysis” (SOSA) (Allen, Sheckley, and Keeton, 1992), as well as
Holland's  Complex  Adaptive  Systems  concept. KANT also evolves from each
predecessor to show the integrated horizontal and vertical net that connects
individuals to organizations/institutions and governance structures.
In the SOSA model, following Almond’s (1990) concerns about viewing human
political behavior as reactive and Thelen and Steinmo’s closing discussion about agency
and choice, we may visualize the different layers of analysis possessing intertwined series
of OODA loops. Each series receives input and provides output in horizontal as well as a
fully integrated vertical flow such that each layer is able to transmit and receive to and
from all other levels and across the full PMESII (political, military, economic, social,
infrastructure, and information) lines of operation. The actors at each level are part of an
iterative spiral creating new norms, transmitting norms and demands from their own as
well as other levels, satisfying or rejecting demands, and manipulating symbols relevant
to their zone of influence.
In this evocation/transmission/satisfaction loop, by creating a delta between
an optimized decision and a “satisficed” (Simon, 1957:118) decision, we see that there is
28
room for the inclusion of not just economic needs, but across the full PMESII spectrum
whereby other factors can be accounted by acceptable risk that seem counter-intuitive
when viewed through a strictly rational-choice/economic lens.
Complex Adaptive Systems:
In our discussion of Kantian networks, we will later examine mechanisms (time,
conflict, center of gravity, etc.) through which social networks display adaptive behavior
to inputs and stressors. Such evolving critical functionality enables  operations within a
complex  adaptive  network  framework  of  interactivity  and  feedback.  Within  this
construct, elements within the larger network cooperate with, compete with, or confront
other elements at varying network distances and compositions to exchange information or
maximize goals. While an extensive discussion of Complex Adaptive Systems (CAS),
lies beyond the scope of this investigation, certain components merit introduction. 
CAS, introduced by Holland (1992:19) based upon his work in cyber networks,
biology and psychology, notes that complex networks display certain functions, namely
evolution  of  adaptations  from  past  outcomes,  aggregate  behavior  seeking  goal
maximization, and anticipation of alternative outcomes combined with game theorization
to project actions, inactions, and reactions of other network elements. Social networks
exhibit these functions, building upon an iterative series of interactions emanating from
the discrete elements within the network. 
Building upon Holland, Cilliers (1998:3-4) further clarified key characteristics of
CAS that possess relevance to this investigation:
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• The number of elements may be sufficiently large that conventional descriptions 
fail to adequately assist system analysis
• Elements within the network interact dynamically, and the interactions can be 
physical or information
• Such interactions are rich, i.e. any element or sub-system in the system is affected
by and affects several other elements or sub-systems
• Some interactions present non-linear effects: small changes in inputs, physical 
interactions or stimuli can cause large effects or very significant changes in 
outputs
• Interactions are primarily but not exclusively with immediate neighbors and the 
nature of the influence is modulated
• Any interaction performed can feed back onto itself directly or after a number of 
intervening lags and at varying qualities and quantities.
• Such systems may be open and it may be difficult or impossible to define system 
boundaries
• Complex systems operate under less than optimal equilibrium conditions. Energy 
must flow constantly to maintain system organization
• Complex systems possess history. They evolve and their past is co-responsible for
their present behavior
• Elements operate in ignorance of the behavior of the system as a whole, 
responding only to the information or physical stimuli available to them locally
Each of these CAS characteristics affect network elements within each country.
To  illuminate  the  effect  of  these  factors  on  the  centrifugal  or  centripetal  vectors
ameliorating  or  exacerbating  impetus  toward  intra-state  conflict,  this  investigation
examines some CAS mechanisms, including the downstream effect of factors, previous
conflict as a factor affecting future conflict, and the iterative dynamic across centers of
gravity for elements withing the social contract construct.
Again,  fully  investigating  CAS  within  the  context  of  intra-state  conflict  lies
beyond  our  scope,  however,  this  rich  and  interesting  framework  holds  potential  for
additional future research.
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The following sections describe the configuration space focusing on formal and
informal networks affecting the intra-state layers, the lower three levels, of the analytical
layers.
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Section IV: Formal Networks At The Intrastate Level
The question of whether democratic peace processes perform similar
arbitration/mediation functions at the intrastate level appears under-investigated as of this
writing. As noted above, Russett and Oneal's research indicates that countries composed
of mixed systems, those located within the intermediate ranges of the democracy-
autocracy spectrum, or those displaying antagonistic institutions, tend to exhibit the
highest degrees of instability and insecurity, which in turn increases the probability
of conflict at the interstate level. Moreover, we can certainly observe mixed systems
among those countries experiencing intrastate conflict (Marshall, 2008).
While a vast body of research examines democratic processes, institutional
mechanisms also encompass cooperative, coopetive, and competitive dynamics at both
inter and intra-state levels.
As we can see from Weber’s (1905) discussion of “Bureaucracy” and Pierson and
Skocpol (2002), institutions implement structural – network - formations at sub-state and
intra-state levels that evoked and transmitted norms and demands in political and social
contexts. In addition, institutions function in tying the actors to  path  dependence,
whereby actors’ choices devolved into narrowed ranges of options due to the
accumulated transaction and exit costs of previous decisions, as well as limitations upon
the breadth of possibilities of courses of action.
There is of course the debate concerning the interchangeability of  the terms
“institutions” and “organizations” Martin and Simmons (1998) make a case for
delineation of “institutions” as larger, broad, conceptual constructs, such as the
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financial institution,  and use of the term “organization” to denote specific corporate
entities, such as the UN, American Legion, Citibank, etc. To the maximum extent
possible, I intend to follow this ontology.
Yet,  Weber’s  bureaucratic  “Iron  Cage”  shows  the  perversity  of  institutions
simultaneously acting to restrict the breadth and transmission rate of norms and demands
by constraining the conceptualization of ideas through sub-optimal and pre-formatted
language within its area of jurisdiction. As Orwell (1946, 1993) notes, by controlling the
language, an entity such as a government or institution maintains limits and controls on
the expression of ideas. Further, bureaucracies either intentionally or unintentionally
degrade public access to mechanisms of redress or demand transmission through a
multitude of horizontal and vertical layering with no clearly identifiable navigation.
Mancur Olson’s (1971) investigations into collective action highlights groups that
coalesce for some other benefit, such as labor issues, or commonality of experience, such
as veterans groups, in turn create mechanisms exerting normative and resource pressure
onto governance structures, as well as create negotiation pressure for provision of group
economic benefits such as reduced insurance rates or tariff loopholes. As these groups
grow in size, they create additional bureaucratic layers of management – and in some
cases create seeds from which rebellion germinates.
At the supranational level, Keohane and Nye (1984) provided additional
perspectives underscoring the role of the institutions at the supra-state and sub-state levels
to support and facilitate the growing web of economic development based on
international trade.
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A rich body of research (e.g., Keck and Sekkink, 1998) highlights the power of
institutions and their component organizations in the age of globalization. Additionally,
some publicists, such as March and Olsen (1984), and Weingast (2002) revisited the
institutional/structural model examining institutions as an actor in the governance
process.
Institutions permeate the spectrum above the level of the individual, providing
evocation and conduits for preferences, norms, needs, and demands in both formal and
informal contexts. In some cases, organizations provide quasi-government functionality
such as health care and education in cases where a government has abrogated its
responsibility, or in the case of trade regimes, institutions provide governance capabilities
in the supra-national environment lacking a legitimate governance structure.
Perversely, in addition to the constraining pressure noted above, these institutions
potentially thwart the development of juridical governance once they become entrenched,
presenting a fait accompli that requires intense political capital to overcome
One  critical aspect  of  Russett  and  Oneal's interstate argument exceeds the
capabilities of this investigation, namely the dyad relationship bears additional research
to obtain the DPT/SCT granularity at the intra-state level. Conceivably, were social,
political, economic, and institutional data available across these regions or divisions, a
more nuanced comparative analysis is possible.
For example, both of the case study countries (Kenya and Syria) comprise a
number of regions or administrative divisions, with Syria comprising 14 districts, and
34
Kenya, 7  administrative regions. Dyad analysis would create 94 Syrian domestic
dyads, and 27 Kenyan domestic dyads.
However, few countries maintain the internal level of detail or consistency
wherein analysis of that discrete data potentially provides insight and trend analysis to
determine internal DPT relationships and resiliency level of those relationships.
Therefore, as consistent data exists at the country level within the Fragile State Index,
for the purpose of this investigation, I intend to limit the focus to a country level index
and analyze changes in time-series to extract indications and warning of conflict.
To be clear, this investigation initially focuses the Kantian Formal
Networks’ Triangulating Peace DPT argument down to the intrastate level and then
builds from that base. As noted above, I contend that a state exhibiting a robust and
resilient equilibrium between levels of democracy, levels of domestic economic
interdependence, levels of participation in domestic institutions, and a strong vibrant
social construct may more adroitly withstand systemic shocks that lead to civil war
than a state with a fragile, brittle balance between those factors.
It is that resilient-vs-brittle equilibrium built upon a democracy/autocracy
foundation driving whether the citizens and governance opt to continue to work within
the social contract that they negotiate with each other or whether they allow the
tectonic pressures to drive them to seek grievance resolution through conflict.
In a preliminary incarnation of this investigation (Sullivan, 2013) I examined
election turnouts (as proxy for democracy), domestic hotel check-ins (as proxy for
domestic economic interchange,  and football/soccer club  participation (as proxy for
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domestic institutional participation) for five countries, including Germany, Bosnia,
Kenya, Turkey, and Syria. Using a scaled value methodology, a clear pattern developed,
providing potential indications of a country’s capability for resilience to stress across the
DPT factors in time series, and conflict floors indicating an elevated propensity to
degenerate into conflict as the DPT nexus degrades.
Building on those observations, this investigation presents an initial challenge:
Does DPT provide explanatory value toward providing indications and warning of
impending conflict at the intrastate level? By adding elements of SCT (Putnam, 2002),
can I intercalate international institutions with domestic societal networks, as intrastate
dynamics hold more social dependence than international relations?
Once measured, can I determine what mix of DPT and SCT elements holds
significance in maintaining a country’s resilience? If DPT/SCT is not explanatory in a
given case, can I examine why those intrastate factions in the mixed-system states cannot
attain acceptable levels of security and an arbitrational outlet internal to a country,
leading to resolution of their grievances through factional war?
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Section V: Kantian Informal Networks
This investigation now proceeds to an examination of an application of Kantian
Informal Networks, initiated in Metaphysics of Morals, and operationalized as Social
Capital Theory (SCT) to determine whether the theory provides explanatory value at the
intrastate level.
War, like politics (Clausewitz, 1873) is a human activity, and the logic that a real-
estate maxim of “location, location, location” so simply explains a nation’s fate fails to
persuade. As we shall observe in the next section, although Goldstone et al. (2010)
achieved high correlations to conflict with infant mortality, “bad neighbors,” etc., these
are generally factors providing  little,  if  any,  bearing on  human agency as a  factor in
conflict.
The human dynamic as noted by Wendt (1999) and Lichbach and Zuckerman
(1997) as well as the social institutionalism of Hall and Taylor (1996) provide a
counterbalance within the state – institution relationship. This cultural layer injects
reminders to ensure that analysis and action begins with the individual. Too often
political scientists treat states and institutions as actors independent of the people who
work in those offices.
As Jackson (2002)16, Hall and Taylor (1996), and Thelen and Steinmo (1992)
emphasize, reified institutions, organizations, and states do not make decisions, people
do.  The human-in-the-loop  nature of all transactions, whether active decisions or
Immergut’s (1990) counter-balancing ‘veto points” requires the balancing of preference,
16 Jackson (2002) wryly reminds us that: “States are people.”
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norms, needs, and demands at the varying levels of analysis – but the decision maker is
always an actual person. That person may well make decisions to support themselves, or
their organizational or bureaucratic mission, and those organizations might have juridical
identity but the consequences and responsibilities for that decision falls upon the
individual.
We further perceive the connection between the human agency driving conflict in
Skocpol (1979, and Gregor, 2014), wherein she examines and rejects four major groups
of social theories of revolution and then advocates for a fifth.
The first, classic Marxist theory evolves out of dialectic structural conflicts
between the production-sector and class-based property owners. The second, aggregate-
psychological theory claims oppositional movements form through the participants’
psychological motivations informing beliefs concerning social-contract legitimacy. A
third, system/value consensus theory asserts political violence results from the actions of
ideological movements responding to socio-economic fractures. The fourth, political-
conflict theory argues participants cannot engage in political action until they achieve a
certain minimum level of organization and resource accumulation.
Skocpol rejects all these theories as they all argue from a manufactured crisis
position. She then argues for a structural approach to revolutions, noting that combination
of domestic and international relationships of the state and the state’s response to the
demands and crises determine whether the regime maintains the support of key elites to
suppress conflict, regardless of the acquiescence or support from the popular majority.
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To some extent, these theories inform the iterations in the center of gravity
analysis in  Chapter  4  and  inform analysis concerning  variance  in  the  conflict factor
“fingerprint.”
Historically, Small (2009:235) notes the extended lineage of Social Capital
reaches back to Kant, therefore, in addition to the formal network analysis (DPT), I
opted to add Kantian Informal Networks, operationalized as Social Capital Theory, as a
line of inquiry to this investigation to examine their explanatory value toward intra-state
conflict. While in-depth examination of the history and permutations of SCT lies beyond
the  scope  of  this investigation, a review of the conceptual archaeology assists in
understanding the relationship of social capital to the centrifugal and centripetal vectors
affecting intra-state conflict – and thus drives the assessment of FSI factors as proxies in
developing indications and warning of such conflict.
Kantian Informal Networks builds on Kant’s long-running dialogue with
Achenwall17 (Kant 1795, 1797; Achenwall, 1768; Nawrath 2005; Rauscher, 2012)
concerning the boundaries, rights, freedoms, and responsibilities of persons and
groups inhabiting or transitioning between the state18 of nature, the ‘private state’
(alternately, Achenwall’s19 ‘social state’), and, ultimately, the juridical or civil state.
This dialogue culminates in Metaphysics of Morals, wherein Kant reluctantly
17 Alternately, KANT could parse out as Kant-Achenwall Networks Theory
18 Meaning “condition,” as in states of matter. Without diverting into a complete exposition on 
Kant, in Morality he seems to follow a model of hierarchies of state, asserting that juridical or civil states 
become elevated in a Platonic sense, rising closer to a more perfect condition.
19 Achenwall, G., Ius Naturae, 1768; “Since each human holds happiness closely, all {humans} 
are of united strength to pursue mutually shared happiness and thus naturally bound to become a universal 
society. Therefore all duties tend toward others and consequently those are of necessary {meant} as social 
thought, it is clear that the obligations and the duties of necessity, can be regarded as the perfect law of 
obligations” Translated from Latin, 2015 by Dennis Sullivan
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acknowledges the impact and necessity of small groups forming families and societies,
yet existing in a state of nature under a system of private rights (Ebels-Duggan, 2012).
However, he  carefully caveats recognition and levying importance to these groupings
and their internal and external relationships until such  time as they achieve a form of
juridical  structure  through publicly  enforced  norms of property  and  obligation  rights
(claims) becoming law, and thus transition from the state of nature into civil society.20
The  modern  concept  of  social  capital emerged more  fully  from Tocqueville
(1835) and Durkheim (1893) concerning the strength and resilience of informal and
formal civil society structures. The term achieved generalized consciousness when
Hanifan (1916, 1920) coined the phrase “social capital” to describe the symbiotic
relationship between the individual and those non-governance civil society elements
providing social benefits, transmission of demand signals, and recognition of mutual
interests. Similarly, future publicists asserted that social capital develops from the
network of cooperative relationships between citizens that facilitates resolution of
collection action problems (Coleman, 1988; Putnam, 1993).
Small (2009:6-7) further acknowledges the social capital theory contributions of
Bourdieu (1977, 1986), Coleman (1988) and Lin (2001) noting their development of a
formalized social network analysis theory and praxis. These works culminate in a
description of four crucial social capital resource types invested in and leveraged across
social  networks: information, influence over people, social  credentials,and the psycho-
social reinforcements provided by and leveraged through these networks.
20 Metaphysics of Morals § 22 & 41
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More relevant to this investigation, Putnam (2002:11), echoing Waltz (1959) and
contemporaneous with Hedges (2002), highlights the relationship of war to social
conflict, noting the “bonding/bridging” function of war to social capital.
Of interest, Putnam’s “bonding/bridging” function, further explored and amplified
through the civil/uncivil/formal/soft spectrum matrix of social capital (Perez-Diaz, in
Putnam, 2002:245-287), also creates an opportunity to examine social capital from the
causative perspective as well as an iterative cause and result of conflict.
Brehm and Rahn (1997) observe the reciprocal relationship between community
involvement and trust in others places social capital at the individual action and cognitive
levels. The scale of social capital reflects the participant’s psycho-social involvement
with their communities, inherent cognitive abilities, economic resources, and overall
satisfaction and quality of interactions, which affects trust in their local society and
national institutions.
This trust spectrum drives participation in the formation, normalization, and
operationalization of Communities of Practice as well as the boundary edges creating
transitory inclusion/exclusion zones between the communities. (Lave and Wenger, 1991)
that in turn foster the development of conflict trajectories discussed above in Skocpol.
Henri and Pudelko (2003) refine this discussion by observing the relationship
between communities of interest and communities of practice. Of interest for analyzing
the development of center of gravity analysis in potential conflict environment, they
further assess that communities of interest/practice may well be local, global, and/or
virtual, and combinations thereof. Interpolating Parsa (2000), these communities of
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interest/practice inject an iterative dynamic during the grievance and alliance formation
phase of impending conflict, as well as the decisive phase of engaged conflict. In a
variety of cases, what external actors perceive as intra-state conflict, upon examination,
deconstructs into a series of micro inter-group conflicts.
At the quantitative level, Lee, Jeung, and Chae (2011) attempt to overcome
criticisms that the difficulty in creating measurement of social capital therefore degrades
its value in providing empirical insight. In response, they develop a broad measure of
social capital, incorporating four major components: trust, norms, networks, and social
structure. Employing data measurements of these types of social capital, they
constructed an index of social capital for 72 countries by extracting the principal
components from 44 variables.21
From the Kantian foundation, the relevance of social capital resource types across
the informal network lends corroboration to inclusion of social capital as a variable for
analysis. Lee, Jeung, and Chae’s model further highlights necessity for quantifiable social
capital factors in this investigation.
21 Interestingly, as a side analysis I performed a regression analysis on Lee’s index against the 
master conflict data from Chapter III, developing an R2 of .13 with significance, approximately one half of 
the R2 result achieved using the SCT components of the Fragile State Index, at R2 = .22
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Section VI: The Deeper Literature Archaeology
Scholarship at the nexus of DPT, SCT, intrastate/civil war, and the FSI appears
rare22 to nonexistent as of this writing. However, this investigation does not exist in a
complete vacuum. Numerous publicists address the range of discrete components
synthesized into this investigation, but addressing that full range of publications far
exceeds the scope and limits of this investigation. The following subsections provide a
high-level review of selected relevant publicists, broken down in the broad categories of
DPT and the FSI.23
DPT:
Building on the concept of DPT/SCT in specific relation to intrastate conflict
presents a challenge, yet the challenge appears to have few direct takers to date. DPT
literature—specifically Russett and Oneal's interpretation of Kant’s triangular structure of
democracy, economic interdependence, and institutions—presents limited investigations
into DPT’s explanatory value for intrastate conflict (likewise for SCT). Investigations
into DPT’s explanatory value in interstate conflict abound, but that line of investigation
remains outside the scope of this particular investigation.
Although Bremer, Regan, and Clark (2003) recommend that intrastate
conflict warrant inclusion in an ontological process examined through multiple
analytic perspectives, including DPT, an initial review of the DPT/SCT literature
presents limited investigations into exploring whether DPT/SCT provides explanation
22 One possible candidate paper by Lochard, I. V. (2008) remains under embargo, so unable to 
determine applicability beyond the public abstract.
23 AKA Failed State Index.
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of conflict at the intrastate level. For example, Davenport and Armstrong (2004)  look
specifically  at  effects of democratization on internal repression. Likewise, Sow and
Davoodi (2008) perform a case study on democracy and peace in Zimbabwe.
However, as with most of the few other authors discovered to date, they tend to
focus solely on the effects of democracy and democratic pressures on the regime,
excluding the economic and institutional factors critical to Russett and Oneal's analysis.
Similarly, other  authors  focus  on  economic (Boix,  2008)  or institutional  issues
(Auerswald, 1999) to the exclusion of examining democracy factors.
Likewise, the broader intrastate conflict literature tends to focus on discrete areas
of analysis that peripherally touch on a DPT/SCT-based analysis. Given the myriad of
permutation  of  conflict  and  conflict’s  predecessor  conditions,  I  contend  uni-variate
analysis falls short in providing global explanatory value.
Collier and Hoeffler (2000, 2004), and later Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009)
initiate their inquiries by exploring how demands and opportunism tie to economic and
grievance resolution; however, their investigation ultimately presents economic  decline
as more significant than grievance. Boix (2008) further reinforces economic factors
contributing to civil war and other politicized violence, especially in areas of high
inequality and predominantly agrarian economies. As we shall appreciate in Chapter 3,
my results, derived from both univariate and several multivariate analyses generally
favor Group Grievance over  economic causes when focusing on singular explanations,
however provide some slight buttress to the economic argument in the flash-to-bang
model with economic factors alternating prominence with group grievance depending on
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the analysis performed. While interesting, this range of results, depending on the
analytical method, lends credence to a optimizing for a multivariate approach, rather
than creating a competitive environment among univariate  analysis enthusiasts (Ward,
et. al., 2010).
Additionally, Arnson and Zartman (2005), Kalyvas (2006), and Evans (2006) all
highlight that intrastate conflict erupts through the influence of a web of vectors unique to
each country, a factor fingerprint, creating a dilemma for univariate-centric analysis
seeking global explanatory value. Poverty might hold potency in Country A, yet registers
as irrelevant in Country B. Thus, I contend an adaptable taxonomy across all FSI
factors provides flexible explanatory options at both country and global systemic levels.
Walter (2004) analyzes conflict itself as a contributing factor, although she notes
that even though earlier conflict possibly will inject higher propensity for a later conflict,
it is not necessarily determinant. To explore the impact of previous conflict, I incorporate
an examination of downstream conflict effects in Chapter 3.
A smaller group of publicists pursues multivariate investigations. Goldstone et al.
(2010) posits a multivariate model; however, their analysis uses only a single DPT
element, type of democracy, combined with infant mortality, location near other conflict
countries, and state-led discrimination to predict intrastate conflict. Of interest, none
of the other tested and rejected variables24 encompasses democratic peace, only one
touches social capital vectors, nor does the FSI reflect these variables directly.
24 Goldstone, ibid, p. 207
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As Goldstone et al. notes25 , a majority of the variables typically used by
political scientists to explain intrastate conflict remain outside the realm of factors that
policy changes can affect in the short term, such as terrain and resource endowments.
This highlights an important area for potential research. As intrastate conflicts
involve the decisions and actions of a country’s residents that tend toward resolution
or conflict, I contend that an examination should focus on factors under the direct or
second order control of the residents, or at least proxies for those factors.
Fearon and Laitin (2003) examine a wider scope of factors in close equivalence to
DPT factors. Ultimately, they conclude that poverty, a large population, and instability-
are effective predictors of which countries are at risk for civil war than are indicators of
ethnic and religious diversity or measures of grievances such as economic inequality,
dearth of democracy or civil liberties, or state discrimination against minority religions
or languages. (Fearon & Laitin, 2003:88).
In DPT/FSI terms, their findings present in favor of Poverty - Economic Decline
and Demographic Pressures over Group Grievance, Legitimacy of the State, Human
Rights, or Uneven Development, which partially aligns with my results as perceived in
Chapter 3.
Hegre (2014) revisits democracy, economic development, and socioeconomic
factors in a literature meta-analysis encompassing both inter- and intrastate conflict,
concluding with a recommendation to examine the dynamics between socioeconomic
changes, institutional changes, and the incentives for the use of political violence.
25 Goldstone, ibid, p. 205
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Therefore, a more comprehensive examination utilizing the full calculus of
DPT/SCT (democratic, economic, and institutional and/or social capital) to determine
the applicability of DPT/SCT on internal relationships and political vectors would
provide a richer understanding of the mechanisms of intrastate conflict resolution. In
addition, such an investigation potentially provides illumination of potential
breakdowns in those resolution mechanisms at the intra- and interstate levels.
FSI:
Many of the works reviewed in the course of this investigation, especially those
developing focus on a particular cause of intrastate conflict, develop their arguments in a
general framework of gathering data across multiple vectors, controlling for various
factors depending on the particular hypothesis, and then building models of varying
complexity to isolate univariate explanatory factors. Such is the case with Collier and
Hoeffler (2000, 2004), and Collier, Hoeffler and Rohner (2009). However, the
initial results of this investigation tend to illustrate the answer more likely lies in the
infamous “D: all of the above.”
The road to war, as Parsa (2000) and Kalyvas (2006) perceives, relies on
interactions of a multitude of factors, some mitigating, and some aggravating. Moreover,
observing the Arab Spring eruptions, the proximate spark for conflict frequently emerges
from an unexpected direction whose fine granularity lies far below the level revealed
through most data streams. Nevertheless, analyzing these data streams can highlight the
change(s) in conditions across multiple factors optimizing a fecund environment for
conflict.
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In this investigation, the multivariate “competitive advantage” lies with
employing the FSI26 in providing democracy, economic, institutional, and social
factors in one dataset:
• Social: Demographic Pressures, Group Grievance, Refugees and IDPs, Human
Flight, Factionalized Elites
• DPT economic interchange: Uneven Development, Poverty and Economic 
Decline
• DPT democracy: Legitimacy of the State
• DPT domestic institutions: Public Services, Human Rights, Security Apparatus, 
Factionalized Elites
• Other: External Intervention
Fund for Peace already performed the heavy lifting on amalgamating data sources
encompassing up to 14 sub-factors for each of the 12 FSI factors. Yet, utilizing the FSI
presents a disadvantage in that there is no way to “look under the hood” at the underlying
data and the calculations/weights used to determine each of the index scores.27
Although an extensive and rich list of researchers reference the FSI in either
incarnation28, a sizable majority of those references simply consist of noting that a given
country ranked at a certain level—or changed ranking from year to year, or, in the case of
Krasner (2010:10), observing that certain level within the ranking system—comprises a
grouping of interest.
Deeper analysis of the FSI itself appears limited to Berea, Twardy, and Maxwell
(2013) who employ the FSI in a Bayesian network featuring crowdsourced
26 http://ffp.statesindex.org/indicators.
27 "CAST Conflict Assessment Framework Manual | The Fund for Peace " [cited 2014]. Available
from http://library.fundforpeace.org/cfsir1418.
28 Failed State Index (2005-2012) or Fragile State Index (2013-current)
48
information marketplace probabilities to predict future FSI changes. This Bayesian
area of inquiry possibly will hold promise for follow-on research.
On a core FSI level, Carlsen and Brüggemann (2013, 2014) present their
application of mathematical techniques, partial-order methodology, and weighted-
sum/bias-free sensitivity, respectively, to the FSI dataset. Of interest, their results (2013)
from partial-order analysis, namely, determination of high importance of Human Flight,
Group Grievance, and Poverty and Economic Decline approximate the results that
I achieve in Chapter 3, with the exception of Human Flight. Similarly, their
sensitivity method (2014) assesses Human Flight as most critical, a result to which I do
not concur.
As of this writing, the combination of FSI in the context of formal or informal
networks as well as FSI in context of intrastate/civil war appears to be an under
explored analytical avenue. Use of the FSI as a variable regressed against another
dataset appears limited to Piazza’s (2008) investigation into the relationship between
failed states and terrorism. In the course of this investigation, he employs the FSI
ranking system as an independent variable to correlate exploitation of a negative
binomial regression against the (now-defunct) Memorial Institute for the Prevention of
Terrorism database29 to establish that higher rankings on the FSI correlate with higher
incidents of terrorism.
29 "START.umd.edu " [cited 2015]. Available from http://www.start.umd.edu/.
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Section VII: Methodology
Conceptual Goals:
In the endeavor to examine conflict development in context of human social and
cognitive activity, I constructed KANT as a theoretical framework to facilitate
examination within structured boundaries and provide explanatory value toward
understanding and potentially ameliorating intra-state conflict, while conforming to the
definition proffered by Schafersman (1997):
“A scientific theory is a unifying and self-consistent explanation of
fundamental natural processes or phenomena that is totally constructed of
corroborated hypotheses.”
To determine my measure of effectiveness (Mullen, 2011) achieving the goal of
developing a valid theory, therefore this investigation serves a tertiary purpose, namely to
subject KANT to validity testing as a theory, within the parameters provided by Popper’s
(1963) and Chaffee and Berger’s (1987:104) criteria30 to define a valid theory. As
measures of performance, during the course of this investigation, does KANT:
• Exhibit explanatory power? Does it offer plausible explanations for the 
phenomena and the range of phenomena it seeks to explain?
• Provide predictive power? Can KANT suggest future events or outcomes?
• Offer parsimony or simplicity in its explanatory power?
• Possess falsifiability?
• Present internal consistency?
• Present as heuristically provocative?
• Demonstrate organizing power?
See Chapter 5 for the assessment of this validity testing
30 Interpreted through Davie’s "Tests for a Theory | Mass Communication Theory " May 25, 2010
[cited 2015]. Available from http://masscommtheory.com/2010/05/25/test-for-a-theory/.
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Hypotheses:
Therefore, within the context of a valid theory, this dissertation documents my
investigation into the question of human agency, specifically the adaptive networks, as a
critical factor in the phenomenon of intrastate conflict. In the next chapter, I conduct a
case analysis to gain some understanding of the global conflict environment and then
apply those data in case studies focusing on all four factors of KANT operationalized as
DPT/SCT in the context of human agency contributing to internal political risk and the
road to intrastate war.
To accomplish this task, I intend to test the following initial hypotheses31:
• H1: Do democratic peace vectors provide a statistically significant explanation of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
• H2: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors provide a
statistically significant explanation of human agency in contributing to or 
preventing intrastate conflict?
• H0: There is no link between intrastate conflict and human agency (DPT or SCT)
factors.
Analytical Approach:
In keeping with an ecumenical approach to quantitative and case analysis, Gerring
(2007),  building  upon  King  et.  al.,  (1994),  presents  the  efficacy  of  making  use  of
quantitative analysis to guide case selection.
To that end, I decided to establish a global baseline drawing on quantitative
analysis in order to test my hypotheses concerning expected significance of democratic
31 National Academy of Sciences, Science, and Creationism: A View from the National Academy
of Sciences, Second Edition, (Washington, DC: The National Academies Press, 1999). Hypothesis: A 
testable provisional statement about the world leading to deductions. Once verified, deductions increase the
probability that the hypothesis is correct. If the deductions are incorrect, the original hypothesis can be 
abandoned or modified. Hypotheses can be used to build more complex inferences and explanations.
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peace and social capital factors as indications and warning of conflict and establish
significance of the variables. Following identification, I then reduce my analysis to an
investigation of the most critical factors across a multivariate environment.
For the case-study portion of this project, I opted to use a baseline state that
exhibits a transition into civil war during the investigation period, and for comparison,
one that is constantly stable yet presents indicators of potential conflict.
Under those criteria, my baseline state is Syria. During the 1982-2011 time-
frame, Syria presented as a relatively stable country and then collapsed into civil war in
2011. To that purpose, I examined the 2008-2013 FSI,32 which ranks countries against a
normalized set of 12 criteria. Based on the FSI rankings, Syria consistently ranked as a
weak but stable country; however, 2011 saw a marked deterioration as conflict erupted.
To determine the comparative case study, I sought a country that would provide a
manageable, but interesting, dataset for comparison. This country met the following
criteria: I required a country that ranked worse than Syria, yet avoided falling into civil
war during the data window; this is critical, as I am not just researching intrastate
conflict but also investigating opportunities and policy options to avoid conflict. To
determine conflict status, I then added the conflict data from Uppsala’s UCDP datasets.
Through initial analysis, including regression, ANOVA, and F tests, the country
meeting these criteria is Kenya: Kenya consistently ranks worse than Syria on the FSI, is
not in a measurable conflict, and consistently ranks in the top 10 when I ran statistical
similarity tests (F test) compared with an average or median country already in a state of
32 Fund For Peace, “The Fragile States Index 2013,” The Fund for Peace (2013).
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war. By many accounts, Kenya should be in a state of war, but so far, it has avoided
falling into conflict.
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CHAPTER THREE: QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS 
In this chapter, to test my initial and follow-on hypotheses, I perform a series of
statistical analyses on the FSI as independent variables against the UDCP Master Conflict
data as dependent variable.
Section I: Description Of Quantitative Data Selection And Analysis
Sources: 
For  this  particular  research,  and  in  keeping  with  an  ecumenical  approach  to
quantitative and qualitative analysis (Gerring, 2007), it was necessary to first establish a
global  baseline  applying  quantitative  analysis.  First,  in  order  to  test  my  hypotheses
concerning expected significance of DPT and SCT factors as indications and warning of
conflict, I sought to establish significance of the variables and then reduce my analysis to
an investigation of the most critical factors across a multivariate environment. 
I  faced  an  immediate  challenge  of  finding  a  dataset  with  enough  breadth  to
provide global data points that spanned the investigation’s focus on democratic peace and
social  capital  variables  as  well  as  a  broad  range  of  other  variables  for  comparison
purposes. It also became clear that time is a factor in the iterative nature of conflict and
conflict resolution; therefore, I required a dataset spanning multiple years.
Information Cutoff: 
Despite interesting events occurring in the world last year (CY 2014), such as the
advent of the Ukrainian civil war, I decided on a data cutoff of CY 2013 in order to keep
my two main data sources – the Fund for Peace’s (FFP’s) FSI and the UCDP conflict
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datasets – synchronized. The conflict dataset at the time of retrieval did not yet include
the CY 2014 data.
Tools: 
Given the multitude of statistical tools available, I opted to try several statistical
tools33 to compare ease of use, breadth of features, and usability of results.34 
In most cases, I performed calculations in JMP and processed the results in Excel
to create the tables used in this investigation. I performed the more esoteric calculations
such as Granger Causality or SEM in Stata or XLSTAT. Again, I processed results in
Excel for interoperability with Microsoft Word.
Caveat About Statistical Analysis Tools: 
For  my  purposes,  pushing  the  boundaries  of  the  application  of  statistics  lies
beyond  the scope of  this  investigation.  Although I  will  attempt  to  use  some second-
generation  techniques  in  the  latter  sections  of  this  paper,  all  statistical  functions  are
“stock” functions incorporated in the various packages listed above with no modifications
from the default settings. I therefore stipulate definitions of the statistical processes, such
33 Beyond the rights conferred within the EULA, I am not claiming any rights to these programs. All 
trademarks remain the property of their respective owners. Mention or use in this investigation does not 
constitute endorsement. 
34 For this project, I used:
• Microsoft Excel 2013 with Data Analysis pack installed offers very basic features, but features 
excellent integration across the Microsoft Office suite.
• Minitab is good for basic analysis and provides many templated analytic processes. It is 
moderately priced at $59 for a 1-year academic license.
• XLSTAT – a Visual Basic add-on using Excel as its core: XLSTAT is easy to use and holds a 
wide array of features, including structural equation modeling (SEM); however, it is 
comparatively expensive – even the student version is $400.
• JMP by SAS holds a wide breadth of features within limits (no SEM, e.g.). It features a generally 
intuitive interface for ease of use; however, results are nested inside multiple drop-down menus. It 
is free to students when available under university bulk purchase.
• Stata is very powerful with extensive features, but it is not intuitive for non-statistics experts. It is 
moderately priced at around $100 per year for student license.
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as linear and logistic regression, multivariate, vector auto-regression, etc. as understood
in common social science usage and consistent with the help features of each program.
There  possibly  will  be  superior  ways  to  perform  the  analyses  described  in  this
investigation;  however,  follow-on  investigations  provide  the  optimal  venue  for
exploration of those options. Any errors in calculations are mine. 
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Section II: Variables
Independent Variables:
As noted above, I sought a dataset that encompassed as many DPT (democracy,
economic interdependence, institutional participation) and social capital vectors within a
manageable dataset array. Following research into a number of independent data sources
and indices (Marshall,  2008; Ziaja,  2012),  I  opted to  use the FSI.  The FSI,  formerly
known as the Failed States Index, is a production of the FFP.35
Through  FFP’s  Conflict  Assessment  System  Tool  (CAST)  program,  the  FFP
accumulates  and  analyzes  a  large  array  of  data  sources  including  governmental,
nongovernmental,  and  supra-governmental  datasets,  news  reports,  and  academic
resources. In most cases, these far exceeded the data sources and access available to me.
In this case, the FFP provides value added through use of a proprietary algorithm based
on analysis of the data sources for relevance to the factors, adjusts for weights, and adds a
level of subjective analysis to produce a normalized set of indices across 12 indicators,
with up to 14 sub-indicators in each category. 
In the FSI, factors are scaled on a 1-10 basis, with the lower limit of the scale
tending toward stability and the higher limit tending toward fragility or failing on the
basis of graded criteria specific to each factor (see below for evaluation criteria for each
factor). Thus, states with higher scores are in greater danger of failure and collapse into
crisis and conflict. 
35 An independent, nonpartisan, nonprofit research and educational organization who states that they 
work to prevent violent conflict and promote sustainable security.
57
Table 1 shows a sample of the FSI scores for Kenya during the 2009-2013 time-
frame.
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Kenya.2009 9.0 9.0 8.6 8.3 8.8 7.5 9.0 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.8 8.2
Kenya.2010 9.1 8.7 8.9 7.9 8.7 7.4 9.3 8.1 8.0 7.5 8.7 8.4
Kenya.2011 8.8 8.5 8.7 7.6 8.5 7.0 8.9 7.8 7.7 7.9 8.8 8.5
Kenya.2012 8.9 8.4 8.9 7.7 8.2 7.3 8.6 8.1 7.4 7.6 9.0 8.4
Kenya.2013 9.1 8.7 9.0 7.8 8.3 7.6 8.3 8.1 7.1 8.1 9.0 8.5
Table 1: FSI Example: Kenya 2009-2013
In  this  particular  example,  we perceive  that  during  the  CY 2009-2013 period
Kenya  improved in Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Human Flight,
Uneven Development,  Legitimacy of the State,  and Human Rights but  deteriorated in
Demographic  Pressures,  Group  Grievance,  Poverty  and  Economic  Decline,  Public
Services, Security Apparatus, Factionalized Elites, and External Intervention.
Of  particular  interest,  the  FFP’s  FSI  dataset  spans  the  periods  CY  2005  (77
countries), CY 2006 (146 countries), and CY 2007-2014 (177 countries); however, as
noted above, my information cutoff is CY 2013. From a research perspective, there is
some risk in sourcing a nontransparent data source as independent variables; however,
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noting Ziaja (2012) and Carlsen and Brüggemann (2014), I judged that I might be able to
identify any major inconsistencies through statistical analysis. More critically, the FSI, to
a  greater  degree  than  any  of  the  alternates,  spans  a  variety  of  social,  institutional,
economic,  governance,  and  external  intervention  indices;  covers  the  necessary  time
frame; maintains an acceptable internal statistical cohesion (primary component analysis
and multidimensional scaling); and provides a broad range of variables and observations
for statistical analysis.
To prepare the data for analysis, I first combined the data (available in .xls format
for 2007-2013 and imported via web page tables for 2005-2006) from each year’s Index,
spanning  CY  2005-2013,  arranged  by  year  and  country.  As  different  FFP  editors
apparently  favored  alternate  country  name  spellings  over  the  years,  I  converted  the
country names to consistent spellings across all years. 
As noted in the previous paragraph, CY 2005 (77 countries) and CY 2006 (146
countries) lack data and entries for a large group of countries included in the subsequent
years. As we will appreciate during statistical analysis, this disparity injects some error
into the regressions.  Consequently,  in some operations I opted to remove those years
from the analysis.
Additionally, the secession of South Sudan in CY 2012 from Sudan created an
additional  country that did not exist  in earlier  years.  Ultimately,  I decided to remove
South Sudan from the dataset for SEM because it did not greatly contribute to the overall
analysis, nor did it have prior FSI factors. 
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The following is an excerpt of the FFP’s description of the FSI indicators.36 Where
there is a direct relationship with the democratic peace and social capital vectors, I have
annotated the section header accordingly, although I depart from Berea et al. (2013) by
differentiating an institutional vector in addition to their social, political, and economic
vectors. 
Demographic Pressures (social): Demographic Pressures can include:
Pressures deriving from high population density relative to food supply, access to
safe water, and other life-sustaining resources
Pressures  deriving  from  group  settlement  patterns  that  affect  the  freedom  to
participate in common forms of human and physical activity, including economic
productivity, travel, social interaction, religious worship, etc.
Pressures deriving from group settlement patterns and physical settings, including
border disputes, ownership, or occupancy of land, access to transportation outlets,
and control of religious or historic sites
Refugees and IDPs (social): The Refugees and IDPs measure focuses on the
forced uprooting of large communities as a result of random or targeted violence
and/or repression, causing food shortages, disease, deficiency of clean water, land
competition,  and turmoil  that  can  spiral  into  larger  humanitarian  and security
problems – both within and between countries. 
Group Grievance (social): Group Grievance can include specific groups singled
out by state authorities, or by dominant groups, for persecution or repression; and
36 http://library.fundforpeace.org/cfsir1418; 
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groups  aggrieved  due  to  denied  autonomy,  self-determination,  or  political
independence.
Human Flight and Brain Drain (social): The Human Flight and Brain Drain
measure can include a “brain drain” of professionals, intellectuals, and political
dissidents  fearing  persecution  or  repression;  and  voluntary  emigration  of  “the
middle class,” particularly economically productive segments of the population,
such as  entrepreneurs,  business-people,  artisans,  and traders,  due  to  economic
deterioration.
Uneven  Development  (DPT  economic  interchange): Uneven  Economic
Development  can  include  group-based  inequality,  or  perceived  inequality,  in
education and economic status; and group-based impoverishment as measured by
poverty levels, infant mortality rates, educational levels, etc.
Poverty  and  Economic  Decline  (DPT  economic  interchange): Economic
Decline can include: 
A pattern of progressive economic decline of the society as a whole as measured
by per capita income, GNP, debt, child mortality rates, poverty levels, business
failures, etc.; 
A sudden decline in commodity prices, trade revenue, or foreign investment; and 
Growth of hidden economies,  including the drug trade,  smuggling,  and capital
flight. 
Legitimacy of the State (DPT democracy): Legitimacy of the State can include
resistance  of  ruling  elites  to  transparency,  accountability,  and  political
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representation  revealed  by  scandals,  investigative  journalism,  criminal
prosecution, or civil action. In addition, widespread loss of popular confidence in
state institutions and processes, e.g., widely boycotted or flawed elections, mass
public demonstrations, sustained civil disobedience, inability of the state to collect
taxes, resistance to military conscription, and rise of armed insurgencies.
Public  Services  (DPT  domestic  institutions): The  Public  Services  measure
refers  to  the  lack  of,  or  disappearance  of,  basic  state  functions  that  serve  the
people, including failure to protect citizens from terrorism and violence and to
provide  essential  services,  such  as  health,  education,  sanitation,  public
transportation, etc. 
Human Rights (DPT domestic institutions): Human Rights and Rule of Law
can include a rising number of political prisoners or dissidents denied due process
consistent with international norms and practices. In addition, widespread abuse
of legal, political, and social rights, rights of individuals, groups, and institutions
(e.g., harassment of the press, politicization of the judiciary, internal use of the
military for political ends, and public repression of political opponents).
Security  Apparatus  (DPT  domestic  institutions): The  Security  Apparatus
indicator can include the emergence of elite or praetorian guards loyal to a leader,
who operate with impunity and bypass the chain of command of regular armed
forces; and the emergence of state-sponsored or state-supported “private militias”
that terrorize political opponents, suspected “enemies,” or civilians perceived to
be sympathetic to the opposition.
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Factionalized  Elites  (social/DPT  domestic  institutions): Factionalized  Elites
can include fragmentation of ruling elites and state institutions along ethnic, class,
clan, racial, or religious lines; and use of nationalistic political rhetoric by ruling
elites,  often in terms of communal  irredentism (e.g.,  a “greater  Serbia”)  or of
communal solidarity (e.g., “ethnic cleansing” or “defending the faith”).
External Intervention: External Intervention can include military or paramilitary
engagement – both covert and overt – in the internal affairs of the state at risk by
outside armies, states, identity groups, or entities that affect the internal balance of
power  or  the  resolution  of  conflict;  and  humanitarian,  economic,  or  strategic
military intervention into an internal conflict or for “regime change.”
Dependent Variables: 
In  order  to  perform classic  linear  regression  analysis,  I  required  a  dependent
variable to measure response. In this case, I sought a dataset that accounted for intrastate
conflict. The candidate datasets included Penn State’s Correlates of War (COW) project
and Sweden’s University of Uppsala UCDP. In this particular instance, I opted to use the
UCDP dataset due to the presence of data from recent  conflicts,  including CY 2013,
which more closely matched the FSI, whereas COW, at the time I accessed the data, only
included data through CY 2007. 
To prepare the data for analysis, I first isolated the target data by year (CY 2005-
2013), country, and type of conflict. I filtered type of conflict to include intrastate conflict
and internationalized intrastate conflict and concatenated. I opted to concatenate into a
binary (conflict vs not conflict), as in the circumstances in which an intrastate conflict
63
presented an external component might be evident through significance testing of the FSI
“external intervention” factor. As with the FSI, it was necessary to ensure consistency of
country names and correlated with my edited country names in the FSI dataset. Finally, in
cases in which a country had multiple conflict events in a given year, I opted to consider
each country as being in a single conflict in that year and concatenate down to a single
country name per year by removing duplicates.
Table 2 provides an example of the UCDP dataset before preparation.
Dimension Location 1 Year (Conflict)
Intrastate Mali 2012
Intrastate South Sudan 2011
Intrastate South Sudan 2012
Intrastate Sudan 2011
Intrastate Libya 2011
Intrastate India 2012
Intrastate With Foreign Involvement Mauritania 2010
Intrastate With Foreign Involvement Mauritania 2011
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2008
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2007
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2009
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2010
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2011
Intrastate Russia (Soviet Union) 2012
Table 2: UCDP Conflict Data Pre-Processing
After  processing,  the  UCDP  data  became  a  list  of  counties  sorted  by  year
(example only) in Table 3.
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2007 2008 2009
Afghanistan Afghanistan Afghanistan
Algeria Algeria Algeria
Angola Burundi Angola
Chad Chad Central African Republic
Iraq India Iraq
Colombia China Chad
DR Congo (Zaire) Colombia Colombia
Ethiopia DR Congo (Zaire) Ethiopia
India Ethiopia India
Iran Georgia Iran
Israel Iran Israel
Mali Iraq Mali
Myanmar Israel Myanmar
Niger Mali Nigeria
Table 3: UCDP Data Post-Processing
Using an Excel command (=countif), I associated the FSI data, sorted on country
and year, with a UCDP status of whether or not a country was in a conflict in that year
(conflict = 1; not conflict = 0). The combined dataset (“Master FSI”) became the basis for
all subsequent quantitative analyses (See Appendix 2). I also extracted a subset for each
year (observation year) with all conflict variables. Table 4 is an example of the combined
master dataset.
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7 2013 Afghanistan 106.7 9.3 9.2 9.2 7.2 7.8 8.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 9.9 9.4 10.0 1
6 2012 Afghanistan 106.0 8.9 9.0 9.4 7.4 8.1 7.7 9.5 8.5 8.5 9.7 9.4 10.0 1
7 2011 Afghanistan 107.5 9.1 9.3 9.3 7.2 8.4 8.0 9.7 8.5 8.8 9.8 9.4 10.0 1
6 2010 Afghanistan 109.3 9.5 9.2 9.7 7.2 8.2 8.3 10.0 8.9 9.2 9.7 9.4 10.0 1
7 2009 Afghanistan 108.2 9.3 8.9 9.6 7.2 8.4 8.3 9.8 8.9 8.8 9.9 9.1 10.0 1
7 2008 Afghanistan 105.4 9.1 8.9 9.5 7.0 8.1 8.5 9.2 8.3 8.4 9.6 8.8 10.0 1
8 2007 Afghanistan 102.3 8.5 8.9 9.1 7.0 8.0 8.3 8.8 8.0 8.2 9.0 8.5 10.0 1
119 2013 Albania 65.2 4.7 3.1 4.8 6.6 4.8 5.3 7.0 4.8 6.0 5.5 6.3 6.3 0
118 2012 Albania 66.1 5.0 2.8 5.1 6.8 5.1 5.6 7.3 4.9 5.5 5.4 6.6 6.0 0
121 2011 Albania 66.1 5.5 3.1 5.1 6.8 5.4 5.9 6.4 5.0 5.0 5.4 6.3 6.3 0
121 2010 Albania 67.1 5.9 2.8 4.9 7.1 5.7 6.1 6.8 5.6 5.3 5.4 6.0 5.5 0
109 2009 Albania 70.0 6.4 2.6 5.4 7.2 5.9 6.5 7.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.9 5.7 0
112 2008 Albania 69.7 6.2 2.7 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.3 7.2 5.9 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 0
110 2007 Albania 70.5 6.5 2.7 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.8 7.4 6.2 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 0
Table 4: FSI + Conflict Master Data Example
Methodology: 
As previously noted, for this project I am testing the hypotheses listed below to
examine the relationship of human agency to intrastate conflict. Although Goldstone et
al. (2010) achieved high correlations with infant mortality, “bad neighbors,” etc., these
are mostly factors that  provide little,  if  any,  bearing on human agency as a factor  in
conflict. Echoing Chapter 2, war, like politics, (Clausewitz, 1873) is a human activity,
and  the  logic  that  a  nation’s  fate  is  so  simply  explained  by  real-estate  maxims  of
“location, location, location” fails to persuade.
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Thus, my null hypothesis sets the bar to distinguish the significance of human
agency as a factor in intrastate conflict compared with random chance or other factors
beyond the scope of this investigation. 
However,  contingent  upon  null-hypothesis  rejection,  I  am  investigating  two
variations that form H1 and H2. The first tests for DPT factors and attempts to measure
their  combined  fit  to  explain  intrastate  conflict.  The  second,  acknowledging  the
limitations of DPT as previously discussed, also adds the SCT factors:  Can I achieve
greater explanatory value by adding the social dimension?
Note: 
All analyses performed at the 95% confidence level. For notational purposes, my
initial hypotheses are:
 H1: Do democratic peace vectors provide a statistically significant explanation of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
 H2: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors provide a
statistically  significant  explanation  of  human  agency  in  contributing  to  or
preventing intrastate conflict?
 H0: There is no link between intrastate conflict and human agency (DPT or SCT)
factors.
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Initial Observations: 
In reference to FSI scores/ranks, a high value on the FSI is not a guarantee of
intrastate conflict. For example, in the period CY 2007-2013, of the top 20 rankings (140
observations), almost half (66 observations, 47%) were not in a state of intrastate conflict.
Of those, three (Guinea, Haiti, and Zimbabwe) spent
the  entire  period  (CY  2007-2013)  in  the  top  20
(Table 5).
Similarly,  presenting  a  low score  does  not
guarantee  freedom from conflict.  Malaysia  in  CY
2013 (66.11), Libya in CY 2011 (68.72), and India
in CY 2007 (70.80) all fall below the mean score of
71.12 held by Suriname in CY 2011. Turkey in CY
2011  and  India  in  CY  2008  also  fall  below  the
median  countries  of  São Tomé and Jordan in  CY
2011 at 74.5. However, below Malaysia’s CY 2013 score of 66.11, if a country achieves
a lower score, the probability of conflict declines close to zero – albeit with one anomaly,
the United States.37
37 On a definitional basis, I disagree with UCDP’s designation of the United States being in a status of
intrastate conflict for the period of CY 2001-2013. Although the United States is involved on an external 
intervention basis in the Afghan intrastate conflict and the Iraq adventure from CY 2003 to 2010, the 
United States itself is not in the throes of a civil war with combat deaths over 1000 per year or even 25 
internal combat deaths per year attributable to a domestic terrorist or separatist group. However, I opted to 
leave the conflict fields for the United States coded for conflict.
Country Name Top 20 
Appear
Guinea 7
Haiti 7
Zimbabwe 7
Cȏte d’Ivoire 6
Kenya 5
Burundi 4
Niger 4
North Korea 4
Bangladesh 3
Chad 3
DR Congo (Zaire) 3
Guinea Bissau 3
Nigeria 3
Timor-Leste 3
Central African 
Republic
2
Lebanon 1
Uganda 1
Table 5: FSI Top 20 Appearances
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Initial Analysis: 
After combining the FSI and UCDP datasets across the period CY 2005-2013,
statistical description of the FSI dataset CY 2007-2013, I examined the resulting dataset
for parameters and normality. See Appendix 1.
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Section III: Statistical Processing And Analysis
Standard Linear Regression: 
The first step regressed each factor
one  by  one  as  independent  variables
against  Master  Conflict  as  the  dependent
variable. Each FSI factor, when regressed
individually  as  independent  variables
against  Master  Conflict  as  the  dependent
variable, tests significantly with R2 ranging
from  .02  to  .21  and  Prob  >  t values
consistently below .05 (Table 6).
It would appear that at a basic level
of  analysis,  all  FSI  factors,  taken
individually,  test  significantly  as  independent  variables  in  contributing  to  intrastate
conflict.
At this point, it appears that we can reject the null hypothesis H0 – that there is no
link between intrastate conflict and human agency (DPT or SCT) factors – as all FSI
factors  demonstrated  significance  below  the  .05  threshold.  However,  determining
viability of H1 and/or H2 will require some additional analysis.
Factor Coefficient R2 H0 
Group Grievance .08 .21 Reject 
Refugees and IDPs .07 .19 Reject 
Security Apparatus .06 .14 Reject 
Human Rights .05 .12 Reject 
Factionalized Elites .05 .11 Reject 
Uneven
Development
.06 .09 Reject 
Demographic
Pressures
.05 .08 Reject 
Public Services .04 .07 Reject 
Legitimacy of the
State
.04 .07 Reject 
External
Intervention
.04 .06 Reject 
Human Flight .03 .03 Reject 
Poverty 
and Economic
Decline
.02 .02 Reject 
Average .049 .10
Median .049 .09
Sum .584 1.19
Table 6: Univariate Regression
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Multivariate Analysis: 
Regression Statistics Mult R R2 Adjusted R2 SE Observations
Goodness of Fit .564 .318 .311 .293 1241
ANOVA df SS MS F Significance F
Regression 12.000 49.165 4.097 47.718 .000 (reject)
Factor Coeff Abs CoeffSE t RatioProb > t VIF
Group Grievance .074 .074 .010 7.720 .000 5.299
Poverty and Economic Decline -.070 .070 .010 -7.370 .000 4.725
Legitimacy of the State -.055 .055 .013 -4.360 .000 13.013
Security Apparatus .043 .043 .010 4.370 .000 7.960
Refugees and IDPs .037 .037 .007 5.480 .000 3.469
Public Services .035 .035 .012 2.840 .005 11.691
Uneven Development -.024 .024 .010 -2.420 .016 4.871
Human Rights .025 .025 .011 2.330 .020 8.786
Factionalized Elites -.018 .018 .010 -1.700 .090 9.238
Demographic Pressures .011 .011 .012 .840 .401 9.693
Human Flight -.002 .002 .008 -.220 .826 3.422
External Intervention .000 .000 .008 -.050 .962 4.918
Table 7: Multivariate Regression: Initial
Sartori  (1970) reminds  us to  climb a little  higher  up the ladder  of abstraction
without becoming  over-conscious thinkers. Single factors regressed individually fail to
capture the complexity of a society heading toward, currently in, or climbing out of a
conflict.  We  must  note  that  societies  and  conflicts  are  composed  of  a  web  of
interconnected vectors. Such a web justifies applying multivariate methods for analysis to
discern  which  factors  are  most  relevant  in  determining  indications  and  warning  for
conflict. Thus, when analyzed in multivariate mode, the factors’ contributions change, as
indicated in Table 7.
Multivariate Results: 
Whereas the R2 value resolved to .318 when analyzed in multivariate mode, four
factors’ p values registered above .05, preventing rejection of the null hypothesis in those
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cases  (Factionalized  Elites,  Demographic  Pressures,  Human  Flight,  and  External
Intervention).Of interest, two factors – Factionalized Elites and Demographic Pressures –
that  fall  below the  significance  cutoff  and,  among  the  remaining  significant  factors,
Legitimacy of the State and Public Services, present a multicollinearity concern (Pedace,
2013)  with  variance  inflation  factors  (VIF)  above  or  approaching  the  critical  VIF
threshold  value  of  10.00,  highlighting  the  possibility  that  these  factors  derived  from
related source data.
Multivariate Reduction:
At this point, I applied multivariate analysis  techniques of pairwise correlation
and performed an ordered Prob > t removal to reduce the number of factors from 12 to
eight  by  removing  the  non-significant  factors.  Following  this  reduction,  the  VIF  for
Legitimacy of the State also decreased below the high multicollinearity threshold value
(10). Removing the four factors reduced the R2 by .007 to .311 and all remaining factors
present as significant in Prob > t (Table 8).
Regression Statistics R2 R2 Adj RMSE MOR Obs
Goodness of Fit .316 .311 .293 .146 1241
ANOVA df SS MS F F Sig
Regression 8.000 48.816 6.102 71.066 .000
FACTOR Coeff Abs Coeff SE t Ratio Prob > t VIF
Poverty and Economic Decline -.071 .071 .009 -7.940 .000 4.156
Group Grievance .068 .068 .009 7.640 .000 4.511
Legitimacy of the State -.065 .065 .011 -6.210 .000 9.089
Public Services .042 .042 .010 4.230 .000 7.607
Security Apparatus .038 .038 .009 4.080 .000 7.345
Refugees and IDPs .037 .037 .006 5.780 .000 3.158
Human Rights .026 .026 .010 2.570 .010 7.567
Uneven Development -.020 .020 .009 -2.230 .026 3.955
Table 8: Multivariate Regression: Post-Processing
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Logistic Regression: 
Tangentially, with a binary dependent variable, I noticed the option of performing
a logistic regression on all FSI factors as independent variables against Master Conflict as
the dependent variable. In this case I performed a find/replace to convert Master Conflict
= 0 to “Peace” and Master Conflict = 1 to “War” and performed the logistic regression
for all FSI factors individually as well as multivariate.
Similar  to  the  linear  regression,  all  FSI  factors  presented  as  significant  when
regressed  individually.  However,  when  regressed  in  multivariate  mode,  several
differences  between  linear  regression  and  logistic  regression  presented.  In  the
multivariate  logistic  regression,  Public  Services,  Factionalized  Elites,  and  Uneven
Development  presented p > chi2 above the .05 significance threshold,  whereas  in  the
previous  multivariate  linear  regression,  Factionalized  Elites,  Demographic  Pressures,
Human  Flight,  and  External  Intervention  fell  below  the  .05  cutoff  (Table  9).  In  the
logistic regression, an R2 of .439 presented post-reduction.
This  logistic  model  provides  consistency with the  results  of  the  linear  model,
noting  the  addition  of  alternate  significant  factors.  SCT  and  DPT  factors  remain
Factor Coeff Abs Coeff SE chi2 Prob > chi2
Group Grievance -.798 .798 .089 80.960 .000
Legitimacy of the State .532 .532 .110 23.480 .000
Demographic Pressures -.528 .528 .085 38.570 .000
Refugees and IDPs -.358 .358 .062 33.070 .000
Poverty and Economic Decline .340 0340 .069 23.970 .000
Human Rights -.389 .389 .104 14.010 .000
External Intervention .255 .255 .073 12.110 .001
Security Apparatus -.297 .297 .089 11.170 .001
Human Flight .208 .208 .069 9.190 .002
Table 9: Logistic Regression Results Post-Reduction
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significant.  The  addition  of  External  Intervention,  albeit  with  one  of  the  lower
coefficients,  could  be  of  interest  further  in  the  investigation  during  the  policy
recommendation discussion.
Equation And Examination Of Hypotheses: 
Returning to the linear model, I now have a preliminary model to work from, with
a prediction formula of: 
-.095 + -.071 (Poverty)  + .068 (Group Grievance)  + -.065 (Legitimacy of the
State) + .042 (Public Services) + .038 (Security Apparatus) + .037 (Refugees and IDPs) +
.026 (Human Rights) + -.020 (Uneven Development)
Earlier in this investigation, I coded the FSI factors with their relevance to DPT
and/or social capital vectors. A review of the coding shows:
• (Social): Demographic Pressures; Group Grievance; Refugees and IDPs; Human
Flight; Factionalized Elites
• (DPT  economic  interchange):  Uneven  Development;  Poverty  and  Economic
Decline
• (DPT democracy): Legitimacy of the State
• (DPT domestic institutions): Public Services; Human Rights; Security Apparatus;
Factionalized Elites
• Uncoded: External Intervention
Following  the  main  FSI  factor  reduction,  these  factors  remain,  with  their
relevance to democratic peace or social capital vectors:
• (Social): Group Grievance; Refugees and IDPs
• (DPT  economic  interchange):  Uneven  Development;  Poverty  and  Economic
Decline
• (DPT democracy): Legitimacy of the State
• (DPT domestic institutions): Public Services; Human Rights; Security Apparatus
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Conducting a multivariate regression utilizing the extracted SCT factors from the
reduced multivariate analysis, I observe that with an  R2 of .22, the SCT factors test as
significant against Master Conflict (Table 10).
Similarly, performing a multivariate regression manipulating the remaining DPT
factors from the reduced multivariate analysis, I also observe an R2 of .22, and the DPT
factors test as significant – with the exception of Uneven Development with a Prob > t
of .230, well over the .05 significance threshold. Reducing the DPT factors by removing
Uneven Development and running the analysis a second time, I maintain the  R2 of .22,
and the remaining factors test as significant (Table 11).
SCT Cluster Vs DPT Cluster:
At this point in this investigation, I have examined the effects of the full FSI that
comprises both democratic peace and social capital vectors. Yet, to investigate the effects
of DPT and SCT separately, I clearly require an additional hypothesis to isolate out SCT
factors: 
• Hnew:  Social  capital  vectors  provide  a  statistically  significant  explanation  of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict. 
Factor Coefficient Abs Coeff SE t Ratio Prob > t VIF
Group Grievance .055 .055 .007 7.930 .000 2.493
Refugees and IDPs .044 .044 .006 7.040 .000 2.493
Table 10: SCT Factors Augmenting DPT
Factor Coefficient Abs Coeff SE t Ratio Prob > t VIF
Security Apparatus .088 .088 .009 9.940 .000 5.779
Legitimacy of the State -.073 .073 .011 -6.700 .000 8.570
Poverty and Economic Decline -.069 .069 .009 -7.390 .000 4.069
Human Rights .052 .052 .010 5.010 .000 7.201
Public Services .035 .035 .009 3.770 .000 6.11
Table 11: Significant DPT Factors
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To test this additional hypothesis, I divided the original FSI factors into separate
SCT and DPT clusters according to the coding and performed a multivariate regression
against each cluster. 
For SCT, my factors are Demographic Pressures, Group Grievance, Refugees and
IDPs, Human Flight, and Factionalized Elites. Initial multivariate regression indicates an
R2 of  .258,  with  all  factors  achieving  significance  –  again  with  the  exception  of
Demographic Pressures. After reducing to remove Demographic Pressures, R2 remains
at .258 and all four factors indicate significance (Table 12).
Similarly, conducting multivariate regression applying the DPT factors of Uneven
Development, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, Public Services,
Human Rights, Security Apparatus, and Factionalized Elites as a separate cluster presents
an R2 of .234 and all factors are significant (Table 13).
Factor Coefficient Abs Coeff SE t Ratio Prob > t VIF
Group Grievance .085 .085 .009 9.640 .000 4.166
Refugees and IDPs .044 .044 .006 7.040 .000 2.801
Factionalized Elites -0.03 .028 .007 -3.940 .000 4.098
Human Flight -.024 .024 .006 -4.230 .000 1.806
Table 12: SCT Factors Regressed vs Master Conflict
Factor Coefficient Abs Coeff SE t Ratio Prob > t VIF
Legitimacy of the State -.090 .090 .012 -7.520 .000 10.512
Security Apparatus .076 .076 .010 7.830 .000 6.857
Poverty and Econ Decline -.070 .070 .009 -7.540 .000 4.076
Human Rights .047 .047 .011 4.450 .000 7.380
Public Services .040 .040 .009 4.250 .000 6.258
Factionalized Elites .033 .033 .010 3.360 .001 7.27
Table 13: DPT Factors Regressed vs Master Conflict
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Hypotheses Revisited:
Returning to the hypotheses under investigation and including the new hypothesis
added above, we could, following the rejection of the null hypothesis (H0) earlier, accept
the following hypotheses: 
• H1: Do democratic peace vectors provide a statistically significant explanation of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
◦ Yes. DPT factors alone achieve an R2 of .234 and test as significant.
• H2:  Do social  capital  vectors  provide  a  statistically  significant  explanation  of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict? 
◦ Yes. SCT factors alone achieve an R2 of .258 and test as significant.
• H3: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors provide a
statistically  significant  explanation  of  human  agency  in  contributing  to  or
preventing intrastate conflict?
◦ Yes. DPT factors when combined with SCT factors achieve an  R2 of .311,
greater than either SCT or DPT cluster alone, and present as significant. 
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Section IV: Flash-to-Bang: Downstream Effects
Time And Iterative Spiral Of Information And Effects: 
Reviewing the multivariate regression results, whereas an R2 of .31 is respectable,
there  is  certainly room for  taking the model  to another  level  to  test  whether  a  more
comprehensive explanation might be developed. One vector for further investigation that
presents itself is time. 
Assimilating across a variety of fields, such as our earlier discussion of Colonel
Boyd’s OODA38 loop, and econometrics (Friedman, 1968; Nelson, 1981), there is a time
delay between the treatment and the effect. Treatments possibly will include injection of
the policy, cognizance of the effect of an earlier policy, and/or the lag between observing
an effect added to the time required to formulate a new policy to alter the performance of
agency in econometrics. Effects could include observing the econometric change of an
indicator,  or  even  the  detonation  of  the  air-to-air  missile  and  the  observation  of  its
detonation. Alternatively, as my artillery colleagues sometimes refer to it, the “flash-to-
bang” (F2B) delays.39 
For the purposes of this investigation, applying these concepts raises the question
of time lag (Blomberg and Hess, 2002; Teeple, 2014) between FSI treatments. Examples
include elections, fracturing of political elites, changes to group grievance mechanisms,
changes to loan behavior or interest rates by local or national banks, and vectors that
38 Observe, Orient, Decide, Act.
39 US Army Field Manual 6-30, 1991, 
http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/doctrine/CDG/cdg_resources/manuals/fm/fm6_30.pdf.
78
influence the number of refugees as well as the effect of descending into, continuing in,
or achieving resolution of intrastate conflict.
Understanding the F2B delay,  if  present,  clearly provides applications  in  both
indications and warning of impending crises as well as prophylactic policy prescriptions
to mitigate the eruption of intrastate conflict in the first place. Implementing a treatment
at time (T) might not create a measurable effect until some period of time (T + x) later
due to various dissemination mechanisms.
To determine the presence of these “downstream” effects, I first opted to create an
approximation of downstream effects by applying a brute-force solution: I broke out the
FSI  observations  from  each  target  year  and  conducted  linear  regression  against  the
conflict  results  from  each  subsequent  observation  year,  essentially  treating  each
successive conflict as current (Table 14). 
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Afghanistan 8.9 9.1 8.0 8.3 8.8 8.0 8.2 9.0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Algeria 6.7 7.0 7.3 3.5 7.3 7.0 7.4 6.4 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Angola 7.5 5.9 8.7 4.2 8.6 7.7 7.5 6.2 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0
Azerbaijan 7.5 7.3 7.4 6.3 7.8 6.0 6.4 7.2 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
Burundi 8.9 6.7 8.8 8.2 7.1 8.9 7.5 6.8 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Central African Republic 8.4 8.8 8.6 8.4 9.0 8.0 8.2 8.9 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1
Chad 8.9 9.5 9.0 8.3 9.5 9.1 9.2 9.6 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0
China 5.1 8.0 9.0 4.0 8.5 6.5 9.0 5.3 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0
Colombia 9.5 7.4 8.4 3.8 8.2 6.0 7.4 8.3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Table 14: Sample Post-Reduction CY 2007 FSI Matrix with Follow-on Conflicts
I repeated this regression for each year between CY 2007 and CY 2013. Each
regression result was collected in a master worksheet and sorted by Prob > F. I distributed
all results that passed the .05 threshold across a matrix of factors and a base year (0) plus
downstream years (1-6). Of note, one factor (Uneven Development) present earlier in the
reduced multivariate regression declined below significance in this process. The factor
counts appear in Table 15.
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Factor 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Sum
Poverty and Economic Decline 6 5 4 3 3 2 1 24
Group Grievance 6 5 4 3 2 1 0 21
Legitimacy of the State 4 4 4 3 3 2 1 21
Refugees and IDPs 4 5 4 3 2 1 0 19
Public Services 3 2 1 0 0 0 0 6
Security Apparatus 2 1 1 1 0 0 0 5
Human Rights 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 3
Totals 25 22 19 14 11 6 2 99
Table 15: Brute-Force Analysis of Downstream FSI Effects
Illustration 2 graphically depicts the distribution of FSI factors across downstream
years
As illustrated above, Poverty/Economic Decline, Group Grievance, Legitimacy of
the  State,  and  Refugees/IDPs  project  the  greatest  downstream  effects  across  most
observation periods, with the second downstream year  presenting all  seven significant
factors. Also of note is the F2B delay for Human Rights, which does not present as a
significant effect until at least 2 years downstream after the observed treatments – but
Illustration 2: Downstream Factors
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also dissipates after Year + 4. Likewise, the effects of Group Grievance dissipate after
Year + 5; Public Services discontinues after Year + 2; Security Apparatus dissipates after
Year + 3, etc. However, the effects of Poverty/Economic Decline and Legitimacy of the
State continue to reverberate through at least Year + 6.
Time Series: 
Having tentatively identified time lag as a factor, I then analyzed the reduced FSI
dataset utilizing the time series and multivariate time-series functions of JMP and Stata.
These  functions  build  upon  the  econometric  work  of  Box-Jenkins  (1970),  Lütkepohl
(1991,  2005),  and  others  previously  mentioned  to  determine  the  downstream
interdependence effects of time-series data. 
First, I analyzed global level data to determine the presence of time-series effects
making use of Stata’s Vector Auto Regression (VAR) option, with Master Conflict as the
dependent variable and the full FSI as the exogenous variables, calculated across eight
lags.  This  achieved  an R2 of  .41,  and  eight  FSI  factors  presented  as  significant.
Additionally, the second year (Lag_2) presented as significant, indicating that the most
significant F2B between treatment and effect is 2 years downstream. This is consistent
with my brute-force results above in which the second year downstream presented the
full spectrum of factors.
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Parameters Root MS Error R2 chi2 Prob > chi2
21 .339 .412 702.817 0
IndVar Coeff Abs Coeff SE z Prob > z
Group Grievance .097 .097 .011 8.621 .000
Legitimacy of the State -.063 .063 .016 -3.989 .000
Lag_2.Master Conflict .054 .054 .024 2.220 .026
Poverty / Economic Decline -.051 .051 .010 -4.859 .000
Refugees and IDPs .048 .048 .008 5.865 .000
Human Rights .047 .047 .013 3.515 .000
Security Apparatus .040 .040 .012 3.444 .001
Demographic Pressures .032 .032 .014 2.284 .022
External Intervention -.031 .031 .010 -3.186 .001
Table 16: VAR Analysis against Master Conflict
FSI VAR Linear Logistic
R2 .41 .31 .44
Demographic Pressures  
External Intervention  
Factionalized Elites
Group Grievance   
Human Flight 
Human Rights   
Legitimacy of the State   
Poverty / Economic Decline   
Public Services 
Refugees and IDPs   
Security Apparatus   
Uneven Development 
Table 17: Comparison of analysis results
Of  interest,  in  this  time-series  VAR  analysis,  External  Intervention  and
Demographic Pressures present as significant, similar to their appearance in the logistic
regression results. The common significant factors across the three analytical processes
(VAR, Linear,  and Logistic)  are  Group Grievance,  Human Rights,  Legitimacy of the
State, Poverty and Economic Decline, Refugees and IDPs, and Security Apparatus.
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Country-level Effects: 
I then attempted to focus VAR and auto-regressive integrated moving average
(ARIMA) at the country level. However, with only nine observations (CY 2005-2013)
per  country,  attempting  to  exploit  the  FSI,  VAR,  and  ARIMA  calculations  for  the
country-level analysis failed due to deficiency of observations and degrees of freedom.
Additional research and investigation into the applicability of time series and multivariate
time-series  analysis  exercising  a  broader  range  of  observations,  injection  of  dummy
random observations or alternate data sources at the country level potentially provides
additional explanatory value.
The Past Is Prologue: Previous Conflict As SCT Factors:
Malinowski  (1941),  Schneider  (1959),  and Hedges  (2002)  provide  perspective
that conflict  itself  is an expression of social  capital  and cultural  institutions.  Whereas
Schneider40 and Malinowski generally examine the centripetal forces that bring a state
into being, followed by the subsequent challenges of interstate conflict, Hedges observes
many of the characteristics also apply in the intrastate domain when expressed in civil
wars.
The dialectic processes of creation and destruction normally associated with the
development of the nation-state (or tribe-nation and tribe-state in Malinowski’s lexicon)
do not fully consume or assimilate fully the former sub-tribe components, nor integrate
their grievances and aspirations. The newly amalgamated nation-state always contains a
40 Despite his protests to the contrary. In his introduction, Schneider claims that war is not a 
social activity, and then spends the rest of the paper demonstrating how war is a human activity pursued 
through social institutions.
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certain  amount  of  error  and  residual,  which,  if  not  mitigated  through  negotiation,
amelioration, or successful repression, possibly will evolve (Walter, 2004) into the dark
seeds for the next intrastate conflict. Moreover, when such conflict erupts, the cleavages
deconstruct the state in reverse order.
To determine whether previous conflict  provides explanatory value toward the
performance of FSI factors, I performed a VAR exercising the FSI factors as dependent
variables and each of the previous conflict years as independent variables.
This necessitates development of a new hypothesis:
o H4: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors, including
previous conflict; provide a statistically significant explanation of human agency
in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict when analyzed?
o Yes. DPT factors when combined with SCT factors, including previous
conflict and analyzed in time series, achieve a mean R2 of .175 and present
as significant. 
R2 values ranged from .075 for Poverty and Economic Decline to .317 for Group
Grievance, with the conflict years significant in Tables 18 and 19.
Finally, VAR analyzing Master Conflict with the FSI and previous conflicts as
independent variables presents an R2 of .760 with Group Grievance, Legitimacy of the
State,  Human  Rights,  Demographic  Pressures,  and  Human  Flight  demonstrating
significance,  as  well  as  all  previous  conflict  years  –  except  for  Conflict.2007,  which
failed the Prob > z threshold (Table 20).
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Equation Parameters Root MS Error R2 chi2 Prob > chi2
Group Grievance 54 1.651 .317 560.473 .000
Refugees and IDPs 54 1.988 .286 482.218 .000
Security Apparatus 54 2.140 .233 365.787 .000
Human Rights 54 2.034 .214 329.273 .000
Uneven Development 54 1.735 .161 231.445 .000
Legitimacy of the State 54 2.236 .148 210.131 .000
Demographic Pressures 54 1.941 .143 201.028 .000
External Intervention 54 2.088 .129 179.206 .000
Public Services 54 2.225 .124 170.861 .000
Human Flight 54 1.999 .091 121.123 .000
Poverty and Economic Decay 54 1.926 .075 98.387 .000
Table 18: VAR R2 of FSI Factors by Previous Conflicts
Dependent Variable 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 Sum
Group Grievance 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 8
External Intervention 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 4
Refugees and IDPs 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 4
Poverty and Economic Decline 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 3
Public Services 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 3
Human Rights 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 3
Uneven Development 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 3
Security Apparatus 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Legitimacy of the State 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 2
Human Flight 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 2
Demographic Pressures 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
Totals 3 10 2 1 4 3 6 2 4 35
Table 19: VAR Analysis of FSI Factors by Previous Conflicts
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Ind Var vs Master Conflict Coeff Abs Coeff SE z p Value
Conflict 2011 .576 .576 .036 16.182 .000
Conflict 2008 .420 .420 .047 8.963 .000
Conflict 2005 .369 .369 .035 10.430 .000
Conflict 2010 -.270 .270 .045 -6.024 .000
Conflict 2006 -.255 .255 .047 -5.459 .000
Conflict 2009 .229 .229 .049 4.682 .000
Conflict 2013 .171 .171 .040 4.316 .000
Conflict 2012 -.118 .118 .041 -2.882 .004
Lag_1.Master Conflict .029 .029 .014 2.080 .037
Group Grievance .028 .028 .006 4.331 .000
Legitimacy of the State -.021 .021 .008 -2.481 .013
Human Rights .019 .019 .008 2.366 .018
Demographic Pressures .018 .018 .008 2.224 .026
Human Flight -.015 .015 .005 -2.783 .005
Table 20: VAR of FSI and Past Conflict on Master Conflict
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Section V: Second-Generation Techniques
Structural Equation Modeling: 
Observing the relationship between Master Conflict, previous conflicts, and FSI
factors brings up the question of how past conflicts and the FSI factors affect current and
future conflicts. With R2 as low as .22, or up to a maximum of .44, on the basis of the
various analyses performed so far in this investigation, I contend that there are still areas
within the current FSI/Master Conflict dataset that can be explored to determine whether
a more explanatory model can be achieved with the current dataset. 
The  question  of  factor  analysis,  regression  (linear,  logistic,  and  vector  auto
regression), and lag time leads to considering the application of SEM to determine the
presence  and effects  of  potential  unobserved latent  variables  on the overall  intrastate
conflict dynamic. This builds upon the work of Joreskog and Goldberger (1975), Wold
(1986), Chin and Marcolin (1995), Gerow et al. (2008), Wold-Chin, et al (2013), and
Hair et al. (2014). 
Phase I: To test this concept, I used XLSTAT, which, as mentioned in Section I,
is a Visual Basic overlay or add-on for Excel. One feature that this software offers is the
partial least squares (PLS), path modeling (PLS-PM), and SEM platforms. For the initial
test, I reused the CY 2009 subset from the earlier brute-force downstream test. 
The critical capability of PLS-PM or PLS-SEM is the ability to model and test
latent  variables  that  function  as  representation  of  conceptual,  abstract,  or  otherwise
unobservable  variables  (Hair  et  al.,  2014).  Additionally,  PLS-SEM  can  approximate
causation between the independent and dependent variables (Gerow et al., 2008).
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In this particular investigation, given time and VAR results, past conflict, current
conflict, and future conflict emerge as latent variables. 
Additionally, based on factor analysis, in this instance, the FSI factors logically
group together in five main latent variables:
• People: Refugees and IDPs; Demographic Pressures; Human Flight
• Prosperity: Poverty and Economic Decline; Uneven Development
• Rage: Group Grievance; Legitimacy of the State; Human Rights
• Governance: Public Services; Security Apparatus; Factionalized Elites
• Externals: External Intervention
Finally, I opted to explore a way to account for the impact of the elasticity of the
interaction between the FSI factors and past conflict. This elasticity affects current and
future conflict, which for the purposes of this investigation I label “resilience” to measure
the  ability  of  a  country  to  absorb  FSI  shock  (OECD,  2009)  before  descending  into
intrastate conflict. In this case, it forms through the interaction of the FSI factors plus the
effects of past conflicts. Figure 3 shows the CY 2009 SEM model used in this phase.
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The complete  results  will  be presented  in  Appendix  3 however;  some critical
results are exhibited below in Table 21. First, composite reliability presents above .75 for
Cronbach’s α and well above .70 for the Dillon-Goldstein ρ, and the first eigenvalues are
consistently well above the second value. 
Illustration 3: PLS-SEM Model for CY 2009
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Latent
Variable
Dimensions Cronbach's
alpha α
D.G. Rho ρ Condition
Number
Critical
Value
Eigenvalue
Past Conflict 2 .953 .977 4.628 1.000 1.911
.089
People 3 .875 .923 3.498 1.000 2.401
.403
.196
Rage 3 .938 .960 5.798 1.000 2.670
.251
.079
Prosperity 2 .796 .908 2.215 1.000 1.661
.339
Governance 3 .936 .959 5.248 1.000 2.659
.245
.097
Externals 1
Resilience 14 .963 .969 14.766 1.000 9.770
1.797
Current
Conflict
1
Future
Conflict
4 .934 .953 5.246 1.000 3.341
.383
Table 21: Critical Results from SEM CY2009
Goodness-of-fit results display an absolute goodness of fit of .587, very close to
the bootstrap goodness of fit of .584 (Table 22).
Goodness-of-Fit Index Goodness of Fit Goodness of Fit (Bootstrap) SE Critical Ratio (CR)
Absolute .587 .584 .031 19.107
Relative .885 .873 .040 22.028
Outer Model .993 .985 .030 32.686
Inner Model .891 .886 .023 38.384
Table 22: Goodness of Fit for CY 2009 with Resilience
In addition,  latent-variable  level R2 ranges  from .067 to .805 for  the dynamic
latent variables (Table 23).
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Latent Variable R² Prob > F R² Bootstrap SE Critical Ratio (CR)
Prosperity .067 .002 .073 .024 2.808
Externals .075 .001 .090 .038 1.963
Governance .120 .000 .124 .036 3.353
People .144 .000 .149 .040 3.550
Rage .159 .000 .160 .042 3.770
Current Conflict .212 .000 .208 .043 4.916
Future Conflict .805 .000 .816 .063 12.710
Table 23: Latent Variable R2 in CY 2009 SEM with Resilience
Finally, total effects for the latent variables across the entire model are indicated
in Table 24.
Past
Conflict
01
Past
Conflict
02 PeopleRageProsperityGovernanceExternalsResilience
Current
Conflict
Past
Conflict 01
Past
Conflict 02 .911
Past
Conflict .977 .512
People .358 .300
Rage .371 .353 .000
Prosperity .246 .197 .000 .000
Governance .330 .258 .000 .000 .000
Externals .261 .201 .000 .000 .000 .000
Resilience .472 .350 .226 .241 .150 .271 .090
Current
Conflict .217 .161 .104 .111 .069 .125 .042 .460
Future
Conflict .217 .161 .104 .110 .069 .124 .041 .459 .869
Table 24: Total Effects for CY 2009 Resilience SEM
Phase  II.  Building  upon  the  concepts  explored  in  Phase  I,  I  performed  this
analysis  again,  in this  instance  employing all  conflict  years  (CY 2005-2013) as past,
current, and future conflict latent variables. Additionally, I reduced the number of FSI
latent  groups  down  from  five  to  three  based  on  factor  analysis.  Finally,  I  added  a
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superblock41 latent variable (FSI) to account for the entire range of FSI-related latent and
manifest variables and a Total Conflict superblock latent variable. Figure 4 shows the CY
2005-2013 SEM model used in this phase.
The critical results are displayed in Table 25.
Goodness of Fit Index Goodness of Fit Goodness of Fit (Bootstrap) SE Critical Ratio (CR)
Absolute .645 .642 .018 35.632
Relative .849 .850 .018 47.921
Outer Model .911 .909 .016 55.790
Inner Model .932 .936 .012 80.215
Table 25: All vs All SEM with FSI and Resilience
41 An XLSTAT feature to combine one or more latent variables.
Illustration 4: PLS-SEM All vs All
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Table 26 displays the relevant Total Effects (rotated to fit the page).
Factor Current Conflict Future Conflict Total Conflict
PAST CONFLICT-2005 .116 .115 .122
PAST CONFLICT-2006 .191 .191 .196
PAST CONFLICT-2007 .073 .073 .051
PAST CONFLICT-2008 .184 .183 .174
PAST CONFLICT-2009 .178 .180 .139
PAST CONFLICT-2010 .060 .062 .025
PAST CONFLICT-2011 .195 .195 .204
PAST CONFLICT-2012 .126 .126 .116
Past Conflict .980 .988 .730
G-1 -.024 -.029 .040
G-2 -.052 -.037 -.288
G-3 -.030 -.021 .048
FSI -.054 -.046 -.337
Resilience 1.019 1.029 .723
CURR. CONFLICT-2005 .108 .014 -.185
CURR. CONFLICT-2006 .110 -.073 -.323
CURR. CONFLICT-2007 .115 -.024 -.257
CURR. CONFLICT-2008 .111 -.089 -.349
CURR. CONFLICT-2009 .119 -.020 -.257
CURR. CONFLICT-2010 .119 .034 -.176
CURR. CONFLICT-2011 .105 -.045 -.269
CURR. CONFLICT-2012 .103 .045 -.127
CURR. CONFLICT-2013 .122 .221 .106
Current Conflict 1.806 .864
FUTURE CONFLICT-2006 .141 .216
FUTURE CONFLICT-2007 .142 .219
FUTURE CONFLICT-2008 .138 .213
FUTURE CONFLICT-2009 .148 .227
FUTURE CONFLICT-2010 .144 .221
FUTURE CONFLICT-2011 .137 .211
FUTURE CONFLICT-2012 .141 .216
FUTURE CONFLICT-2013 .136 .209
Future Conflict 1.536
Table 26: Total Effects: All vs All SEM FSI with Resilience
94
Section VI: Findings
Hypotheses Revisited:
Returning to the hypotheses under investigation and including the new hypothesis
added above, we can see: 
• H1: Do democratic peace vectors provide a statistically significant explanation of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
◦ Cannot Reject: DPT factors, when tested alone, achieve an R2 of .234 and test
as significant.
• H2:  Do  social  capital  vectors  provide  a  statistically  significant  explanation  of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
◦ Cannot Reject:  SCT factors tested alone achieve an R2 of .258 and test  as
significant.
• H3: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors provide a
statistically  significant  explanation  of  human  agency  in  contributing  to  or
preventing intrastate conflict?
◦ Cannot Reject: DPT factors, when combined with SCT factors, achieve an  R2
of  .311,  greater  than  either  SCT  or  DPT  clusters  alone,  and  present  as
significant. 
• H4: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors, including
previous conflict provide a statistically significant explanation of human agency
in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict when analyzed?
◦ Cannot  Reject:  DPT  factors  when  combined  with  SCT  factors,  including
previous conflict and analyzed in time-series, achieve a mean R2 of .175 and
present  as significant.  When analyzed in PLS-SEM, DPT and SCT factors
achieve  an R2  of  .65  with  previous  and  current  conflicts  creating  additive
effects to FSI factors in determining the indications for future conflict.
• H0: There is no link between intrastate conflict and human agency (DPT or SCT)
factors.
◦ Rejected; significant SCT, DPT, and time-series factors all present above the .
05 threshold.
Initial Policy Implications: 
These will be discussed in more depth in the conclusion.
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CHAPTER FOUR: SHOCK AND WAR:
CASE EXAMINATIONS OF SYRIA AND KENYA
In this chapter, I bring forward the analysis from the quantitative chapter to
examine two cases, Syria and Kenya, to determine whether Kantian Adaptive
Network Theory (KANT) and FSI provide explanatory value in understanding recent
conflict events in those countries.
For expanded perspective, I then work through several theoretical lenses
concerning factors affecting the breakdown of the intrastate social contract and the nature
of the center of gravity counterpoise point formed between governance and societal
elements. I then analyze the FSI in the Syrian and Kenyan cases to illuminate the elastic
and plastic stresses contributing to the recent conflict trajectories in those cases.
Section I: Drilling Down To The Cases
Building on the previous chapter’s discussion of FSI factors as conflict
components in static and dynamic perspectives, the inquiry leads to the question of
whether the macro results hold validity when focused on real-world cases. Ward,
Greenhill, and Bakke (2010) highlight the difficulty encountered when applying global
statistical analysis to drive policy in discrete cases, noting that global statistical
results ought to be re- examined at the case level to determine applicability and to
prevent misapplication of prescriptive policies that create additional havoc despite the
worthiest intentions of the donors.
This is not to assert the impossibility of applying global insights at the micro
level, but attention to an appropriate level of analysis is required. As some of my
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colleagues learned to their chagrin, workable solutions from the Iraq experience did
not apply in Afghanistan due to underlying differences in governance and societal
taxonomy. Clearly, in attempting to illuminate the distinctions of the terrain—
whether physical, mental, political, or economic—that differentiates the cases from
each other; one may better discern nuances between the cases that, if not accounted for
in one’s analysis, potentially lead to errors in policy prescriptions.
The scope of this investigation does not cover an exhaustive analysis of the
history, politics, economics, etc., of the selected cases, but rather comprises an early stage
of what could evolve into a larger investigative series. At this level, we examine the
cases to determine how, and to what extent the results from, the quantitative analysis
of the FSI through a KANT lens assists in explaining the conflicts—or lack thereof—
in Syria and Kenya.
As described in Chapter 1, my focus state is Syria. During the 1982-2011 t ime-
f rame , Syria presented as a relatively stable country, and then collapsed into civil war on
March 15, 2011. Based on the FSI rankings commencing in CY 2005, Syria consistently
ranked as a weak but stable country; however, 2011 saw a marked deterioration as
conflict erupted.
To determine the comparative case, I sought a country that would provide a
manageable, but interesting, dataset for comparison. This country needed to meet the
following criteria: a country that ranked worse than Syria yet avoided falling into civil
war during the data window.
97
One country meeting
these criteria is Kenya: It
consistently ranks worse than
Syria on the FSI,  generally
assessed  as not42 in a
measurable intrastate conflict,
and consistently ranks in  the
top 10 in statistical similarity tests compared with an average or  median country
already in a state of war (Figure 5). By many accounts, Kenya should be in a state of
war, especially given the reverberating effects of the contested 2007 election, but thus far
avoided falling into intrastate conflict during the reporting period. Thus, having met the
criteria, for the remainder of this chapter, this investigation focuses on Syria and Kenya.
42 According to the UCDP, conflicting reports present different figures for the death toll from the 
late CY 2007-2008 election violence, ranging between 800 and 1,550 deaths.
Illustration 5: Total FSI trajectory, SY vs KE
War Averted
War Erupts
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Section II: The Cases: Scene Of The DIME
Syria:
Reviewing literature and news reporting throughout CY 2010, the subject of a
Syrian civil war did not enter the discourse. Early in CY 2011, some political risk firms
mentioned the  remote possibility  of  the  opposition  demonstrations degenerating into
conflict. As late as March 11, 2011, regional commentators43 opined that Syria would not
succumb to the paroxysms of rage and resistance engulfing the Arab world. By that point,
the  “Arab  Spring”  movement swept  through  Tunisia,  Libya, Egypt,  and  other  Arab
countries in the months since a young man immolated himself in a small Tunisian
town  following a humiliating December 2010 confrontation with a market
inspector.44 The commentators asserted
Syria’s governance and economic stability,
absence of cohesion among opposition
elements, and the accepted narrative of
Syrian independence from Western
interference would insulate Syria from the
storm roiling the rest of the Arab world.
Four days later, on March 15, 2011, the
Syrian civil war erupted as Syrian government
43 Oren Kessler, “The road to Damascus,” Jerusalem Post (2011): 14; “Lebanon's Hezbollah TV 
praises Syria's measures to improve lives of its citizens,” BBC Monitoring Middle East (2011): n/a; Dawn 
of the Arab Uprisings: End of an Old Order? ed. Bassam Haddad, Rosie Basheer, and Ziad Abu-Rish 
(London, GBR: Pluto Press, 2012).
44 Kareem Fahim, "Slap to a Man’s Pride Set Off Tumult in Tunisia," New York Times (2011): 
[Cited 2015], Retrieved from http://nyti.ms/1BGHvV7
Illustration 6: Map of Syria, showing
Aleppo and Homs (Hims)
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forces  in  Aleppo  and Homs45 opened  fire  on  demonstrations  demanding  government
reform (Figure 6). However, can we describe Syria’s eruption into civil war as a truly
“black swan” event  (Taleb,  2007,  2015) devoid  of  indications  and warning and only
apparent in hindsight?
Alternatively,  by drawing on KANT can we develop strategic warning (Davis,
2002) of potential for conflict, even if we are not capable of preventing tactical surprise?
Granted, this investigation focuses post facto on Syria; however, gleaning insights from
the Syrian experience creates the possibility to prevent strategic surprise in other locales,
such as Kenya. Therefore, applying the KANT lens I intend to examine, comparable to
the complex factors that drove the fruit seller to put a match to his turpentine-soaked
clothes, detectability of the vectors expressed within the FSI of rage, repression, and
economic devastation that infected Syria long before the protests, repression, and
descent into civil war that erupted on March 15, 2011. Like the slap to the face46 that
started a revolution, did Syria’s hidden rage only lack a trigger to shatter the illusion of
stability?
Kenya:
Kenyan47 President Kibaki’s contested reelection in December 2007 brought
charges of vote rigging from Orange Democratic Movement candidate Raila Odinga and
unleashed two months of ethnic and group violence, killing as many as 1,500
45 Map from CIA World Factbook 2011 edition, annotations by Dennis Sullivan.
46 Whether the slap actually occurred is a matter of debate; however, the after effects of the 
narrative of the slap still echo across the protest squares and shelled buildings.
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people.48 Rapid mobilization of  domestic Kenyan  nongovernmental organizations
combined with regional international mediation led by former UN Secretary General
Kofi Annan in late February 2008 resulted in a power-sharing accord bringing
Odinga into the government in the restored position of prime minister. The power-
sharing accord included a broad reform agenda  including acceding to  demands for
constitutional reform.
In August 2010, Kenyans overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution in a
national referendum. This new constitution introduced additional checks and balances to
executive power and devolved power and resources to 47 newly created counties. It also
eliminated the position of prime minister following the first presidential election
under the new constitution, which occurred on March 4, 2013. Uhuru Kenyatta won the
March elections in the first round by a close margin and entered into office on April 9,
2013.
Economically, with the discovery of extensive oil reserves near the Rift Valley,
Kenya, in conjunction with neighboring Uganda, Ethiopia, and South Sudan, construction
47 Amalgamated from CIA World Factbook; Kenya Country Page, The World Factbook 2013-14. 
Washington, DC: Central Intelligence Agency, 2013; https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world- 
factb," in Central Intelligence Agency [database online]. Washington, DC. Retrieved from 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ke.html; "U.S. travel warning helps wash 
away Kenya tourism | The Seattle Times " [cited 2015]. Retrieved from 
http://www.seattletimes.com/life/travel/us-travel-warning-helps-wash-away-kenya-touris  m/; "Kenya From 
Nowhere Plans East Africa’s First Oil Exports: Energy - Bloomberg Business " [cited 2015]. Retrieved 
from http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-08-19/kenya-from-nowhere-plans-east-africa-s-first- 
oil-exports-energy; "The root-causes of Kenya's post-election crisis | D+C - Development + Cooperation " 
[cited 2015]. Retrieved from http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/root-causes-kenyas-post-election-c  risis., "Civil 
society organizations in Kenya strive to prevent election violence in the future | D+C - Development + 
Cooperation " [cited 2015]. Retrieved from http://www.dandc.eu/en/article/civil-society-organisations- 
kenya-strive-prevent-election-violence-future; and Paul Collier and Pedro C. Vicente, "Violence, bribery, 
and fraud: the political economy of elections in Sub-Saharan Africa," Public Choice 153, no. 1-2 (2012): 
117-147.
48 As noted in the text above, estimates range from 800 to 1,550 people, depending on the source.
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is intended to begin on a transport corridor and oil pipeline to the Indian Ocean refineries
and shipping ports. Based on petroleum discoveries, the Kenyan government projects
energy independence within five years and improving economic conditions for all
Kenyans.
Kenya’s economy struggles due to corruption and reliance on primarily
agricultural production subject to volatile global prices. Low infrastructure investment
threatens Kenya’s long-term position as the largest East African economy, although the
Kenyatta administration prioritized infrastructure development. International financial
lenders and donors remain important to Kenya’s economic growth and development.
Unemployment remains consistently high, hovering around 40% for at least the last 10
years.
The country endures chronic budget deficits, although the government intends that
the recent oil discoveries and improved revenue legislation and collection methods
provide some relief. Inflationary pressures and sharp currency depreciation peaked in
early 2012 but have since abated following low global food and fuel prices and monetary
interventions by the Central Bank.
Recent attacks conducted by Somalia-based terrorists in Kenya and the effects of
this terrorism on the surrounding region threatens Kenya’s important tourism industry
and places additional pressure on the government to accelerate the petroleum project
to alleviate ethnic and inter-regional grievances exacerbated by the loss of  tourist
revenue.
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Section III: Additional Points Of Analysis And Comparison
This examination centers on applying KANT, which is composed of elements of
DPT, SCT, conflict as a social activity, resilience, and lagged over time to illuminate
critical factors exacerbating or ameliorating the impetus to conflict. Building on the
previous chapter’s results achieved employing the FSI to drive linear regression,
multivariate regression, logistic regression, VAR analysis, and SEM, the FSI factors
presenting the largest explanatory value include:
• Group Grievance • Human Rights • Legitimacy of the 
State
• Poverty and Economic 
Decline 
• Refugees and 
IDPs 
• Security Apparatus
Among those listed, the most significant FSI effects, as determined through a
False Discovery Rate LogWorth process49 listed in Figure 7 include Grievance,
Refugees, Legitimacy,  and
Poverty/ Economic Decline.50
Second, as noted in
Chapter 2 and consistent with
Kalyvas (2006), these factors
may interact in concert,
which introduces a question of
harmony or discord, to amplify or mitigate the effects of other factors when contributing
49 The Response Screening Personality in Fit Model” [cited 2015]. Retrieved from 
http://www.jmp.com/support/help/The_Response_Screening_Personality_in_Fit_Model.shtml.  
50 This is not to say that the other factors are irrelevant; however, these results warrant further 
investigation to determine whether there is a greater risk for false positives (Type I errors) given the 
scarcity of observations when applying FSI factors.
Illustration 7: Response screening results reduced FSI
vs master conflict
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to or ameliorating conflict. Yet, Evans (2006) and Arnson and Zartman (2005) counseled
that each conflict potentially presents a unique combination of factors—illuminating the
possibility of an FSI “fingerprint”—that may challenge larger generalizations and require
a more nuanced FSI analysis, or broadening the aperture to include non-FSI factors.
Finally, in considering the cases, we must be aware of the iterative spiral: time and the
flash-to-bang delay that combine to create significant downstream effects several years
after treatment.
These results drive analysis at the case level, provided we bear in mind that
nuances in cases might justify adjustments in technique. Over the next several sections, I
describe several additional conceptual lenses through which I assess Kenya and Syria’s
performance in the dynamic real-world environment affecting KANT and the
corresponding FSI indicators.
Fragile? By Whose Standards?
Whereas the failed/fragile state concept provides a starting point for this
discussion, and the FSI itself provides the data for the quantitative analysis, an
exhaustive examination of the failed state literature lies beyond the scope of this
investigation. Of note, Migdal (1988), Helman and Ratner (1993), Zartman (1994),
Gros (1996), and the OECD (2009) established the discussion and ramifications of
failing states, followed afterward by critique of the failed state literature by Call (2008)
and Solomon (2013).
However, high failed/fragile state rankings do not necessarily lead to intrastate
conflict. As discovered during the calculations for Chapter 3, FSI rank by itself correlates
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in univariate mode against Master Conflict at .33 with an  R2 of .11, but drops from
consideration on Prob>|t| when included in multivariate regression with all FSI factors.
Crossing these discussions, FFP (2013) establishes that the critical taxonomy of
failed/fragile states includes:
• Loss of physical control of territory
• Loss of a monopoly on the legitimate use of force
• Erosion of legitimate decision-making authority
• Inability to provide reasonable public services
• Inability to interact with other states as a full member of the international
• community
Discussions on the nature of failed/fragile states in terms of intrastate conflict
revolve around the observer’s perspective and the relationship between the governance
structures and the various societal elements, frequently referred to as the social contract.
In this case, the term social contract encompasses the more specific constructs
including aggregate-psychological theory and system/value consensus theory (Gurr,
1971; Skocpol, 1979), Gregor, 2014).
Murshed and Addison (2006), building on Rousseau (1762),51, 52 contended that
peace in societies rests on iterative social contracts between governance and society in a
dynamic equilibrium between centrifugal vectors measuring the nation-state’s movement
away from cohesion, balanced against centripetal vectors measuring the movement
toward cohesion (Sartori, 1976; Cox, 1990; Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005). As
the social  contract’s equilibrium deteriorates, as the centrifugal vectors gain
51 Or the Mandate of Heaven in Sino-influenced societies Jiang Yonglin, Mandate of Heaven and 
the Great Ming Code (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 2010).
52 Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals further builds upon Rousseau’s social contract, building a case
for the hierarchy of the civil state (as a condition), with a presupposition of deference to the expectedly 
enlightened wisdom of the incumbent ruler.
105
supremacy, the probability of conflict increases until such point of social contract
failure exhibits disruption by descent into conflict (Sartori, 1976:145).
To paraphrase Wendt (1992), the social contract, like anarchy, is what its
participants make of it. This inverts the external focus on absolute judgments by the
global community concerning this listed taxonomy to a relative perspective
concerning the assessment of fragility/failure by those who must live under that
structure. They, after all, constitute the actors making the decision to accept the status
quo—now and up to x many lags into the estimated future(s)—or to commence action
across their aspects of power53 to exert pressure for reform or revolution. Similarly, the
governance entities seek to contain or control demand signals within the contractual
participants through use of their aspects of power.
How external actors assess the state of the state matters less to a resident or
government official than the extent to which those residents and officials relate to each
other in terms of legitimacy of force or authority, the nature of “reasonable” services, or
representation to external actors (OECD, 2009).54 Estimations considered by an outside
53 Diplomacy/statecraft, information, military/force, and economic pressures/incentives.
54 OECD document discussion on resilience, my commentary noted in << >> The social contract, 
we argue, emerges from the interaction between expectations that a given society has of a given state; 
<<and of its relations with different parts of society with each other, whether cooperative or competitive, or 
coopetive>>>; state capacity to provide services, including security, and to secure revenue from its 
population and territory to provide these services (in part a function of economic resources; élite(s) will to 
direct state resources and capacity to fulfill social expectations. It is crucially mediated by d) the existence 
of political processes through which the bargain between state and society is struck, reinforced and 
institutionalized. Finally, e) legitimacy plays a complex additional role in shaping expectations and 
facilitating political process. Legitimacy is also produced and replenished – or, conversely, eroded – by the 
interaction among the other four factors. Legitimacy has various domestic forms and sources, which are not
always mutually reinforcing: embedded or residual legitimacy, deriving from prior state formation or other 
historical dynamics; performance legitimacy, which derives from effective and equitable service delivery; 
and process legitimacy. Legitimacy can also derive from international recognition and reinforcement, 
although this especially can be at odds with domestic sources of legitimacy.
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entity highlighting a disturbing devolution of the provision of public services away from
expectations that are based on external norms of a just, credible, and well-functioning
service regime merely only have to achieve a level “good enough” for the provider and
recipients in a manner mutually adjudicated between them.
Indeed, Call (2008) highlighted a variation of the Peltzman Effect55 (Peltzman,
1998), observing that risks introduced by well-meaning external actors seeking to
intervene in an internal condition of a failed/fragile state, mostly to assuage their
own internal political demands, which ultimately resulted in exacerbating the
conditions they seek to alleviate. As we realize from the external intervention FSI
factor results from Chapter 3, this does not imply that all interventions create
detrimental results, but does introduce necessity for caution combined with deeper
analysis of the situation, planned intervention, and risk analysis  of second-  and third-
order effects.
Here we note potential  limits of employing the FSI, at least within the
analytical techniques applied thus far. Analysis of the FSI reveals social contract
stresses forming conditions conducive to—or alleviating—conflict, yet the insufficiency
of granularity due to the yearly time-series lag of FSI iterations apparently restricts our
ability to perceive proximate trigger events of a conflict.
The FSI lacks the granularity to illuminate the aspirations, frustrations, and
intentions of the protagonists. FSI analysis remains further limited by its undefined sub-
55 A regulatory regime whose primary purpose existential purpose seeks to prevent some negative 
outcome is doomed to failure. “Regulation seldom changes the forces that were producing the particular 
result the regulators seek to change (Peltzman, 2004)
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factors in the FFP’s methodology, obstructing our ability to cull significant factors
representing the centrifugal–centripetal dynamic. At the case level, does the centrifugal–
centripetal dynamic tension between demands and decisions evolve in consonance or
discord? Viewed in that lens, modalities of breaking a fragile state bear striking
similarities to perspectives derived from the physical sciences.
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Section IV: Breaking The Fragile State
Brittle Systems:
As observed in the FSI, a number of fragile states persist in their debility without
descending into conflict, indicating the possible existence of an additional quality in
proximate sequence between fragility and conflict. To examine this potential progression,
insights from the physical sciences introduce the concept of brittleness and cascading
system failure.
Bush, Hershey, and Vosburgh (1999) noted that physical or technical systems
repeatedly exhibit brittle behavior, sometimes defined as a sudden and steep decline in
performance as the system state changes due to strains56 that exceed specified operating
boundaries. Two forms of strain, elastic (reversible) and plastic (permanent), act on the
system. In a brittle system, plastic strain creates degradation from which the system
cannot recover, whereas a brittle system can recover from reversible, elastic strain.
Systems, whether economic or physical, endure stresses in three ways: shocks,
ratchet, and shock and ratchet (Smithies, 1957; Corden, 1981; Guillamont, 1999; Roland,
2000; Kreps and Wallis, 2003). Shocks comprise short duration but high-intensity
increases in stress directed against vulnerable areas. Ratchet indicates a steady, gradual
change in pressure against fault lines; a ductile system will adjust to the pressure, whereas
a plastic system will resist adjustment until the stress overcomes the ability of the system
to resist and the system fails in rapid succession. Finally, shock and ratchet indicates a
56 To carry the analogy further, ductility measures the amount of permanent strain the system can 
absorb prior to fracture. Stress is the distance by which a parameter exceeds tolerance. A brittle fracture 
occurs with very little energy absorption, whereas a ductile fracture absorbs much energy.
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combination of shock and ratchet, consisting of shocks against some vulnerabilities with
gradual increases in stress in other or the same vulnerabilities.
Based on Bush et al. (1999) criteria, nation-states also display brittle properties,
wherein the dynamic systems between governance and populations exhibit vulnerability
to stresses that exceed the capability of the governance and society to rebound from
shocks and ratcheted pressure.
Cascading Failure:
These concepts provide perspective for physical and technical systems. Therefore,
how does one exceed the “specified operating tolerance” of a country or society? To that
point, Motter and Lai (2002) note that many real-world physical and technical networks
are heterogeneous, deliberately designed to exploit certain advantages contained within
each subsystem to accomplish a certain task when operating in concert. Heterogeneous
systems also possess dissimilar vulnerability to stresses, both plastic and elastic. This
combination of vulnerabilities, considered faults, permeates this amalgamation, with the
risks of those faults accepted through the designers’ risk management processes. This
amalgamation of biased systemic interface zones offers strengths applicable to certain
tasks while simultaneously increasing vulnerability to undergo large-scale cascade
failures when overstresses affect vital nodes.
Center Of Gravity:
Harley’s (1997) discussion of Clausewitz’ center of gravity (COG) concept
bridges the gap between cascading failure in physical systems and targeted cascading
failure in social constructs, especially those in a state of conflict. Strange and Iron (2004)
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expand on Clausewitz through examination of the moral COG to demonstrate linkages
between the COG of a political entity, including leaders, ruling elites, and groups within
the population, and identification of the decisional nexus. Although the “source of power
and movement” (Strange & Iron, 2004:23) built upon the supportive foundations of
an entity, COG, constructed of heterogeneous critical capabilities, also charts the
critical vulnerabilities within the system that hold the potential for the system’s
destruction when stressed through shocks  and/or  ratchets  beyond  the recuperative
capability of the system.
Whereas Clausewitz asserted the necessity for opposition—“a center of gravity is
relevant only in relation to an enemy” (Strange & Iron, 2004:24)—I contend a COG
exhibits both latent/potential and kinetic characteristics in similar manner to energy-based
systems (McCall, 2010). Latent COG functions when operationalized  to  accomplish
uncontested  governance or societal tasks.
Conversely, building on Schmitt’s (1932, 1996)
concept of opposition, kinetic COG analysis
highlights dynamic tension between opposed
antagonists within the social contract, whether preservationist and revisionist (Table 27).
Their vectors contribute to intrastate conflict when elements within the social contract
construct commence  placing  stresses (demands) on  the  system, culminating, in some
cases, in complete system disruption.
With the exception of Schalch (1997) and Gregor (2014), pursuing examination of
COG vectors affecting the tendency toward or away from intrastate conflict appears as an
COG Matrix DemocraticAutocratic
PreservationistDP AP
Revisionist DR AR
Table 27: COG Matrix: Democracy,
Autocracy, Preservationist, & Revisionist
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area under-investigated within the intrastate conflict literature, contrasted with the larger
body of COG work for interstate conflict. This gap leads to a  contention  that we can
develop deeper insight through further accounting for the nature of the COG nexus of
that system and the “barycentric nexus” formed by the COG of the incumbent and the
opponents, once opposition forms. Each oppositional element operates in the span
between democratic and autocratic tendencies, differentiated by the qualities of
preservationist or revisionist impulses. A conflict system within a democratic–
revisionist-dominant dynamic presents a different COG analysis compared with a more
autocratic– preservationist system and possesses an alternate composite of
vulnerabilities.
Strange and Iron (2004) expanded the
COG concept to illustrate the relationship
between the COG and the component factors
of Critical Capability (CC), Critical
Requirement (CR), and Critical Vulnerability
(CV). As presented in Figure 8, each CC
comprises one or more CR, which in turn
comprises one or more CV.57
Returning to the security dynamics of DIME/PMESII discussed in earlier
chapters, DIME58 comprises the aspects of (national) power, e offensively or defensively.
57 Often notated as CVCRCCCOG.
58 Diplomatic, Information, Military, and Economic
Illustration 8: COG Diagram, 
Beavers, 2003
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PMESII59 comprises the simplest taxonomy for CC, with a myriad of options and
permutations of CR and CV. DIME aspects protect one’s PMESII while seeking
advantage (attacking) over an opponents’ PMESII, who in turn is manipulating their
DIME against their opponent’s PMESII. Strategists, Sun Tzu, through Clausewitz, and
into the modern era all stress the requirement to create asymmetric alignments of power,
referred to here as DIME, against capabilities, PMESII, to achieve desired effects of
bending the opponent to one’s will.
Adding a polity discriminant to
the FSI (Table 28) regression
illuminates the difference between
varying polity levels and highlights a
potential critical path to determining
the critical vulnerabilities within
autocratic systems compared with
democratic systems.  Applying
deleterious effects across multiple CVs
along a critical path creates cascading systemic failures at  the CC level, which in a
brittle system affects the speed of system collapse. Military operations, such as Ullman
and Wade’s (1996) Rapid Dominance or Falzon’s (2006) Centre of Gravity
Network Effects concept may seek to create this system collapse artificially and in a
controlled manner to achieve military objectives.
59 Political, Military, Economic, Social, Information, and Infrastructure.
Polity Calculation Value
8 R2 .330
7 R2 .500
-7 R2 .490
Polity Term vs Master Conflict Prob>|t|
8 Poverty and Economic Decline .000
8 Refugees and IDPs .010
8 Uneven Development .010
8 Legitimacy of the State .020
8 External Intervention .030
7 Poverty and Economic Decline .010
7 Human Rights .050
-7 Poverty and Economic Decline .000
-7 Demographic Pressures .030
-7 Public Services .050
Table 28: Sample FSI regressed vs Master Conflict,
by polity level
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In contrast, civil disorder tends to progress in an iteratively disjointed model
within a longer timescale between the rational choice and ideological factions within the
governance and societal antagonists. 
Zimmermann (1987) observed the
more ideological and more autocratic
factions tending toward earlier responses
involving violence as the debate over resources, demands, and decisions evolves. Table
29 depicts the vectors within the democracy <->autocracy | preservationist <->
revisionist | rational <-> ideological configuration space.
Quality of COG affects the nature of how to support and deconstruct a regime
through stresses and supports along critical vulnerabilities. In the cases of Syria and
Kenya, Syria presents as an autocratic preservationist regime with tendencies toward
predominantly ideological attitudes of President Assad, supported by the Syrian Ba’ath
Party and Alawite elites. The Assad regime initially faced opposition from the democratic
revisionist rational choice movement of the political opposition that evolved into the Free
Syria Army. Ultimately, the autocratic revisionist ideological movement of the self-styled
Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS, also known as Daesh) entered the fray.
By contrast, Kenya’s recent political history presents, in CY 2007, a democratic
preservationist rational regime (Kibaki/PNU) versus democratic revisionist rational
challengers (Odinga/ODM). Later, the CY 2013 contest pitted democratic revisionist
rational (Odinga/ODM) and democratic revisionist rational (Kenyatta/TNA). The COG of
Attitude MatrixRational ChoiceIdeological
DP DP-RC DP-I
AP AP-RC AP-I
DR DR-RC DR-I
AR AR-RC AR-I
Table 29: COG Attitude Matrix:
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Kenyan political groups diverges compared with those of Syrian groups, and as such will
create different conditions through which FSI and KANT vectors drive analysis.
Breaking Bad—from Grievance To Conflict:
Contrary to Waltz (1959), civil war does not lurk around the intrastate periphery
merely awaiting removal of obstacles; rather, the process generally entails multiple
fractures and stresses in the social contract building over a period, culminating in the
outbreak of violence. FSI data indicate that only 14% of countries descended into or
continued intrastate conflict in any given year between CY 2005 and 2013. Optimally,
states should not descend into conflict through random change, as Motter and Lai (2002)
observed that random breakdown rarely achieves systemic failure; such deterioration
requires active participation. As Collier and Hoeffler (2004) noted, grievance, like crime,
requires motive and opportunity.
However, FSI results in Chapter 360 call into question Collier and Hoeffler’ s
(2004) conclusion concerning greed as a primary explanation for conflict. Group
Grievance presents as most significant, indicating a prima facie case to examine
grievance and its component for relevance to macro global issues, as well as Kenya and
Syria as cases.
This social capital line of inquiry lends strength to the conflict trajectory resulting
from the devolution of recognition as noted by Wendt (1992, 1999) interpolating Hegel
(1807), reinforced by Cahan (2013), the degenerative micro-conflict process described by
Parsa (2000), and combined with the ideological hardening described by Zimmermann
60 Group Grievance, Refugees/IDPs, Legitimacy of the State, and Poverty and Economic Decline –
in that order.
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(1987). As groups on the governance and societal sides shift toward increasingly
ideological stances to maintain internal cohesion in the challenge of external demands,
internal dissent, and degradation of expectations of negotiated future security (Lake &
Rothchild, 1998), negotiating positions likewise shift from rational to ideological.
Concurrently, the gradual demonization of the other (Markell, 2003) degrades
their mutual recognition; the other transforms, across multiple possible cleavages,
such as ethnicity (Lake & Rothchild, 2008), through malicious misrecognition from
a social contract partner, to an opponent, to an enemy. In parallel with the devolution of
the  other, the impetus to win, to force compliance upon the other regardless of costs,
degrades the fabric of the social contract.
The status quo, in most cases, championed by the governance structures, even
when reinforced  through  repressive  physical and  information actions, maintains a
psychological advantage in the negotiation and prioritization of the revisionist demand
signals expressed by societal elements (Mann, 1993). The red line between protests and
rebellion wears thin, but surmounting that line remains problematic. The revisionist
elements confront internal psychological barriers to overcome the societal inertia
against collective action (Olson, 1971; Edel, 1979). Outright rebellion requires a
Shakespearean61 “screwing of courage to a sticking point.” Such calculus presents as a
variation of an inverse prisoner’s dilemma, in this case styled as a rebel’s dilemma.
The participants must identify the necessity to rebel; identify the opportunity to rebel;
recruit assistance to rebel, which causes the risk calculus between increasing the chance
61 "Macbeth " [cited 2015]. Retrieved from 
http://www.folgerdigitaltexts.org/?chapter=5&play=Mac&loc=line-1.7.69  .  
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of success against increased risk of apprehension and the attendant increased
risk/punishment; resolve that rebellion becomes preferable to acquiescing to continued
repression; and commence operations. 
As Achenwall62 (1765), Fearon and Laitin (2003), Collier and Hoeffler (2004), and
Taydas (2006) observed, the participants convert desperation to action when they perform
the psychological calculus determining that the risks of rebellion outweigh the desolation
of accepting the status quo—they have nothing left to lose.
Autocracies sharpen the gulf between risk and reward when they grow excessively
ideological independent of the demand signals from their societal elements. Bazzi and
Blattman (2014) showed that the institutionalized checking of executive power reduces
incentives for a violent overthrow, and presents less resilience to changes in state revenue.
It follows that centralized, less competitive regimes heighten the potential payoff of the
state prize effect. With Syria ranking at a (-7) on the Polity IV63 scale indicating
heightened levels of autocracy, the barriers to rebellion, once breached, become more
problematic to mediate.
At the opposite limit of the polity scale, Marinov and Goemans (2014) asserted
that higher levels of democracy open the burgeoning conflict to international norms
against rebellion. Major players at the international level professed a commitment to
62 Achenwall, as quoted by Kant, in Reiss’ Kant: Political Writings: “If the danger which threatens
the commonwealth as a result of long endurance of injustices from the head of state is greater than the 
danger to be feared from taking up arms against him, the people may then resist him. It may use this right to 
abrogate its contract of subjection and to dethrone him as a tyrant.”
63 "PolityProject " [cited 2015]. Retrieved from http://www.systemicpeace.org/polityproje  ct.html.  
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defend democracy, including options to punish attempts to depose elected incumbents,
which tends to incentivize reform rather than revolution.
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Section V: Kenya, Syria, And The FSI
Descending To Conflict
Arnson and Zartman (2005:262) claimed:
“[quantitative statistical studies] do not explain civil conflict; they
explain conflict with more than 1,000 deaths, which is a bit like explaining
human growth by starting at the age of twelve years.”
However, this investigation shows that statistical analysis does in fact provide
insight into burgeoning conflict years before conflict reaches 1,000 deaths.
In this section, I examine the FSI data to conduct a low-level time series
comparison between Syria and Kenya on selected factors chosen by  multivariate
and sequential regression, utilizing the Kenyan and Syrian data extracted from the FSI
Master Conflict dataset used in Chapter 3.
The left side of the chart depicts the raw FSI data with an active linear trend-line
for selected factors; the right side depicts the FSI Δ (percentage change) at each lag. This
helps identify shocks and/or ratchets within the FSI data that may denote exacerbation or
alleviation of contributions toward conflict.
As noted in Chapter 3, FSI factors hold significant effect toward conflict occurring
as far downstream as 5 to 7 years lagged after the shock. Yet, building a model from the
FSI appears problematic due to a dearth of specific case observations, presenting only
nine lags in this particular  dataset. Working with the FFP and deconstructing their data
sources potentially provides additional granularity to make more nuanced predictive
analysis, especially if incorporated in a Bayesian Belief Network or similar engine.
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Group Grievance
Illustration 9: FSI Group Grievance comparison: KE vs SY
With Group Grievance presenting at R2 of .21 and significance extending up to 5
years downstream, Group Grievance offers a crucial starting point for this time series
analysis (Figure 9).
Syria: This time series presents as a shock–ratchet combination. The initial shock
following the drought-related crop failures and government responses in CY 2006
improves briefly during 2007-2008, and begins a steady climb through the second year of
the civil war. The spike in CY 2006 opened a 5- to 7-year civil war vulnerability period,
exacerbated by the steady ratchet indicating failure of the governance and societal
elements to reach agreement. With Syria presenting as a highly autocratic state on the
Polity IV scale (polity: -7), Group Grievance reflects deep fractures within the social
contract. Additionally, high autocracy ranks tend toward more rapid devolution of the
social contract into a state-prize melee. Other factors and subsets of those factors may
offer key exacerbating or alleviating data as Syria descended into conflict in CY 2011.
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Kenya: This presents as a shock and release, with a major spike culminating in
CY 2009. Short-lived improvements in Kenyan Group Grievance by CY 2011 revert to
increased Group Grievance by the culmination of the data period. Kenya presents as a
mid– high-level democracy on the Polity IV scale (Polity average = 7.5); however, the
CY 2009 spike indicates a conflict vulnerability within the 5- to 7-year window. Further,
as a mid– high democracy, other factors (discussed below), especially Legitimacy of
the State, potentially  perform a  greater role in  exacerbating or  alleviating  a conflict
trajectory.
Poverty And Economic Decline
Illustration 10: FSI Poverty comparison: KE vs SY
When analyzed specifically in the context of Syria, Group Grievance, and Poverty
and Economic Decline present an R2 of .91 when regressed in multivariate mode against
Master Conflict (Figure 10).
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Syria: The CY 2006-2011 drought and subsequent Syrian governmental
mismanagement64 both water and economic resources took their toll on the economic
sustainability of Syria, directly contributing to the conflict that erupted 5 years later. In
Figure 10, the Poverty and Economic Decline FSI factor spiked in the CY 2006 period
and remained high for the next several years. The shock of total crop failure led to large-
scale population migration, massive public and private debt, and depletion of Syrian
government reserves.65 
As Gleick (2014) assessed, government mismanagement of water resources
exacerbated the problem. Femia and Werrell (2013) directly tied the drought and
subsequent economic effects to the CY 2011 conflict outbreak, highlighting the 5-year lag
between the crop failures to the conflict. Adding the shock and ratchet from the Group
Grievance critical factor above, Syria’s conflict vulnerability opened in CY 2006, and
mediating factors failed, despite the modest improvements to Syrians’ fortunes in the CY
2010-2011 period.
Kenya: In the face of the effects from the CY 2007-2008 global financial crisis
and a similar, although less severe, East African drought, Kenya weathered the
64 "A rural exodus as drought takes hold of Syria | Toronto Star" [cited 2015]. Retrieved from 
http://www.thestar.com/news/world/2013/03/16/a_rural_exodus_as_drought_takes_hold_of_syria.html  ; 
"Syria: Climate Change, Drought and Social Unrest « The Center for Climate & Security" [cited 2015]; 
Retrieved from http://climateandsecurity.org/2012/02/29/syria-climate-change-drought-and-social-unre  st/  ; 
"New Agriculturist: News brief - Crops fail in Syria" [cited 2015]. Retrieved from http://www.new- 
ag.info/en/news/newsitem.php?a=593; "Sowing the Seeds of Dissent: Economic Grievances and the Syrian 
Social Contract’s Unraveling " in Jadaliya [database online]. 02/16/2012 [cited 2015]. Retrieved from 
http://www.jadaliyya.com/pages/index/4383/sowing-the-seeds-of-dissent_economic-grievances-an  ; 
Peter H. Gleick, "Water, Drought, Climate Change, and Conflict in Syria," Weather, Climate, and Society 6, 
no. 3 (2014): 331-340; and Caitlin E. Werrell and Francesco Femia, The Arab Spring and Climate Change: 
A Climate and Security Correlations Series, Center for American Progress, 2013.
65 Bureau of Statistics, Syrian. http://www.cbssyr.org/index-EN.htm  
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economic shocks in healthier shape than Syria. However, as illustrated in Figure
10, Kenya’s experience resembles a  saw-tooth waveform, indicating multiple recurring
system shocks. Concurrent with Kenya’s Group Grievance spike in CY 2009,
Kenya’s conflict vulnerability window extends through at least the next 2 years, barring
other ameliorating factors.
Legitimacy Of The State
Illustration 11: Legitimacy of the State, with SY vs KE voter turnouts
Legitimacy of the State affects the nature of societal relationship to the
governance structure, presenting significance in democratic Polity levels 2, 8, and 9
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and autocratic Polity levels -3 and -4. With Kenya demonstrating Polity level 8 for 3
years within the dataset, I opted to add Legitimacy of the State to the analysis.
Of interest, the election turnout data (IDEA, 2013) provide perspective inside the
FSI data. The chart highlights the reversal between the Syrian and Kenyan electorates
between CY 1998 and 2012, indicating increasing disengagement on the part of Syrian
voters, whereas Kenyan voters’ participation in the election process grew despite the
violence and controversy surrounding the Kenyan election processes.
Syria: A small shock occurred in CY 2008, combined with the Group Grievance
and Poverty and Economic Decline shocks the year prior that contributed to the conflict
vulnerability window.
Kenya: Similar to Poverty and Economic decline, we observe a saw-tooth pattern
in CY 2007 and 2009, with leveling out in CY 2011-2013. With Kenya’s mid–high
democracy Polity rating and the improvement in Legitimacy of the State, the vulnerability
window opened between Group Grievance, and Poverty and Economic Decline holding
potential for amelioration in the CY 2015-2016 window.
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KE And SY Percentage Change
Illustration 12: Percentage FSI Change, SY & KE
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Examining the three factors as COG critical capabilities shows that both Syria and
Kenya endured systemic shocks in CY 2006 and 2009, respectively. The difference
appears that Kenya, as a democracy, possesses deeper systemic resiliency to absorb
shocks elastically, whereas Syria’s more autocratic social construct demonstrated greater
brittleness, with events creating plastic shock, exceeding Syria’s capacity to recover from
these stresses.
In this light, Taleb’s black swan concept loses explanatory value; had analysts
observed these FSI changes upstream, the eruption of conflict in March 2011 might have
proven less surprising. Kenya, however, still faces reverberating effects from the CY
2009 crisis that hold potential to affect events several years downstream. I remain
hopeful that this investigation provides concepts and inspiration for tools to
effectively predict and alleviate crisis conditions preemptively. Lives depend on it.
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CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS, AND WAY AHEAD
This chapter reviews my findings from this investigation, discusses policy options
and other implications, and highlights opportunities for follow-on research.
This  investigation  focused  on  the  development  of  a  hybrid  theory,  which  I
designated  as  KANT,  to  examine  the  indications  and  warnings  of  intrastate  conflict
available within the FSI dataset. In this case, I examined the efficacy of the FSI, refined
through a combination of DPT, SCT, social contracts, and COG theory—all operating
within a contingent, iterative time stream—toward illuminating intrastate conflict risk.
The  FSI,  although  not  manifestly  determinant  for  intrastate  conflict,  contains
indications of systemic brittleness, which when subjected to critical path stresses, also
reflected in the FSI, illuminate conditions conducive to conflict.
This brittleness reflects strengths and vulnerabilities of the combined DPT–SCT
interactions,  and  presents  opportunities  for  targeted  policy  interventions  within  the
constraints of highly nuanced situational analysis of discrete cases. 
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Section I: Chapter Review
Chapter 1 
This  chapter  presented  the  inspiration  for  my  investigation,  from  career
experiences to academic pursuits. I set the stage for the investigation through a discussion
on the trajectory of political  philosophy leading into political  science. Moving further
from philosophy toward operationalizing results,  I  then connected  the insights gained
through  the  political  science  processes  into  the  iterative  loop  of  providing  policy
recommendations. 
This  chapter  assessed the “what” and “why”  of  the modalities  of  the broader
political science process. This discussion provides placement within the broader context
and grounding within the raison d'être of political science. In this section, I highlighted
how political philosophy and theory inspires and shapes the political science processes,
including OODA Loop and the trajectory from data to wisdom. In an optimal construct,
insights from political science then inform policy recommendations. 
Chapter 2 
This chapter covered the configuration space and the development of the relevant
conceptual underpinning of this investigation, which I identified as KANT. The chapter
started with a discussion of the development of Kant’s Perpetual Peace into Russett and
Oneal's evolution of DPT, incorporated Putnam’s SCT, which similarly owes its lineage
to Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals,  and discussed their  potential  relevance to intrastate
conflict. Additional discussions on related literature provided supplementary perspective
to place this investigation with the larger intrastate conflict teleological schema. 
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A  question  about  DPT’s  relationship  to  intrastate  conflict  initiated  this
investigation.  However,  the  inquiry expanded to incorporate  SCT,  and by Chapter  4,
added elements of social  contract theory and COG theory.  Other investigators’  works
provided context, and provided examination of two critical concerns. 
First, the competition created within the rich body of intra-state conflict literature
focusing on univariate explanatory results, exemplified by Collier and Hoeffler, which
falls short of accommodating the extensive breadth of nuanced factors evident in intra-
state conflict development. 
On the other hand, a more recent focus on multivariate analysis, exemplified by
Goldstone et al., presents interesting results with indications and warning implications,
yet remains deficient in explaining formal civic and informal social network effects upon
intra-state conflict. 
Chapter 3 
This  chapter  explored  the  hypotheses,  quantitative  datasets,  and  statistical
methodologies applied to the data to highlight the explanatory value of DPT and SCT
toward indications and warning of potential intrastate conflicts.
The following results presented: 
 H1: Do democratic peace vectors provide a statistically significant explanation of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
o Yes. DPT factors, when tested alone, achieve an   R2 of .234 and test as
significant.
 H2:  Do  social  capital  vectors  provide  a  statistically  significant  explanation  of
human agency in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict?
o Yes. SCT factors tested alone achieve an R2 of .258 and test as significant.
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 H3: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors provide a
statistically  significant  explanation  of  human  agency  in  contributing  to  or
preventing intrastate conflict?
o Yes. DPT factors, when combined with SCT factors, achieve an  R2 of .
311,  greater  than  either  SCT  or  DPT  cluster  alone,  and  present  as
significant. 
 H4: Do democratic peace vectors augmented by social capital vectors, including
previous conflict; provide a statistically significant explanation of human agency
in contributing to or preventing intrastate conflict when analyzed?
o Yes. DPT factors when combined with SCT factors, including previous
conflict and analyzed in time series, achieve a mean R2 of .175 and present
as significant. When analyzed in PLS-SEM, DPT and SCT factors achieve
an R2 of .65 with previous and current conflicts creating additive effects to
FSI factors in determining the indications for future conflict.
 H0: There is no link between intrastate conflict and human agency (DPT or SCT)
factors.
o Rejected; significant SCT, DPT, and time-series factors all present above
the .05 threshold
Analysis  fixed at  static  moments  in time forms just  a portion of the results;  I
illuminated additional lenses affecting the performance of the FSI factors as indications
and warning of conflict, specifically the downstream time-lag effect and resiliency. These
lenses perform critical roles in the case studies in Chapter 4. 
Each analytic method presented tiered factors; however, common results placed
Group Grievance, Poverty and Economic Decline, Legitimacy of the State, and Human
Rights consistently within the top four most significant factors. 
Further,  within  these  results,  I  developed  interesting  observations  concerning
opportunities for further analysis  benefiting from higher-level tools, such as SEM and
Bayesian belief networks.
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Conceptual Review
Returning to  Popper’s  (1963) and Chaffee and Berger’s  (1987) theory criteria
tests in Chapter Two, let us assess my measure of effectiveness toward achieving the goal
of  developing a  valid  theory.  As measures  of performance,  during the course of  this
investigation, did KANT:
Exhibit explanatory power? In this  instance,  I constructed KANT to provide
explanatory  power  for  intra-state  conflict  through  the  mechanism  of  DPT and  SCT,
showing that countries possessed of adaptable formal and informal networks resiliently
weather the storms of economic,  demographic,  political,  and social  stressors, whereas
those  countries  where  the  networks  degraded  displayed  increased  susceptibility  to
conflict.  KANT explains how those networks demonstrate  the mechanisms across the
sub-components  of  DPT  and  SCT  contribute  to  a  resilience  nexus,  such  that  each
country’s  nexus  comprises  different  factors  compared  to  its  neighbors,  or  the  global
system in its entirety. 
Provide predictive power? Can KANT suggest future events or outcomes? In
this instance, I constructed KANT with the desired end-state in mind, conditional upon
validation, to develop indications and warning of conflict risk and lay the groundwork for
examining the mechanisms potentially useful in constructing a predictive tool. Within
KANT, we observe DPT and SCT factors operating within the context of downstream
effects, operating by shock, ratchet, or shock and ratchet stressors through the center of
gravity  of  the  intra-state  actors  to  identify  potential  conditions  under  which  conflict
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erupts – or opportunities for amelioration through policy prescriptions affecting formal
and informal network processes. 
Offer parsimony or simplicity in its explanatory power? I constructed KANT
to  put  forward  the  proposition  that  society/states  comprised  of  increasing  adaptive
Kantian  formal  structured  and  informal  networks  (communities  of  interest  and/or
communities  of  practice)  gain  increasing  resilience  to  stressors,  and  thereby  possess
increasing resistance to impulses leading to intra-state conflict. Whereas the calculations
for the mechanism of resilience develop in complexity, the core function of a potentially
predictive KANT index exhibits simplicity – the more adaptive the networks, the more
resilience to conflict.
Exhibit falsifiability? KANT presents as signally falsifiable with five hypotheses
tested. Each hypothesis, H0-H4, examined in this investigation offered an opportunity for
falsification. As noted above, significant SCT, DPT, and time-series factors all presenting
above the .05 threshold led to rejection of the null hypothesis (H0). All other hypotheses
(H1-H4) met significance. Looking forward, KANT further offers opportunity for future
falsification  in  follow-on  research  (discussed  in  Section  III)  such  as  examination  of
unpacked FSI data, use of additional data streams, and in individual case studies. 
Present  internal  consistency?  Thus  far,  in  the  investigation,  KANT
demonstrates logical consistency and does not contradict itself. Within the information
lag, formal and informal networks create physical and information effects, which in turn
create  cognitive  effects  on  the  intra-state  actors.  Those  actors  then  make  decisions
affecting  impetus  toward  or  away  from  conflict.  By  measuring  indices  reflecting
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behaviors and outcomes, and then conducting statistical analysis, we can approximate the
effect of the networks on the outcomes.
Present  as  heuristically  provocative? KANT serves  to  expand  the  range  of
potential knowledge in the context of intra-state conflict,  providing a multivariate and
time-series  framework  of  analysis.  Further,  as  I  note  in  Sections  II  and  III,  KANT
presents opportunities for further discussions and follow-on research.
Demonstrate  organizing  power? Within  the  formal  and  informal  network
spirals, KANT provides a potentially useful framework for understanding and organizing
intra-state  conflict  related  investigations  and  policy  development.  This  research
opportunity  demonstrates  likely  consistency  with  Ackoff’s  (1999)  data-information-
knowledge-understanding-wisdom trajectory in the context  of intra-state  conflict,  with
the potential for exercising the process to generate opportunities for wisdom concerning
policy prescriptions leading toward or away from conflict opportunities.
With  successful  accomplishment  of  these  seven  established  measures  of
performance toward identification of a valid theory, I therefore assess as a measure of
effectiveness that KANT conditionally achieves validity as a theory. However, this by no
means indicates an attempt to claim KANT as a form of “truth,” but merely a possible
valid explanation for the particular phenomenon of intra-state conflict.
Chapter 4 
This chapter applied the results  from Chapter 3 toward the particular  cases of
Syria and Kenya. Additionally, I placed additional perspective lenses from social contract
and COG theory across the cases to examine case-level variations.
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As investigated in the literature and quantitative results, intrastate conflict defies
simple,  single-variable  explanations.  Each  system possesses  a  unique  combination  of
strengths and vulnerabilities within the heterogeneous interfaces between governance and
societal elements. Each element within the social contract exhibits differing COG from
which it derives power and movement in order to exert demands. Each conflict creates
unique stresses on the system. Each element’s COG construct reacts differently as the
critical path between COG and vulnerability differs. 
In  this  investigation,  I  exercised  DPT/SCT  to  demonstrate  stress  modalities
affecting  the  social  contract  across  critical  paths  within  the  COG  construct.  That
construct, which I generalized within a matrix of democracy–autocracy, preservationist–
revisionist,  and rational choice–ideological for my cases, holds potential for numerous
permutations  should  we  opt  to  open  the  aperture  to  encompass  the  entire  global
community. 
Each  COG option  then  presents  a  minimum of  486 potential  permutations  of
PMESII critical  capabilities,  critical  requirements,  and critical  vulnerabilities  for each
element contending within a state. 
However,  a  KANT tool,  discussed  in  the  next  section,  may assist  analysts  in
narrowing  down  higher-risk  countries  and  identifying  indications  and  warning  of
impending conflict with sufficient predictive certainty to advise policy makers to mediate
with targeted prescriptive interventions.
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Section II: Policy Options And Other Implications
This  investigation’s  secondary  purpose  involves  determining  potential  policy
options  derived  from  the  quantitative  and  case  studies  centered  on  indications  and
warning of intrastate conflict derived through KANT. As discussed in Chapter 1, political
science  provides  crucial  Observe  and  Orient  functions  within  the  Theory–Political
Science–Policy OODA Loop that potentially provides insight to drive nuanced policy
prescriptions. 
Indications And Warning: 
O’Brien  (2010)  noted  the  necessity  to  recognize  deteriorating  conditions  with
sufficient warning time to effect ameliorating or mediating options within the event to
effect  lag.  Clearly,  this  process involves risk: Correct  prescriptions lead to accolades;
incorrect prescriptions lead to massive costs in terms of blood, treasure, and reputation. 
I recall two specific events within my career with the political risk company; one
emergent  situation  involved  concern  over  China  launching  rockets  over  Taiwan.  We
proactively relocated our clients out of the area as a precaution. However, we misread the
situation, which degenerated into large costs over a false alarm.
In contrast, we correctly read the indications and warning involving the onset of
civil  war  in  Cambodia,  but  encountered  an  obstacle  when  bureaucratic  measures
entangled my Oceania-based colleague’s travel documents. Fortunately, I arranged short-
notice travel  to Cambodia in time to evacuate almost  200 clients from the war zone,
completing our operation prior to arrival of most official government operations.
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Feder  (2002)  warned  that  prescriptive  policy  requires  analysis  beyond  simply
picking  the  most  likely  outcomes.  Effective  prescription  also  requires  understanding
composite risk management and understanding the intersection of likelihood effect.66
As mentioned in the discussion of the earlier paper (Sullivan, 2013), from a policy
recommendation perspective, we discern that promoting any one or all of the DPT or
SCT nexuses holds potential for significant effect on the prospects of deterring intra-state
war through an increase in the KANT resiliency of an at-risk country. 
Caution is required; while directly and overtly promoting voter turnout or civil
society organizations may be seen in some countries as interference in domestic affairs,
assisting a country promote domestic tourism for personal and professional reasons, or
promoting sports  participation and spectatorship may offer a less controversial  option
within the political context. Such calculations hold prescriptive potential for cost/benefit
advantage  when  demonstrating  positive  and  immediate  economic  gain  from  these
seemingly tangential activities – the KANT gains are far more subtle but still present the
potential for achieving the desired effect.
To answer the research question contained within the title of this investigation,
yes,  KANT can  provide  significant  indications  and warning  of  impending  intra-state
conflict; however, it is not ready for prime time in its present form. Clearly, additional
research  is  required  to  develop  a  working  predictive  model.  With  R2  values ranging
between  .31  and .46,  depending  on the  methodology,  further  research  into  advanced
66 Scenario analysis - at each turn, does the polity vote for war? Syria 2007 crop failure1 = no; 2008 
crop failure2 + loan sharking1 = no; 2009 crop failure3 + IDPs1 + loan sharking2 = NO; 2010 crop failure4
+ IDPs2 + loan sharking3 + govt insensitivity1 = MAYBE; 2011 crop failure5 + IDPs3 + refugees1 + loan 
sharking4 + govt insensitivity2 + outside influence1 = YES
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statistical  models  potentially  provides  greater  granularity  and  explanatory  power.
Goldstone  (2010)  claims  85%  accuracy  in  conflict  prediction;  determining  whether
KANT can achieve greater accuracy would be an interesting challenge.
Strategic And Tactical Levels: 
Policy prescription options emerge at both strategic and tactical levels.67 At the
strategic level, policy options effect systemic amelioration to reduce systemic volatility,
brittleness, and conflict-conducive behavior.  By implementing long-term planning and
targeted interventions operating over the 5- to 7-year lag, gradual prescriptions increase
systemic  resilience  to  shock.  The  target  country,  or  sectors  within  that  country,
governance or societal, likely ought not make dramatic changes to its FSI status or other
metric; however, small improvements in targeted FSI factors reduce the vulnerability to
proximate trigger events within 3-4 lags and ameliorate plastic stress in ratchet and shock
scenarios. 
Similarly,  tactical  or  crisis  prescriptions  operate  within  a  shorter  time  frame,
generally  under  a  year,  and  may  comprise  multiple  coordinated  sub-national
engagements, necessitating a model68 for processing warning data on a daily or monthly
basis  to  gain  the  required  level  of  granularity.  Such  intervention  requires  careful
consideration of ramifications to avoid misapplication of tangible assistance or national,
regional, or international good offices to mediate in a crisis.
67 This is not limited to military options. The full range of elements of national power, represented as 
DIME can be employed at the Strategic (national or international level) or at the Tactical (sub-national, 
provisional, county, town) level. A delivery of humanitarian food aid or crisis negotiating team to a 
particular village is a tactical operation. Based on "JP 3-0, Joint Operations - jp3_0.pdf " [cited 2015]. 
Available from http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/new_pubs/jp3_0.pdf. p. xi-xii
68 Discussed in the next section.
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Single-factor Consideration: 
A colleague recently inquired what I would offer about this investigation if given
30  seconds  in  an  elevator  with  a  world  leader.  Putting  evidence  aside  supporting
multivariate analysis, if pressed to make an “elevator pitch” with a single takeaway point
concerning this investigation,  quantitative and case analysis  conducted so far strongly
suggest that  solving or alleviating  Group Grievance  flash points69 creates  the greatest
benefit at the global level toward reducing incidence of intrastate conflict.  Conducting
reverse  regression  indicates  that  altering  the  Group  Grievance  FSI  factor  in  a  more
positive direction by only a few points dramatically raises barriers to conflict at the global
level.
OECD concurs on these policy implications:
“Where the state lacks the basic will to negotiate a resilient social
contract, our analysis suggests a two-part basic strategy: political
engagement with the government to seek to generate the necessary
political reforms and support to service delivery functions of the state, if
viable, or alternative mechanisms of service delivery to meet human needs
where not (OECD, 2009:88). 
Warnings  accompany  such  a  course  of  action.  As  discussed  in  the  previous
chapter, Call (2008) urged tailoring intervention to the needs of target country, not the
internal political aspirations of the donor country, to avoid “an excessive attachment to
specific  western  forms  of  state  sovereignty  and  fail  to  recognize  the  significance  of
alternative forms of legitimization or articulation of the state-society contract.”70
69 more so than a more diffused Poverty and Economic Decline environment
70 OECD, op. cit.
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Tailored Factors: 
The previous  section notwithstanding,  this  investigation  reinforces  the conflict
fingerprint  concept:  each  country  presents  a  highly  nuanced  dynamic  between
governance  and  the  multiple  societal  elements  within  its  social  contract.  Through  a
combination of results from quantitative analysis in Chapter 3 and the lenses of social
contract and COG analysis discussed in Chapter 4, a KANT perspective offers the policy
maker a methodological construct for a broader analysis. 
A KANT tool,  when  developed  through  additional  investigation  of  predictive
capability, potentially assists evaluation of the PMESII barycentric balance between the
governance and societal elements within each country. From that analysis, a policy maker
gains  a  broader  range of  DIME options  for  implementing  policy  prescriptions.  Such
prescription, derived from a more nuanced analysis of that particular vignette provides a
spectrum  of  options  to,  at  least,  alleviates  conflict  prior  to  conflict,  or  effect  larger
systemic changes resulting in increased resiliency and decreased vulnerability to conflict
descending to violence. 
A  utopian  goal  of  complete  elimination  of  conflict  likely  lies  beyond  our
collective  reach within the projectable  future;  however,  creating  a resilient,  adaptable
network wherein mediation of conflict occurs presents as more within the realm of the
possible.
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Section III: Opportunities For Follow-On Research
In this section, I discuss opportunities for follow-on research illuminated during
the  course  of  this  investigation.  Observations  identified  during  research  design  or
emerged during  analysis;  these opportunities  generally  exceeded my time,  system,  or
funding constraints. Additionally they would likely benefit from more advanced analytic
tools  or  techniques  optimally  suited  to  collaboration  with  experts  in  those  tools  or
techniques.
Internal Dyads:
As noted  in  the  intra-state  methodology  discussion,  acquiring  consistent  sub-
national  district  level  DPT/SCT data remains  problematic  and clearly lies beyond the
scope of the FSI. Conducting such dyad analysis employing raw data at the sub-national
level  for  the  94  Syrian  and  27  Kenyan  potential  dyads  potentially  provides  greater
granularity  and  insight  concerning  frictions  between  and  among  these  administrative
divisions. 
Gradations Of Conflict: 
During this investigation, I concatenated the UCDP data, consisting of “intrastate”
and  “intrastate  with  foreign  involvement”  categories  into  a  single  intrastate  conflict
variable of Conflict=Yes=1 or Conflict=No=0. Differentiating between the “intrastate”
compared to “intrastate with foreign involvement” potentially provides additional fidelity
when regressing against a dataset such as the FSI. 
140
Integrating Multiple Conflicts: 
Similarly, during this investigation I concatenated the UCDP data listing multiple
conflicts occurring in a defined year and a particular country into a single conflict status
for that country/year. Differentiating countries with singular or multiple conflict states
potentially provides additional fidelity when regressing against a dataset such as the FSI. 
Full-spectrum Crisis: 
Zartman (2005:262) elevated an interesting perspective: “[quantitative statistical
studies] do not explain civil conflict; they explain conflict with more than 1,000 deaths,
which is a bit like explaining human growth by starting at the age of twelve years.” 
This investigation focused on factors affecting intrastate conflict that reached the
defined  conflict  stage,  and  relied  on  statistical  inference  to  identify  predecessor
conditions within the FSI variations. Building on Marshall (2008) and illuminated by the
downstream FSI effects from the quantitative chapter, crises and their precursors present
both contingent  and causal linkages. Conflict,  as iteratively time and causality lagged,
may  benefit  from  investigations  building  from  this  point  to  examine  and  extract
explanatory value for the full spectrum of conflict.
Language Considerations: 
Additional opportunities and challenges lie within the diverse languages of the
source  documents  and  data  sets,  requiring  attention  to  translation  and  interpretation.
Likewise, dissemination of products and recommendations require attention to detail and
nuance to reduce misunderstandings.
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Intersection Of Polity IV Variants: 
While  likely  included within  the  Legitimacy of  the  State  FSI factor,  the  FFP
CAST methodology does not explicitly reference inclusion of Polity IV data. As noted in
Chapter  4,  levels  of  democracy–autocracy,  preservationist–revisionist,  and  fractured–
coherent  state  determinants  appear  to  provide  explanatory value.  Likewise,  a  rational
choice–ideological spectrum adds nuance within the analysis. Examination of this data
stream holds potential to illuminate nuances that provide value added to KANT analysis.
FSI Data Granularity: 
One  issue  identified  during  this  investigation  notes  the  variance  introduced
through  the  yearly  time  lag  of  the  FSI,  combined  with  a  loss  of  fidelity  within  the
individual FSI factors. 
To resolve these concerns, a follow-on investigation may benefit from working
with the FFP and their CAST model to “break open” FSI to acquire core data sources and
perform analysis at the sub-factor level rather than the index level.
Additional  data  streams,  such  as  Leetaru’s  (2014)  GDELT71 conflict  data
amalgamation  tool,  or  Zook  and  Graham’s  (2011)  Floating  Sheep  project72 present
opportunities to update and analyze warning factors in near real time.
Expanded KANT Mechanism Examination:
This investigation focused specifically on FSI data interpreted through KANT to
develop  explanatory  mechanisms  for  intra-state  conflict.  While  the  results  present  as
71 http://gdeltproject.org
72 www.floatingsheep.org
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significant, the R2 values generally lie in the mid ranges (0.31 – 0.44), leaving precarious
gaps in the overall explanatory power of KANT. Exploring additional mechanisms not
included in the FSI and their effects on KANT hold potential for augmenting the overall
R2 or defining the limits of KANT. Examples include the effects leveraged on DPT and
SCT  through  geology,  geography,  climate,  and  weather,  and  factors  discussed  in
Goldstone et.al. (2010) analysis of “bad neighbors,” infant mortality, type of democracy,
and effects  of systematized discrimination;  among others.  This entails  examination of
each factor for itself, i.e., the effect geography qua geography exerts on conflict, but also
the second-order effect that geography presents on social capital, which in turn affects
conflict.
Social Network Analysis: 
Analysis  of  COG  can  benefit  from  overlaying  conflict  group  social  network
analysis with COG analysis to determine the intersection of movements, ideologies, and
connection of groups inhabiting critical vulnerabilities within the critical path structure
affecting intrastate cohesion or fracturing.
Create A KANT Indications And Warning Tool:
Similar  to  Goldstone’s  Political  Instability  Task  Force73 model,  a  tool
incorporating KANT may prove useful in predicting changes in intrastate brittleness that
signal conditions conducive toward ignition of conflict, within the context of accounting
for  Type  I  and  Type  II  errors.  Determining  proximate  triggers  within  the  conflict
73 "Political Instability Task Force” [cited 2014]. Available from http://globalpolicy.gmu.edu/political-
instability-task-force-home/.
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vulnerability  schema further  requires  data  cycling  on monthly or  daily  lags.  Possible
opportunities exist, but not necessarily limited to the following capabilities:
Refined SEM: 
SEM provides  explanatory  power  within  a  potentially  determinant  ontological
construct. As observed in Chapter 3, my limited SEM models presented R2 above .69,
supporting  a  contention  that  a  more  rigorously  constructed  SEM  with  sufficient
computing power may achieve greater explanatory power.
Refined Bayesian Belief Network Modeling: 
Similar to SEM, Bayesian belief network models constructed sourcing the KANT
ontology  applies  Bayesian  probabilistic  ontological  constructs  to  calculate  outcome
probabilities.  A number of commercial  (e.g.,  HUGIN74 and Netica75) and academic or
government (e.g., SIAM76) tools provide potential avenues of follow-on research. 
74"Hugin Academic Version," [cited 2015]. Available from 
http://www.hugin.com/index.php/productsservices/products/academic.
75 "Norsys Software Corp. - Bayes Net Software” [cited 2015]. Available from 
http://www.norsys.com/.
76 "SIAM Software Application” [cited 2015]. Available from http://www.inet.saic.com/inet-
public/siam.htm.
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Section IV: Signing Off
Researchers interested in collaboration on any or all  of these opportunities are
welcome to contact me to discuss options.
Thank you for your time and attention to this investigation, and I welcome your
comments, questions, and suggestions.
~DJS, Miami FL, August 2015
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Table 30: Statistical Description of the FSI
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11 05 Afghanistan 9 8 8 7.4 8.8 7.5 8.1 8.1 7.9 8.2 8 10.0 1
10 06 Afghanistan 7.9 9.6 9.1 7.0 8.0 7.5 8.3 8.0 8.2 8.2 8.0 10.0 1
8 07 Afghanistan 8.5 8.9 9.1 7.0 8.0 8.3 8.8 8.0 8.2 9.0 8.5 10.0 1
7 08 Afghanistan 9.1 8.9 9.5 7.0 8.1 8.5 9.2 8.3 8.4 9.6 8.8 10.0 1
7 09 Afghanistan 9.3 8.9 9.6 7.2 8.4 8.3 9.8 8.9 8.8 9.9 9.1 10.0 1
6 10 Afghanistan 9.5 9.2 9.7 7.2 8.2 8.3 10.0 8.9 9.2 9.7 9.4 10.0 1
7 11 Afghanistan 9.1 9.3 9.3 7.2 8.4 8.0 9.7 8.5 8.8 9.8 9.4 10.0 1
6 12 Afghanistan 8.9 9.0 9.4 7.4 8.1 7.7 9.5 8.5 8.5 9.7 9.4 10.0 1
7 13 Afghanistan 9.3 9.2 9.2 7.2 7.8 8.2 9.4 8.8 8.4 9.9 9.4 10.0 1
110 07 Albania 6.5 2.7 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.8 7.4 6.2 5.4 5.5 5.4 5.6 0
112 08 Albania 6.2 2.7 5.4 7.5 6.1 6.3 7.2 5.9 5.4 5.5 5.7 5.8 0
109 09 Albania 6.4 2.6 5.4 7.2 5.9 6.5 7.3 5.8 5.8 5.5 5.9 5.7 0
121 10 Albania 5.9 2.8 4.9 7.1 5.7 6.1 6.8 5.6 5.3 5.4 6.0 5.5 0
121 11 Albania 5.5 3.1 5.1 6.8 5.4 5.9 6.4 5.0 5.0 5.4 6.3 6.3 0
118 12 Albania 5.0 2.8 5.1 6.8 5.1 5.6 7.3 4.9 5.5 5.4 6.6 6.0 0
119 13 Albania 4.7 3.1 4.8 6.6 4.8 5.3 7.0 4.8 6.0 5.5 6.3 6.3 0
94 06 Albania 6.0 2.7 4.5 7.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 6.9 5.5 5.5 4.5 6.0 0
61 05 Algeria 5 9 6.4 6 9 3 9 5 6.6 8 9.2 5.0 1
72 06 Algeria 6.0 6.6 7.1 5.6 7.4 3.5 7.5 7.6 7.5 6.8 6.4 5.8 1
88 07 Algeria 6.1 6.7 7.0 5.6 7.3 3.5 7.3 7.0 7.4 6.4 5.9 5.7 1
80 08 Algeria 6.1 6.8 7.2 5.9 7.3 4.0 7.5 6.8 7.6 6.7 6.2 5.7 1
73 09 Algeria 6.7 6.7 7.7 6.2 7.3 4.6 7.7 6.7 7.6 7.0 6.7 5.7 1
71 10 Algeria 6.7 6.5 8.2 6.1 7.1 5.1 7.5 6.5 7.6 7.5 6.8 5.7 1
81 11 Algeria 6.4 6.1 7.8 5.7 6.8 5.2 7.1 6.1 7.5 7.2 6.8 5.3 1
77 12 Algeria 6.1 6.5 8.1 5.4 6.5 5.5 7.2 5.9 7.4 7.1 6.8 5.5 1
73 13 Algeria 5.8 7.0 7.8 5.1 6.2 5.8 7.4 5.9 7.7 7.4 7.3 5.2 1
43 05 Angola 7.9 8.6 6.3 3.8 9 4.4 7.9 7.2 8.3 7 8.1 8.8 1
37 06 Angola 8.0 8.5 6.3 5.0 9.0 4.9 8.8 7.6 7.8 6.8 8.0 7.6 1
53 07 Angola 8.5 7.5 5.9 5.0 8.7 4.2 8.6 7.7 7.5 6.2 7.5 7.6 1
56 08 Angola 8.6 6.9 5.9 5.0 9.0 4.0 8.4 7.6 7.5 6.2 7.5 7.2 1
55 09 Angola 8.6 7.0 6.1 5.5 9.4 4.5 8.0 8.0 7.2 6.2 7.3 7.2 1
59 10 Angola 8.4 6.9 5.9 5.6 9.1 5.0 8.1 8.0 7.3 5.9 6.8 6.7 1
52 11 Angola 8.6 6.6 6.2 5.9 8.8 4.5 8.5 8.2 7.5 6.2 7.0 6.7 1
147
48 12 Angola 8.9 6.9 6.5 5.6 9.1 4.8 8.2 8.3 7.6 5.9 7.0 6.4 1
43 13 Angola 8.9 7.2 6.8 5.9 9.4 5.1 8.6 8.4 7.3 6.1 7.3 6.1 1
120 07 Antigua & Barbuda 5.2 3.6 5.2 7.9 7.1 4.8 6.3 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.6 5.4 0
124 08 Antigua & Barbuda 4.9 3.3 4.9 7.9 6.9 4.6 6.0 4.9 5.5 5.2 4.6 5.4 0
126 09 Antigua & Barbuda 4.7 3.6 4.3 7.8 6.5 4.8 5.8 5.0 5.0 5.0 4.4 5.9 0
127 10 Antigua & Barbuda 4.7 3.4 4.5 7.3 6.1 5.5 5.3 4.6 4.7 4.6 4.0 6.2 0
125 11 Antigua & Barbuda 5.2 3.0 4.1 7.6 5.9 5.1 5.8 4.3 4.5 4.9 3.7 5.8 0
127 12 Antigua & Barbuda 4.9 2.7 4.1 7.9 5.6 4.8 5.8 4.3 4.8 4.9 3.7 5.5 0
128 13 Antigua & Barbuda 4.6 3.0 4.1 7.6 5.6 4.5 5.8 4.0 4.4 4.9 3.7 5.8 0
122 06 Argentina 3.0 1.4 4.0 4.0 5.2 4.2 3.5 4.0 3.7 2.0 2.8 3.0 0
149 07 Argentina 3.8 1.5 4.0 4.0 5.2 4.6 3.4 3.8 3.7 1.9 2.7 2.8 0
151 08 Argentina 3.8 1.5 4.0 4.0 5.2 4.5 3.4 3.9 3.7 1.9 2.7 2.8 0
148 09 Argentina 4.1 2.0 4.5 4.0 5.5 4.8 3.4 4.2 4.0 2.1 3.1 3.0 0
148 10 Argentina 4.6 2.2 4.5 3.8 5.8 5.1 3.6 3.7 3.8 2.4 3.2 3.1 0
145 11 Argentina 4.4 2.6 4.9 3.5 6.0 4.4 4.0 3.5 4.0 2.7 3.0 3.8 0
145 12 Argentina 4.4 2.3 4.7 3.3 6.3 4.1 4.3 3.8 3.8 3.0 3.0 3.5 0
144 13 Argentina 4.1 2.0 5.0 3.0 6.0 4.0 4.4 3.9 4.1 3.0 2.7 3.8 0
111 07 Armenia 5.8 7.6 5.0 6.9 6.0 5.0 6.5 6.2 5.5 4.5 5.8 5.5 0
109 08 Armenia 5.8 7.5 5.0 6.7 6.0 5.6 6.5 6.0 5.5 4.5 6.0 5.6 0
101 09 Armenia 5.9 7.2 6.0 6.7 6.5 5.3 7.1 5.4 6.1 5.3 6.9 5.9 0
101 10 Armenia 5.7 6.9 6.0 7.0 6.5 5.8 6.6 5.3 6.4 5.1 7.0 5.8 0
101 11 Armenia 5.5 6.6 6.0 6.6 6.2 5.3 6.6 5.0 6.5 5.2 7.0 5.8 0
102 12 Armenia 5.2 6.8 5.7 6.3 5.9 5.6 6.8 4.7 6.8 5.2 7.0 6.1 0
105 13 Armenia 4.9 7.0 5.7 6.0 5.6 5.9 6.6 4.4 6.8 5.3 7.0 6.2 0
89 06 Armenia 6.0 7.1 5.0 7.0 6.0 5.1 7.0 6.5 6.0 4.5 5.8 5.5 0
140 06 Australia 2.5 1.5 3.0 1.0 4.5 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.5 1.0 1.5 1.0 0
168 07 Australia 2.9 1.6 3.0 1.1 4.4 1.8 1.0 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.5 1.1 0
169 08 Australia 2.9 2.0 3.5 1.1 4.4 2.3 1.0 1.4 2.5 0.9 1.5 1.1 0
170 09 Australia 3.1 2.2 3.4 1.1 4.4 2.8 1.4 1.4 2.5 1.0 1.5 1.1 0
168 10 Australia 3.5 2.5 3.4 1.2 4.2 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.0 1.4 1.5 1.1 0
166 11 Australia 3.3 2.8 3.6 1.6 3.9 2.9 1.6 1.8 1.9 1.7 1.6 1.4 0
165 12 Australia 4.4 3.0 3.9 1.4 3.6 2.6 1.3 2.1 2.2 2.0 1.6 1.1 0
169 13 Australia 3.3 2.7 3.6 1.1 3.3 2.1 1.0 1.8 2.2 1.7 1.6 1.0 0
165 07 Austria 2.8 2.2 3.5 1.1 5.0 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.3 0
168 08 Austria 2.8 2.2 3.5 1.1 4.9 1.9 1.3 1.4 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.3 0
167 09 Austria 2.9 2.2 3.6 1.1 4.9 2.3 1.6 1.4 1.6 1.0 2.4 2.6 0
170 10 Austria 2.7 2.3 3.8 1.2 4.7 2.7 1.4 1.4 1.6 1.1 1.9 2.4 0
168 11 Austria 2.6 2.6 3.8 1.6 4.4 2.3 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.1 2.4 2.2 0
168 12 Austria 2.6 2.3 4.0 1.9 4.1 2.0 1.3 1.8 1.8 1.4 2.4 1.9 0
166 13 Austria 2.3 2.4 4.3 1.6 4.0 1.9 1.5 1.5 2.0 1.1 2.7 1.6 0
136 06 Austria 2.5 2.1 3.5 1.0 5.0 1.9 1.3 1.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 3.3 0
50 05 Azerbaijan 8 6 6 5.8 9 4.1 9.7 5 8.5 7 9.6 7.0 1
61 06 Azerbaijan 6.0 8.1 7.3 5.0 7.5 5.9 8.1 6.5 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.0 1
62 07 Azerbaijan 6.0 7.5 7.3 5.3 7.4 6.3 7.8 6.0 6.4 7.2 7.5 6.5 1
64 08 Azerbaijan 6.0 7.8 7.3 5.3 7.0 5.9 8.1 5.5 6.9 7.2 7.5 6.5 1
56 09 Azerbaijan 6.4 8.2 7.9 5.7 7.4 6.1 8.2 5.5 7.0 7.3 7.9 7.0 1
148
55 10 Azerbaijan 6.2 8.1 7.9 5.7 7.3 5.9 8.0 5.5 7.2 7.3 7.9 7.4 1
63 11 Azerbaijan 5.8 7.9 7.5 5.4 6.9 5.5 7.7 5.7 7.2 7.0 7.8 7.5 1
68 12 Azerbaijan 5.6 7.6 7.2 5.1 6.6 5.2 8.0 5.4 7.3 6.7 7.8 7.2 1
76 13 Azerbaijan 5.3 7.9 6.9 4.7 6.1 4.7 8.2 5.1 7.6 6.9 7.8 6.9 1
128 07 Bahamas 6.0 3.6 5.3 5.4 7.2 3.2 6.4 4.1 3.0 5.4 5.3 5.2 0
127 08 Bahamas 6.2 3.6 5.3 5.4 7.2 3.7 5.9 4.3 3.0 5.4 5.3 5.2 0
130 09 Bahamas 6.7 3.7 5.0 5.7 6.9 4.4 5.5 4.6 3.0 5.3 4.8 5.3 0
132 10 Bahamas 6.2 3.2 4.7 5.8 6.4 5.0 5.5 4.4 2.8 4.8 4.8 5.3 0
133 11 Bahamas 5.8 2.8 4.4 6.2 6.2 4.8 5.2 4.2 3.2 4.3 4.5 4.9 0
134 12 Bahamas 6.1 2.5 4.4 5.9 5.9 4.5 4.9 4.4 3.1 4.3 4.5 4.6 0
133 13 Bahamas 6.6 2.8 4.4 5.6 5.6 4.5 4.9 4.4 2.8 4.3 4.5 4.3 0
51 05 Bahrain 6 5 6.7 9 9 1.7 9.7 4 8.4 9 9.6 7.5 0
133 07 Bahrain 5.3 3.6 6.0 3.7 5.0 3.5 6.8 3.7 4.7 3.4 6.0 5.3 0
134 08 Bahrain 5.3 3.1 6.0 3.7 5.0 3.3 7.0 3.4 4.7 3.7 6.0 5.6 0
133 09 Bahrain 5.0 3.1 6.4 3.7 5.9 3.5 6.9 3.1 5.0 4.4 6.1 5.9 0
133 10 Bahrain 4.5 2.6 6.5 3.5 6.0 4.0 6.7 3.1 5.4 4.7 6.1 5.7 0
129 11 Bahrain 4.5 2.9 6.8 3.1 6.0 3.4 6.9 2.7 5.9 4.8 6.6 5.3 0
125 12 Bahrain 4.6 2.6 7.3 2.8 5.7 3.1 7.5 2.7 7.0 6.0 7.0 5.9 0
124 13 Bahrain 4.6 2.5 7.3 3.3 5.7 3.2 7.6 2.4 7.5 6.1 7.1 5.6 0
17 05 Bangladesh 8.4 7 7.6 6 9 7.4 9.5 8.2 8.5 8 8.7 6.0 1
19 06 Bangladesh 9.0 5.8 9.5 8.5 9.0 7.0 9.0 7.5 7.8 8.3 8.9 6.0 1
16 07 Bangladesh 8.6 5.8 9.6 8.4 9.0 6.9 9.0 7.4 7.8 8.0 9.5 5.9 1
12 08 Bangladesh 9.8 7.1 9.7 8.4 9.0 7.1 9.1 7.8 8.0 8.3 9.6 6.4 1
18 09 Bangladesh 8.9 6.9 9.4 8.4 9.0 8.0 8.5 8.0 7.6 8.0 8.9 6.5 1
24 10 Bangladesh 8.4 6.7 8.9 8.4 8.8 7.9 8.0 8.3 7.4 8.1 8.9 6.3 1
25 11 Bangladesh 8.3 6.5 9.2 8.1 8.4 7.7 8.0 8.0 7.1 7.9 8.9 6.2 1
29 12 Bangladesh 8.0 6.8 8.9 7.8 8.1 7.4 8.2 7.8 6.8 7.6 8.9 5.9 1
29 13 Bangladesh 8.1 7.3 8.6 7.5 7.8 7.3 8.3 8.0 7.3 7.7 8.9 5.8 1
129 07 Barbados 4.1 3.6 5.8 6.9 7.6 5.0 6.1 2.6 3.0 5.3 4.8 5.1 0
131 08 Barbados 4.1 3.3 5.5 6.9 7.0 5.0 5.9 2.6 3.0 5.3 4.8 5.1 0
135 09 Barbados 4.1 3.3 5.3 7.0 7.1 5.2 4.5 2.8 3.0 5.0 4.5 5.4 0
135 10 Barbados 4.0 3.2 4.9 6.5 6.7 5.4 4.1 3.1 2.8 4.5 4.5 5.7 0
135 11 Barbados 4.3 2.9 4.4 6.8 6.3 5.0 3.9 2.9 2.5 4.2 4.2 5.4 0
135 12 Barbados 4.1 2.6 4.4 6.5 6.0 5.3 3.6 3.0 2.8 4.2 4.2 5.3 0
137 13 Barbados 3.8 2.7 4.4 6.2 5.7 5.8 3.6 2.7 2.5 4.2 4.2 5.0 0
44 05 Belarus 9 8 7 2.4 9 5.4 8.5 7 7.3 6.8 9.4 7.5 0
50 06 Belarus 9.0 5.1 5.5 3.5 8.5 6.3 9.0 7.5 7.3 6.8 8.0 8.0 0
51 07 Belarus 8.0 4.6 6.5 5.0 7.5 6.8 9.1 6.9 8.5 6.7 8.5 7.1 0
53 08 Belarus 7.7 4.3 6.7 5.0 7.2 6.7 9.3 6.6 8.8 6.5 8.5 7.1 0
66 09 Belarus 7.2 4.1 6.9 5.0 7.2 6.6 8.9 6.6 8.0 6.6 8.1 7.1 0
82 10 Belarus 6.7 3.7 6.4 4.8 6.7 6.7 8.7 6.2 7.9 6.2 7.8 6.9 0
82 11 Belarus 6.3 3.6 6.8 4.5 6.3 6.2 8.8 5.8 8.0 6.3 8.0 7.0 0
85 12 Belarus 6.0 3.3 6.5 4.2 6.0 6.5 9.0 5.5 8.3 6.0 8.0 7.3 0
82 13 Belarus 5.7 3.6 6.8 3.9 5.7 6.2 9.0 5.2 8.3 6.3 8.3 7.6 0
138 06 Belgium 3.0 1.5 3.5 1.0 4.0 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.5 2.5 0
166 07 Belgium 3.2 1.6 4.0 1.1 4.0 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.6 1.5 2.0 0
149
164 08 Belgium 3.2 1.6 4.7 1.1 4.6 2.5 1.8 1.4 1.5 1.6 3.0 2.0 0
162 09 Belgium 2.8 1.7 4.9 1.3 4.9 3.2 2.8 2.0 1.7 1.7 3.5 3.0 0
163 10 Belgium 2.6 1.8 4.4 1.3 4.7 3.7 2.3 2.1 1.5 1.8 3.0 2.8 0
160 11 Belgium 2.5 2.1 4.4 1.6 4.4 3.6 2.7 2.5 1.6 2.0 4.0 2.6 0
163 12 Belgium 2.6 1.9 4.1 1.9 4.1 3.6 2.4 2.5 1.8 2.3 4.0 2.3 0
164 13 Belgium 2.5 1.6 4.1 1.8 3.8 3.5 2.1 2.2 1.5 2.0 3.9 2.0 0
113 07 Belize 6.6 5.2 5.2 6.9 7.6 6.0 6.5 5.7 3.8 5.7 5.0 5.6 0
110 08 Belize 6.8 5.5 5.2 6.9 7.6 5.8 6.5 5.7 3.8 5.7 5.0 5.7 0
111 09 Belize 7.0 5.0 4.9 6.9 7.3 6.0 6.2 5.7 4.0 5.9 4.6 6.0 0
112 10 Belize 6.5 5.1 4.9 6.7 7.1 6.2 6.2 5.8 3.8 5.7 4.6 6.1 0
114 11 Belize 6.7 5.4 4.4 7.0 6.8 5.7 6.0 5.8 3.8 5.5 4.3 6.3 0
113 12 Belize 6.8 5.1 4.4 7.0 6.9 5.4 6.0 5.9 3.9 5.5 4.3 6.0 0
114 13 Belize 6.5 4.9 4.4 7.1 6.6 5.5 6.0 6.0 4.1 5.5 4.3 6.3 0
90 06 Benin 6.0 5.1 4.0 6.9 7.3 6.5 6.5 7.8 4.8 5.5 3.8 6.7 0
103 07 Benin 6.5 5.2 4.0 6.9 7.4 7.1 6.4 8.1 4.8 5.2 3.8 6.6 0
100 08 Benin 6.9 5.2 4.0 6.7 7.4 7.0 6.7 8.1 5.2 5.2 3.8 6.6 0
97 09 Benin 7.5 6.2 4.1 7.0 7.4 6.9 6.6 8.0 5.6 5.2 4.3 6.7 0
93 10 Benin 7.7 6.7 4.2 6.7 7.4 7.4 6.4 8.4 5.5 5.3 4.1 7.0 0
74 11 Benin 8.1 7.1 3.9 6.6 7.2 7.9 6.7 8.5 5.7 6.0 5.0 7.3 0
74 12 Benin 8.0 6.8 3.6 6.3 6.9 7.6 6.4 8.3 5.4 6.0 6.4 7.0 0
78 13 Benin 8.3 6.5 3.6 6.2 7.2 7.1 6.0 8.6 5.1 5.8 6.1 7.3 0
26 05 Bhutan 8 8 5.5 8 9 8 9.8 5 8 6 10 6.7 0
39 06 Bhutan 6.0 8.1 7.0 6.7 9.0 8.0 8.4 6.0 8.6 5.0 8.4 6.7 0
47 07 Bhutan 6.5 7.5 7.0 6.7 8.7 7.9 8.0 6.5 8.5 4.6 8.0 6.5 0
51 08 Bhutan 6.5 7.5 7.0 6.7 8.7 7.8 7.7 6.7 8.3 4.6 7.7 6.2 0
48 09 Bhutan 6.5 7.5 7.9 6.8 8.7 7.5 7.4 7.2 8.4 5.5 7.7 6.2 0
50 10 Bhutan 7.0 7.3 7.7 7.1 8.5 7.5 6.9 7.3 7.9 5.8 7.7 6.6 0
50 11 Bhutan 6.6 6.9 7.8 6.8 8.2 6.9 6.6 6.9 7.6 6.2 7.5 7.0 0
59 12 Bhutan 6.7 6.6 7.6 6.5 7.8 6.6 6.3 6.6 7.3 5.9 7.5 7.0 0
63 13 Bhutan 6.4 6.9 7.3 6.8 7.5 6.3 6.0 6.9 7.3 5.6 7.5 7.3 0
56 06 Bolivia 7.5 4.0 7.0 7.0 8.8 6.2 7.0 7.8 6.7 6.5 8.4 6.0 0
59 07 Bolivia 7.4 3.7 7.0 7.0 8.5 6.4 7.2 7.4 7.0 6.2 8.3 5.9 0
55 08 Bolivia 7.7 4.2 7.3 7.0 8.5 6.4 7.4 7.6 7.0 6.2 8.5 6.4 0
51 09 Bolivia 7.8 4.9 7.5 6.9 8.7 7.0 7.6 7.7 6.8 6.4 8.2 6.8 0
53 10 Bolivia 7.6 4.7 7.7 6.7 8.7 6.8 7.1 7.5 6.6 6.5 8.3 6.7 0
59 11 Bolivia 7.2 4.6 7.7 6.4 8.9 6.5 6.8 7.1 6.3 6.5 8.0 6.9 0
62 12 Bolivia 7.5 4.3 7.4 6.1 8.8 6.5 7.1 6.8 6.5 6.5 8.0 6.6 0
69 13 Bolivia 6.9 4.0 7.1 6.4 8.9 6.2 7.2 6.8 6.3 6.7 8.0 6.3 0
35 06 Bosnia 6.5 8.5 8.6 6.0 7.3 6.2 8.1 5.8 5.3 7.5 8.7 10.0 0
54 08 Bosnia 6.1 8.0 8.5 6.0 7.2 5.5 7.9 5.4 5.3 7.3 8.6 8.5 0
63 09 Bosnia 5.5 7.2 8.2 5.8 7.3 5.5 8.2 5.6 5.4 7.4 8.7 8.5 0
60 10 Bosnia 5.3 7.1 8.7 5.6 7.1 5.7 8.0 5.4 5.9 7.2 9.2 8.3 0
69 11 Bosnia 5.0 6.8 8.4 5.9 6.8 5.2 7.6 5.0 6.1 7.0 9.2 8.0 0
79 12 Bosnia 4.7 6.5 8.0 5.8 6.5 5.5 7.0 4.7 6.1 6.7 8.7 7.7 0
83 13 Bosnia 4.4 6.8 7.7 5.6 6.2 5.2 6.7 4.4 6.4 6.4 8.7 8.0 0
22 05 Bosnia 7 8 8.6 5.7 9 5.7 8.5 6 7.3 9 8.7 10.0 0
150
54 07 Bosnia 6.1 8.0 8.3 6.0 7.2 6.0 7.6 5.6 5.3 7.3 8.3 8.8 0
96 06 Botswana 9.3 6.0 3.5 6.0 6.9 5.0 5.5 6.8 4.9 4.0 3.0 6.0 0
118 07 Botswana 9.2 5.8 3.4 6.0 7.0 5.6 5.4 6.5 4.8 3.9 2.8 6.0 0
120 08 Botswana 9.2 6.0 3.4 6.0 6.9 5.3 5.4 6.2 4.8 3.9 2.8 6.0 0
116 09 Botswana 9.2 6.7 4.3 6.0 7.2 5.6 5.8 6.4 5.0 4.0 2.8 5.8 0
113 10 Botswana 9.0 6.6 4.1 5.9 7.7 6.1 5.3 6.4 4.8 4.0 2.9 5.8 0
113 11 Botswana 8.9 6.4 4.5 5.6 7.4 6.3 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.1 3.3 5.4 0
117 12 Botswana 8.6 6.1 4.8 5.3 7.7 6.5 4.7 5.9 4.7 3.8 3.3 5.1 0
122 13 Botswana 8.3 5.8 4.8 5.0 7.5 6.1 4.4 6.0 4.4 3.5 3.3 4.8 0
62 05 Brazil 9 5 5.7 5.9 9 2 7.8 8.3 6.7 6.5 8.7 6.4 0
101 06 Brazil 6.5 3.6 5.7 5.0 8.5 2.7 5.5 6.7 5.3 5.7 3.2 4.7 0
116 07 Brazil 6.6 3.4 6.1 5.0 8.8 3.2 6.2 6.3 5.3 6.9 4.5 4.6 0
117 08 Brazil 6.3 3.3 6.1 5.0 8.8 3.7 6.2 6.0 5.6 7.1 4.9 4.6 0
113 09 Brazil 6.4 3.9 6.4 5.0 8.9 4.1 6.4 6.0 5.6 6.9 5.1 4.4 0
119 10 Brazil 6.3 3.7 6.2 4.8 8.8 4.0 6.2 6.0 5.4 6.7 5.1 4.2 0
123 11 Brazil 6.1 3.5 6.5 4.5 8.5 3.9 5.9 5.8 5.1 6.5 4.9 3.9 0
123 12 Brazil 7.0 3.9 6.2 4.2 8.4 3.6 5.6 5.5 5.0 6.2 4.9 3.6 0
126 13 Brazil 7.0 3.6 5.9 3.9 8.3 3.3 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.9 4.9 3.3 0
108 07 Brunei 6.3 5.6 7.4 4.2 7.9 3.2 7.7 3.3 6.6 6.9 7.4 4.7 0
116 08 Brunei 5.9 4.9 6.7 4.2 7.4 3.2 7.7 3.3 6.8 6.3 7.4 4.7 0
118 09 Brunei 5.4 4.4 6.6 4.0 7.8 3.4 7.9 3.6 6.8 6.1 7.4 4.7 0
117 10 Brunei 5.4 4.2 6.6 3.8 7.8 3.7 7.7 3.5 6.9 5.9 7.4 4.7 0
122 11 Brunei 5.1 3.9 6.2 4.1 7.8 3.4 7.7 3.2 6.7 5.6 7.4 4.7 0
123 12 Brunei 4.8 3.6 6.2 4.3 7.8 3.1 7.4 2.9 6.6 5.6 7.4 4.4 0
123 13 Brunei 4.5 3.3 6.2 4.6 7.8 2.8 7.4 2.6 6.9 5.6 7.4 4.1 0
103 06 Bulgaria 6.0 4.1 4.0 6.0 6.2 4.3 6.2 5.3 4.9 5.5 4.1 5.5 0
127 07 Bulgaria 5.4 4.1 4.2 5.9 6.2 4.3 5.7 5.0 4.7 5.4 3.9 5.5 0
131 08 Bulgaria 5.1 4.1 4.0 5.7 6.0 4.3 5.4 4.6 4.7 5.2 3.9 5.5 0
128 09 Bulgaria 4.7 3.8 4.4 6.0 6.3 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.8 5.3 4.6 5.6 0
126 10 Bulgaria 4.5 3.9 4.5 5.8 6.1 5.3 6.0 5.0 4.6 5.1 4.6 5.8 0
130 11 Bulgaria 4.1 3.6 4.3 5.5 5.7 5.3 5.9 4.6 4.3 4.9 5.3 5.5 0
130 12 Bulgaria 4.0 3.3 4.9 5.2 5.4 5.0 5.1 4.3 4.0 4.6 5.3 5.2 0
132 13 Bulgaria 4.4 3.1 4.6 4.9 5.1 5.0 4.8 4.4 3.7 4.7 5.3 5.0 0
30 06 Burkina Faso 9.0 5.9 6.5 6.6 8.8 8.2 7.8 8.4 6.5 7.6 7.7 6.7 0
33 07 Burkina Faso 8.6 5.6 6.4 6.6 8.9 8.2 7.6 8.9 6.6 7.6 7.7 7.0 0
36 08 Burkina Faso 8.6 5.6 6.4 6.6 8.9 8.1 7.6 8.9 6.6 7.6 7.7 7.3 0
35 09 Burkina Faso 9.0 6.0 6.1 6.5 9.0 8.2 7.9 9.0 6.5 7.5 7.6 8.0 0
35 10 Burkina Faso 9.3 6.2 5.9 6.6 8.8 8.0 7.7 8.8 6.6 7.3 7.6 7.9 0
37 11 Burkina Faso 8.9 6.2 5.5 6.3 8.5 8.0 7.7 8.7 6.4 7.0 7.3 8.0 0
41 12 Burkina Faso 8.9 5.9 5.2 6.0 8.2 7.7 8.0 8.4 7.0 7.1 7.3 7.7 0
35 13 Burkina Faso 9.4 7.4 5.3 6.3 8.4 7.7 7.7 8.7 6.8 7.2 7.3 8.0 0
18 05 Burundi 9 7.2 7.1 3.8 8.8 7.8 7.2 9 8.3 7.5 8.6 10.0 1
15 06 Burundi 9.0 9.1 7.0 6.7 8.8 7.8 7.2 8.5 7.5 7.3 7.8 10.0 1
19 07 Burundi 9.1 8.9 6.7 6.7 8.8 8.2 7.1 8.9 7.5 6.8 7.5 9.0 1
24 08 Burundi 9.1 8.2 6.7 6.5 8.8 8.0 7.1 9.0 7.5 6.8 7.8 8.6 1
24 09 Burundi 9.2 8.1 7.5 6.5 8.4 8.0 7.5 9.0 7.6 7.3 7.7 8.9 1
151
23 10 Burundi 9.4 8.4 7.8 6.5 8.4 8.2 7.6 9.0 7.7 7.1 7.9 8.7 1
17 11 Burundi 9.1 8.7 8.2 6.2 8.1 8.5 8.2 8.8 8.0 7.7 8.2 9.0 1
18 12 Burundi 8.8 8.9 8.0 5.9 7.9 8.8 8.3 8.5 8.1 7.4 7.9 9.0 1
20 13 Burundi 8.9 8.8 8.1 6.2 7.6 9.1 8.4 8.3 7.9 7.7 7.9 8.7 1
48 07 Cambodia 7.6 5.9 7.3 8.0 7.2 6.4 8.5 7.6 7.1 6.2 7.5 6.4 0
48 08 Cambodia 7.8 5.7 7.5 8.0 7.2 6.6 8.3 7.6 7.1 6.2 7.2 6.6 0
48 09 Cambodia 7.9 5.2 7.0 8.0 7.2 7.5 8.5 7.9 7.4 6.5 7.5 6.7 0
40 10 Cambodia 8.0 5.3 6.9 7.9 7.1 7.7 8.7 8.3 7.7 6.4 7.7 7.0 0
38 11 Cambodia 7.7 5.6 7.2 7.6 6.8 7.2 8.5 8.4 8.0 6.2 8.0 7.4 0
37 12 Cambodia 7.5 5.9 7.3 7.7 7.1 6.9 8.2 8.3 7.7 6.5 8.0 7.7 0
41 13 Cambodia 7.2 6.2 7.0 7.4 7.3 6.4 8.3 8.1 7.8 6.2 8.0 8.0 0
47 06 Cambodia 7.5 6.5 7.0 8.0 7.2 6.0 7.8 7.5 6.9 6.7 7.5 6.4 0
53 05 Cameroon 9 7 5.1 8.6 9 4.2 6.4 7.5 6.6 8 8.2 5.0 0
36 06 Cameroon 6.5 6.8 6.5 8.0 8.7 6.0 8.5 8.0 7.2 7.6 7.9 6.7 0
35 07 Cameroon 7.0 6.8 7.0 7.9 8.7 6.1 8.5 7.5 7.2 7.7 8.0 7.0 0
33 08 Cameroon 7.4 7.1 7.1 7.9 8.7 6.1 8.7 7.6 7.4 7.8 8.2 7.2 0
26 09 Cameroon 8.0 7.5 7.2 8.0 8.9 6.9 9.2 8.0 8.0 7.8 8.7 7.1 0
26 10 Cameroon 8.2 7.6 7.5 8.1 8.7 7.0 9.0 8.0 7.8 7.8 8.7 7.0 0
24 11 Cameroon 8.0 7.3 7.8 7.8 8.4 7.0 8.8 8.3 8.1 7.8 8.5 6.8 0
26 12 Cameroon 8.2 7.0 7.5 7.5 8.1 6.5 8.9 8.1 7.8 7.9 9.2 6.5 0
27 13 Cameroon 8.3 7.3 7.8 7.2 7.8 6.1 8.5 8.4 8.1 8.0 9.2 6.8 0
167 07 Canada 3.3 2.4 2.0 2.1 5.0 1.5 1.5 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.6 1.5 0
167 08 Canada 3.3 2.4 3.0 2.1 5.0 1.5 1.5 1.2 2.0 1.0 1.8 1.5 0
166 09 Canada 3.3 2.4 3.0 2.1 4.7 2.0 1.7 1.2 2.1 1.1 2.4 1.7 0
166 10 Canada 3.2 2.5 3.1 2.1 4.5 2.5 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.2 2.4 1.5 0
168 11 Canada 2.9 2.5 3.3 2.4 4.1 2.4 1.2 1.9 1.6 1.5 2.5 1.4 0
169 12 Canada 2.7 2.2 3.0 2.4 3.8 2.1 1.0 2.2 1.9 1.8 2.5 1.1 0
168 13 Canada 2.6 2.1 3.1 2.1 3.5 1.8 1.5 2.0 2.0 1.8 2.5 1.0 0
139 06 Canada 3.0 2.3 2.0 2.0 5.0 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.6 1.0 0
66 07 Cape Verde 7.9 4.8 4.8 8.2 6.2 8.0 7.0 7.4 6.4 6.1 6.4 7.9 0
65 08 Cape Verde 7.9 4.8 4.8 8.2 6.2 7.8 7.3 7.2 6.4 5.8 6.4 7.9 0
84 09 Cape Verde 7.9 4.0 4.4 8.2 6.2 7.2 7.4 7.6 6.2 5.7 6.1 7.6 0
88 10 Cape Verde 7.7 4.1 4.4 8.2 6.0 7.0 7.2 7.4 6.0 5.5 6.1 7.6 0
90 11 Cape Verde 7.3 4.3 4.2 8.3 6.3 6.3 6.9 6.9 5.7 5.7 5.7 8.2 0
91 12 Cape Verde 7.0 4.0 4.2 8.4 6.6 6.6 6.6 6.6 5.4 5.7 5.7 7.9 0
94 13 Cape Verde 6.7 4.1 4.2 8.3 6.9 6.1 6.3 6.5 5.1 5.7 5.5 8.2 0
20 05 Central African Republic 9 5 8.8 3 7 9 9.7 8 8.2 9 10 7.0 0
13 06 Central African Republic 9.0 7.7 8.8 5.5 8.5 8.1 9.0 8.0 7.5 8.9 8.0 8.5 1
10 07 Central African Republic 8.9 8.4 8.8 5.5 8.6 8.4 9.0 8.0 8.2 8.9 9.3 9.0 1
10 08 Central African Republic 9.0 8.8 8.9 5.5 8.8 8.4 9.2 8.6 8.7 9.4 9.4 9.0 1
8 09 Central African Republic 8.9 9.0 8.6 5.7 9.1 8.4 9.3 9.3 8.9 9.6 9.5 9.1 1
8 10 Central African Republic 9.1 9.3 8.9 6.1 9.2 8.4 9.0 9.2 8.8 9.7 9.1 9.6 1
8 11 Central African Republic 8.9 9.6 8.6 5.8 8.9 8.1 9.1 9.0 8.6 9.7 9.1 9.6 1
10 12 Central African Republic 8.8 9.7 8.5 5.6 8.7 8.0 8.9 9.1 8.5 9.6 9.1 9.3 1
9 13 Central African Republic 8.6 9.8 8.5 6.1 9.2 7.7 9.0 9.5 8.6 9.7 9.1 9.4 1
7 05 Chad 8 9.1 7.1 8.3 9 8 8.9 9 9.1 7 9.4 8.0 1
152
6 06 Chad 9.0 9.0 8.5 8.0 9.0 7.9 9.5 9.0 9.1 9.4 9.5 8.0 1
5 07 Chad 9.1 8.9 9.5 7.9 9.0 8.3 9.5 9.1 9.2 9.6 9.7 9.0 1
4 08 Chad 9.1 9.2 9.7 7.8 9.1 8.3 9.7 9.4 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.5 1
4 09 Chad 9.3 9.4 9.8 7.8 9.3 8.3 9.8 9.6 9.5 9.9 9.8 9.7 1
2 10 Chad 9.4 9.5 9.8 8.3 9.3 8.5 9.9 9.6 9.6 9.9 9.8 9.7 1
2 11 Chad 9.2 9.5 9.4 8.0 8.9 8.5 9.8 9.6 9.3 9.2 9.8 9.1 1
4 12 Chad 9.3 9.5 9.1 7.7 8.6 8.3 9.8 9.5 9.3 8.9 9.8 7.8 1
5 13 Chad 9.5 9.7 8.8 8.0 8.9 8.0 9.7 9.9 9.8 9.4 9.5 7.9 1
158 07 Chile 3.8 1.1 3.5 2.1 4.0 3.8 1.6 3.7 3.7 2.0 1.5 3.0 0
157 08 Chile 3.8 2.0 3.9 2.1 4.6 3.7 2.0 3.8 3.9 2.0 1.5 3.0 0
155 09 Chile 4.0 2.5 3.6 2.1 4.4 4.3 2.0 4.2 3.6 2.0 1.5 3.3 0
155 10 Chile 4.1 2.6 3.4 2.5 4.5 4.6 1.8 4.0 3.4 2.3 1.5 3.3 0
153 11 Chile 5.0 3.0 3.5 2.8 5.0 4.6 2.1 4.3 3.3 2.5 1.4 3.3 0
151 12 Chile 4.6 2.7 3.8 3.1 5.5 4.6 3.7 4.5 3.2 2.8 1.4 3.5 0
152 13 Chile 4.9 2.4 3.5 2.8 5.5 4.1 3.8 4.3 3.5 2.9 1.4 3.2 0
132 06 Chile 3.0 1.0 3.5 2.0 4.0 3.4 1.5 3.5 3.6 2.0 1.5 3.0 0
75 05 China 6.8 5 7.4 6 9 0.5 8.6 2.9 8.9 7 8.4 1.8 1
57 06 China 8.5 5.1 8.0 6.6 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.3 9.0 5.5 8.0 2.3 1
62 07 China 8.7 5.1 8.0 6.5 9.0 4.0 8.5 6.5 9.0 5.3 7.5 3.1 1
68 08 China 8.8 5.1 7.8 6.3 9.0 4.0 8.3 6.6 8.9 5.2 7.0 3.3 1
56 09 China 9.0 6.8 7.9 6.1 9.2 4.5 8.5 7.2 8.9 6.0 7.2 3.3 1
62 10 China 8.8 6.6 8.0 5.9 9.0 4.3 8.3 7.0 9.0 5.8 7.2 3.1 1
72 11 China 8.2 6.2 7.9 5.6 8.6 4.4 7.9 6.6 8.8 5.7 6.9 3.3 1
76 12 China 7.9 5.9 7.9 5.3 8.3 3.9 7.9 6.3 8.6 6.0 6.9 3.5 1
66 13 China 8.1 6.1 8.3 5.0 8.0 3.6 8.1 6.8 9.4 6.5 7.2 3.8 1
14 05 Colombia 9 8 6.9 9.2 9 7.1 9.8 4.2 8.2 5.4 9.2 9.0 1
27 06 Colombia 7.0 9.1 7.4 8.5 8.5 3.2 8.7 6.5 7.6 9.0 9.2 7.1 1
33 07 Colombia 6.8 9.5 7.4 8.4 8.4 3.8 8.2 6.0 7.4 8.3 8.5 7.0 1
37 08 Colombia 6.8 9.2 7.4 8.4 8.4 3.8 7.9 6.0 7.2 8.0 8.3 7.6 1
41 09 Colombia 6.9 9.2 7.2 8.5 8.5 4.3 7.9 6.0 7.2 7.5 8.0 8.0 1
46 10 Colombia 6.7 9.0 7.2 8.3 8.3 4.6 7.7 5.8 6.9 7.7 8.0 8.0 1
44 11 Colombia 6.7 8.7 7.5 7.9 8.6 4.1 7.5 5.6 7.2 7.5 8.0 7.7 1
52 12 Colombia 6.4 8.4 7.2 7.6 8.4 4.0 7.4 5.9 7.0 7.0 7.7 7.4 1
57 13 Colombia 6.5 8.3 7.5 7.3 8.1 3.8 7.3 6.1 7.3 6.8 7.7 7.1 1
78 07 Comoros 6.2 3.6 5.3 5.7 6.1 7.6 7.9 8.7 6.6 6.7 6.5 6.9 0
74 08 Comoros 6.7 3.6 5.3 6.0 6.1 7.3 8.1 8.5 6.9 7.0 6.7 7.4 0
51 09 Comoros 7.4 3.7 5.5 6.0 6.3 7.8 8.7 8.7 7.0 7.5 7.9 9.8 0
52 10 Comoros 7.5 3.9 5.6 6.4 6.1 7.6 8.2 8.5 6.8 7.5 8.0 9.0 0
56 11 Comoros 7.5 4.0 5.3 6.6 5.8 7.6 8.0 8.2 6.6 7.5 8.0 8.7 0
57 12 Comoros 7.3 4.2 5.3 6.9 6.1 7.9 7.7 7.9 6.3 7.5 7.5 8.4 0
56 13 Comoros 7.4 4.5 5.3 7.2 6.4 8.2 7.4 7.9 6.6 7.5 7.5 8.1 0
26 07 Congo (Republic) 8.7 7.3 6.8 6.1 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.8 7.9 7.9 7.2 7.4 0
26 08 Congo (Republic) 8.7 7.7 6.8 6.1 8.1 8.0 8.8 8.8 7.9 7.9 7.2 7.4 0
30 09 Congo (Republic) 8.9 7.8 6.5 6.1 8.0 8.0 8.6 8.8 7.9 7.8 7.1 7.6 0
31 10 Congo (Republic) 8.7 7.7 6.3 6.4 8.1 7.8 9.1 8.6 7.7 7.6 7.1 7.4 0
32 11 Congo (Republic) 8.5 7.7 6.0 6.7 8.2 7.3 8.9 8.3 7.5 7.3 6.7 8.2 0
153
33 12 Congo (Republic) 8.3 7.7 6.3 6.5 7.9 7.5 8.6 8.4 7.2 7.0 6.7 7.9 0
36 13 Congo (Republic) 8.2 8.0 6.0 6.2 8.2 7.0 8.7 8.7 7.5 6.7 6.7 8.2 0
114 06 Costa Rica 6.0 4.2 4.0 5.0 6.2 4.5 3.9 2.5 3.5 2.0 3.3 4.5 0
139 07 Costa Rica 5.6 4.4 4.0 5.0 6.6 4.8 3.9 2.9 3.5 2.0 3.3 4.5 0
140 08 Costa Rica 5.6 4.2 4.0 4.8 6.6 4.6 4.1 3.5 3.5 2.2 3.3 4.5 0
137 09 Costa Rica 5.7 4.5 4.1 4.7 6.7 5.0 4.1 4.0 3.5 2.2 3.2 4.8 0
138 10 Costa Rica 5.5 4.6 3.9 4.5 6.5 5.4 3.9 4.1 3.3 2.5 3.2 4.6 0
137 11 Costa Rica 5.1 4.3 4.1 4.1 6.5 4.9 3.5 4.2 3.0 2.5 3.5 4.9 0
139 12 Costa Rica 4.6 4.0 4.4 3.8 6.4 4.6 3.2 4.5 2.7 2.8 3.5 5.2 0
139 13 Costa Rica 4.9 4.1 4.1 3.5 6.1 4.3 3.5 4.6 2.4 2.5 3.8 4.9 0
1 05 Cote d'Ivoire 8 8 7.7 8.8 9 7.7 9.8 9.5 9.4 9 9.1 10.0 1
3 06 Cote d'Ivoire 8.8 7.6 9.8 8.5 8.0 9.0 10.0 8.5 9.4 9.8 9.8 10.0 1
6 07 Cote d'Ivoire 8.6 8.3 9.8 8.4 8.0 8.9 9.5 7.9 9.2 9.6 9.3 9.8 1
8 08 Cote d'Ivoire 8.4 8.3 9.5 8.4 8.0 8.5 8.9 7.8 9.0 9.2 8.9 9.7 1
11 09 Cote d'Ivoire 8.6 7.8 9.0 8.4 8.1 8.3 9.1 8.0 8.5 8.5 8.5 9.7 1
12 10 Cote d'Ivoire 8.4 8.0 8.9 8.2 7.9 8.0 9.0 8.3 8.3 8.2 8.5 9.5 1
10 11 Cote d'Ivoire 8.1 8.5 8.7 7.9 8.0 7.7 9.5 8.4 8.6 8.6 9.1 9.7 1
11 12 Cote d'Ivoire 7.9 9.0 9.0 7.6 7.7 7.4 9.6 8.3 8.3 8.9 9.9 10.0 1
12 13 Cote d'Ivoire 7.8 9.3 9.0 7.3 7.8 7.7 9.3 8.5 8.6 9.1 9.4 9.7 1
126 07 Croatia 5.3 6.5 6.0 5.0 5.7 5.7 4.2 4.1 4.5 3.9 3.9 5.7 0
129 08 Croatia 5.1 6.3 5.7 5.0 5.5 5.3 4.4 4.1 4.5 3.9 3.9 5.7 0
131 09 Croatia 4.9 6.1 5.4 4.8 5.5 5.9 4.5 3.9 4.7 4.3 4.3 5.8 0
131 10 Croatia 4.7 5.9 5.2 4.6 5.3 6.2 4.8 3.7 4.5 4.4 4.3 5.4 0
132 11 Croatia 4.3 5.5 5.5 4.9 5.0 5.9 4.4 3.4 4.3 4.4 4.7 5.0 0
130 12 Croatia 4.0 5.2 5.6 4.7 4.7 5.4 4.2 3.2 4.6 4.7 4.7 5.3 0
135 13 Croatia 3.7 5.5 5.3 4.4 4.4 5.1 3.9 2.9 4.7 4.8 4.4 5.0 0
104 06 Croatia 5.7 6.6 6.5 5.0 5.7 5.8 4.2 4.1 4.6 4.0 3.9 5.8 0
58 05 Cuba 5 8 6.3 5.4 8.8 5.7 7.8 3.8 9 9 8.6 6.3 0
61 06 Cuba 7.5 4.7 5.5 6.0 7.9 6.5 7.8 4.0 8.3 8.0 8.0 7.7 0
76 07 Cuba 6.5 4.7 5.5 6.0 7.2 6.3 7.6 3.8 7.8 7.7 7.8 7.7 0
76 08 Cuba 6.5 4.7 5.5 6.8 7.2 6.1 7.6 4.0 7.8 7.7 7.0 7.7 0
73 09 Cuba 6.9 5.9 5.5 7.2 6.8 6.3 7.5 5.0 7.4 7.5 7.1 7.5 0
77 10 Cuba 6.7 5.7 5.5 7.2 6.6 6.3 7.0 5.0 7.5 7.3 7.1 7.5 0
86 11 Cuba 6.3 5.4 5.1 6.9 6.3 6.0 6.6 5.3 7.4 6.9 6.9 7.5 0
101 12 Cuba 6.0 5.0 4.8 6.6 5.9 5.5 6.4 5.0 7.4 6.6 6.9 7.0 0
101 13 Cuba 6.6 5.3 4.8 6.3 5.9 5.2 6.5 4.7 7.5 6.3 6.9 6.7 0
112 07 Cyprus 5.1 4.2 8.3 5.7 7.5 4.8 5.5 3.8 3.5 4.2 8.4 9.2 0
112 08 Cyprus 4.9 4.2 8.3 5.2 7.5 4.2 5.5 3.8 3.5 5.0 8.4 9.2 0
114 09 Cyprus 5.0 4.5 7.5 5.2 7.8 4.0 5.4 3.6 3.8 5.2 7.9 9.0 0
114 10 Cyprus 4.8 4.5 7.6 5.0 7.6 4.3 5.2 3.4 3.6 5.3 7.9 8.8 0
115 11 Cyprus 4.4 4.4 7.6 5.3 7.3 5.0 5.0 3.3 3.3 5.3 7.9 8.8 0
115 12 Cyprus 4.1 4.7 7.3 5.0 7.0 5.4 5.2 3.1 3.3 5.0 7.9 8.8 0
115 13 Cyprus 4.0 4.4 7.3 4.8 7.0 5.8 5.5 3.0 3.3 5.0 7.9 9.0 0
92 06 Cyprus 5.0 3.6 8.6 6.0 7.7 5.0 5.4 4.2 3.5 4.0 8.5 9.0 0
148 07 Czech Republic 4.0 3.3 3.2 5.0 3.9 2.8 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.0 3.5 3.4 0
149 08 Czech Republic 3.8 3.1 3.2 4.8 3.9 3.4 3.7 3.8 3.5 2.0 3.5 3.4 0
154
152 09 Czech Republic 3.5 2.7 3.6 4.5 4.3 4.1 3.6 3.8 3.5 2.0 3.3 3.7 0
152 10 Czech Republic 3.3 2.8 3.4 4.3 4.1 4.4 3.4 3.6 3.3 2.1 3.3 3.5 0
152 11 Czech Republic 3.0 2.8 3.8 4.0 3.8 4.6 3.7 3.9 3.0 2.1 3.8 3.8 0
155 12 Czech Republic 2.8 2.5 3.5 3.7 3.5 4.3 3.5 3.6 2.7 2.1 3.8 3.5 0
154 13 Czech Republic 2.5 2.2 3.8 3.4 3.8 4.5 4.1 3.7 2.4 2.1 4.2 3.2 0
119 06 Czech Republic 4.0 3.5 3.2 5.0 4.0 2.5 3.7 3.9 3.0 2.0 3.5 3.5 0
137 06 Denmark 3.0 2.5 4.5 2.0 2.0 2.0 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 3.3 0
169 07 Denmark 3.2 2.6 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 0
170 08 Denmark 3.2 1.9 2.5 2.0 1.9 2.1 1.0 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 0
172 09 Denmark 3.0 1.6 3.0 2.0 2.2 2.7 1.3 1.5 1.5 1.3 1.0 2.1 0
172 10 Denmark 2.8 1.7 3.0 1.8 2.0 3.1 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.5 1.0 2.3 0
173 11 Denmark 2.9 2.1 3.3 2.1 1.7 2.5 1.2 1.6 1.3 1.5 1.0 2.6 0
175 12 Denmark 2.8 1.9 3.0 2.2 1.8 2.2 0.8 1.7 1.5 1.8 1.0 2.3 0
174 13 Denmark 2.5 1.6 3.4 1.9 1.6 1.9 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.5 1.4 2.0 0
60 11 Djibouti 7.8 7.2 6.2 5.2 6.8 6.0 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.2 7.5 8.3 0
53 12 Djibouti 8.3 6.9 6.5 4.9 7.1 6.6 7.5 7.2 6.8 6.5 7.5 8.0 0
50 13 Djibouti 8.3 7.2 6.2 5.2 7.3 6.9 7.8 7.4 7.0 6.6 7.5 8.1 0
70 07 Djibouti 7.9 6.5 5.5 5.0 6.1 6.9 7.4 7.5 6.0 7.0 6.9 7.6 0
71 08 Djibouti 7.7 6.4 5.5 5.2 6.2 7.1 7.4 7.3 6.2 6.5 6.9 7.6 0
73 09 Djibouti 8.0 6.4 5.7 5.2 6.3 6.6 7.4 7.5 6.2 6.2 6.9 8.2 0
68 10 Djibouti 7.9 6.8 5.9 5.5 6.5 6.4 7.2 7.3 6.6 6.0 7.1 8.7 0
19 05 Dominican Republic 9 8 7.1 8.5 9 6.8 6.8 9.6 9.2 7 9.2 4.0 0
47 06 Dominican Republic 7.8 7.0 6.5 8.5 8.0 6.0 6.2 8.0 7.1 7.0 7.4 5.5 0
69 07 Dominican Republic 6.5 6.4 6.1 8.3 8.1 5.8 6.0 6.9 7.0 6.5 7.4 5.6 0
77 08 Dominican Republic 6.5 5.4 6.1 8.3 8.1 5.6 5.8 6.9 7.0 6.1 7.0 5.6 0
88 09 Dominican Republic 6.7 5.3 6.0 8.5 8.0 5.6 5.8 6.7 6.7 5.8 6.8 5.8 0
93 10 Dominican Republic 6.5 5.1 5.8 8.3 7.8 5.9 5.6 6.9 6.5 5.6 6.8 6.0 0
84 11 Dominican Republic 6.5 5.5 6.1 7.9 7.5 5.6 5.8 6.8 6.3 5.8 6.8 6.2 0
95 12 Dominican Republic 6.5 5.2 5.8 7.6 7.2 5.8 5.7 6.5 6.0 5.5 6.5 5.9 0
95 13 Dominican Republic 6.4 5.5 6.1 7.9 6.9 5.5 5.4 6.2 5.7 5.2 6.5 5.9 0
2 06 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.5 9.5 9.1 8.0 9.0 8.1 9.0 9.0 9.5 9.8 9.6 10.0 0
2 05 DR Congo (Zaire) 9 9.4 9 7 9 8 8 9 9.1 8.7 9.1 10.0 1
7 07 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.4 8.9 8.8 7.6 9.1 8.0 8.3 8.7 8.9 9.6 8.6 9.6 1
6 08 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.6 9.2 8.8 7.9 9.0 8.3 8.3 9.1 8.9 9.6 8.6 9.4 1
5 09 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.7 9.6 8.9 8.1 9.3 8.3 8.6 9.2 9.0 9.7 8.7 9.6 1
5 10 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.9 9.6 8.6 8.0 9.5 8.7 8.8 9.0 9.4 9.8 8.9 9.7 1
4 11 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.7 9.6 8.3 7.7 9.2 8.7 9.0 8.9 9.2 9.6 8.8 9.5 1
2 12 DR Congo (Zaire) 9.9 9.7 9.3 7.4 8.9 8.8 9.5 9.2 9.7 9.7 9.5 9.6 1
2 13 DR Congo (Zaire) 10.0 10.0 9.4 7.1 8.8 8.5 9.6 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.5 9.7 1
46 05 Ecuador 9 6 5.6 6.9 9 5 9.5 7.5 7.9 8 8.6 4.0 0
63 06 Ecuador 6.0 5.6 6.8 7.1 8.0 5.2 8.3 7.4 6.7 6.8 7.8 5.5 0
72 07 Ecuador 6.2 6.0 6.7 7.1 8.0 5.3 7.5 6.8 6.6 6.6 7.6 5.5 0
68 08 Ecuador 6.2 6.0 6.5 7.3 7.8 5.9 7.1 6.8 6.4 6.7 7.9 5.7 0
69 09 Ecuador 6.5 6.3 6.3 7.3 8.0 6.4 7.0 6.8 6.0 6.8 7.8 6.0 0
69 10 Ecuador 6.3 6.1 6.4 7.5 8.0 6.7 7.4 7.0 5.8 6.6 7.8 6.1 0
62 11 Ecuador 5.9 6.4 6.9 7.1 7.7 6.3 7.5 7.2 5.7 7.0 8.2 6.3 0
155
67 12 Ecuador 5.6 6.0 6.9 7.1 7.7 5.9 7.5 7.2 5.2 6.5 8.2 6.3 0
74 13 Ecuador 5.8 5.7 7.2 6.8 7.4 5.6 7.2 6.9 4.9 6.7 8.2 6.2 0
38 05 Egypt 9 8 7.8 5 9 3.8 9.5 7.3 7.7 8.5 8.2 5.0 0
31 06 Egypt 8.0 6.0 8.5 6.0 8.0 7.0 9.0 7.3 8.0 6.5 7.7 7.5 0
36 07 Egypt 7.7 6.5 7.8 6.2 7.8 7.0 9.0 6.7 8.5 6.1 8.3 7.6 0
40 08 Egypt 7.5 6.3 7.7 6.2 7.8 6.9 9.0 6.3 8.5 6.1 8.4 8.0 0
43 09 Egypt 7.6 6.9 8.0 6.2 7.6 7.0 8.6 6.4 8.4 6.2 8.1 8.0 0
49 10 Egypt 7.4 6.7 8.2 6.0 7.4 6.8 8.4 6.1 8.2 6.5 8.1 7.8 0
45 11 Egypt 7.1 6.4 8.3 5.7 7.4 6.5 8.6 5.9 8.3 6.8 8.0 7.8 0
31 12 Egypt 7.1 6.4 8.8 5.7 7.4 7.1 9.2 5.9 9.0 7.0 8.8 8.0 0
34 13 Egypt 7.2 6.5 8.5 5.4 7.1 8.2 8.9 5.6 9.6 7.3 8.7 7.7 0
72 05 El Salvador 5 5 5.6 2.7 9 7.5 9 3 8 6 9.7 5.0 0
77 06 El Salvador 8.5 6.1 6.0 7.0 7.0 5.0 7.0 7.4 6.7 6.0 3.9 5.5 0
91 07 El Salvador 7.6 5.6 6.0 7.0 7.3 5.4 7.0 6.9 6.9 5.8 3.9 5.5 0
91 08 El Salvador 7.4 5.6 6.0 7.0 7.6 6.0 7.0 6.5 7.0 6.3 3.9 5.2 0
90 09 El Salvador 7.6 5.7 6.2 6.9 7.8 6.3 7.0 6.6 6.9 6.4 4.5 5.3 0
85 10 El Salvador 8.1 5.7 5.9 7.1 7.9 6.6 6.8 7.0 6.7 6.7 4.5 5.1 0
89 11 El Salvador 7.6 5.3 5.8 7.1 7.6 6.3 6.5 6.9 6.7 7.0 4.3 4.9 0
93 12 El Salvador 7.7 5.2 6.0 7.2 7.3 6.0 6.2 6.6 6.4 6.7 4.3 4.8 0
96 13 El Salvador 7.4 5.5 5.7 6.9 7.0 6.5 5.9 6.5 6.1 6.4 4.3 5.1 0
33 05 Equatorial Guinea 8 6 6.3 9 9 5.1 9.9 8 7.8 7 9.8 5.0 0
52 06 Equatorial Guinea 7.0 2.0 6.7 7.5 9.0 4.0 9.0 8.0 8.5 8.3 8.0 6.0 0
41 07 Equatorial Guinea 8.0 2.0 7.0 7.4 9.0 4.0 9.4 8.6 9.4 8.9 8.5 6.0 0
42 08 Equatorial Guinea 7.8 2.0 7.0 7.4 9.2 3.9 9.4 8.3 9.5 9.0 8.5 6.0 0
47 09 Equatorial Guinea 8.3 2.0 6.8 7.4 9.0 4.4 9.4 8.6 9.2 8.6 8.6 6.0 0
44 10 Equatorial Guinea 8.4 2.3 6.8 7.4 8.8 4.7 9.6 8.4 9.4 8.4 8.4 5.9 0
40 11 Equatorial Guinea 8.5 2.7 6.6 7.2 9.1 4.5 9.6 8.1 9.4 8.1 8.2 6.0 0
43 12 Equatorial Guinea 8.2 3.0 6.6 6.9 8.8 4.8 9.4 7.8 9.1 7.8 8.2 5.7 0
47 13 Equatorial Guinea 8.3 3.3 6.6 6.6 9.1 4.5 9.6 7.6 9.4 7.5 8.2 5.5 0
55 05 Eritrea 8 8 5.4 4 9 8.8 9 7 5.7 5 9.2 5.0 0
54 06 Eritrea 8.0 7.2 5.4 6.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 7.3 6.8 7.2 7.5 6.5 0
50 07 Eritrea 8.1 7.1 5.4 6.0 5.9 8.4 8.3 7.7 7.4 7.5 7.2 6.5 0
44 08 Eritrea 8.6 7.1 5.6 6.0 5.9 8.5 8.4 7.9 7.4 7.5 7.2 7.3 0
36 09 Eritrea 8.6 7.0 5.8 6.5 6.0 8.6 8.6 8.6 7.9 7.4 7.7 7.6 0
30 10 Eritrea 8.7 7.2 6.1 7.1 6.2 8.6 8.8 8.6 8.4 7.6 7.9 8.1 0
28 11 Eritrea 8.3 6.8 6.1 7.4 6.5 8.3 8.5 8.4 8.9 7.7 8.1 8.5 0
23 12 Eritrea 8.6 7.1 6.4 7.1 6.9 8.6 8.4 8.2 8.7 7.8 8.1 8.5 0
25 13 Eritrea 8.7 7.4 6.1 7.3 6.9 8.3 8.7 8.4 9.1 7.5 8.1 8.6 0
140 07 Estonia 4.8 4.8 4.5 4.0 4.9 3.7 5.0 3.8 3.7 2.1 5.9 3.3 0
139 08 Estonia 4.8 4.8 5.1 4.0 4.9 3.7 4.8 3.8 3.5 2.6 5.7 3.3 0
140 09 Estonia 4.7 4.4 4.9 4.0 5.4 4.4 4.7 3.5 3.5 2.5 5.5 3.7 0
140 10 Estonia 4.5 4.2 5.0 4.1 5.2 5.0 4.5 3.3 3.3 2.6 5.5 3.5 0
140 11 Estonia 4.1 3.9 5.4 4.5 4.9 4.3 4.1 2.9 3.0 2.9 5.5 3.9 0
143 12 Estonia 3.8 3.6 5.7 4.2 4.6 3.8 3.8 3.0 2.7 3.2 5.5 3.6 0
145 13 Estonia 3.5 3.3 5.9 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.8 3.0 2.4 2.9 5.5 3.3 0
111 06 Estonia 5.0 5.1 4.5 4.0 5.0 3.5 5.0 4.0 3.7 2.0 5.9 3.3 0
156
30 05 Ethiopia 8.7 8 6 7.3 9 8.5 7.9 5.5 6.3 9 8.9 6.0 1
26 06 Ethiopia 9.0 7.6 7.0 7.5 8.5 8.0 7.6 6.2 8.0 7.5 8.7 6.3 1
18 07 Ethiopia 9.0 7.9 7.8 7.5 8.6 8.0 7.9 7.0 8.5 7.5 8.9 6.7 1
16 08 Ethiopia 8.9 7.5 7.8 7.5 8.6 8.2 7.9 7.5 8.5 7.5 8.9 7.3 1
16 09 Ethiopia 9.4 8.0 8.2 7.7 8.8 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.5 7.5 8.8 7.6 1
17 10 Ethiopia 9.2 7.8 8.6 7.5 8.5 8.0 7.7 8.1 8.7 7.8 9.0 7.9 1
19 11 Ethiopia 9.1 8.2 8.4 7.2 8.2 7.7 7.5 8.4 8.5 7.9 9.0 8.1 1
17 12 Ethiopia 9.6 8.7 8.1 7.0 7.9 7.4 7.2 8.4 8.6 8.1 8.7 8.2 1
19 13 Ethiopia 9.7 8.7 8.6 6.7 7.6 7.7 7.3 8.7 8.7 8.4 8.7 8.1 1
89 07 Fiji 5.9 4.0 7.5 5.4 7.5 5.9 9.0 4.1 5.9 7.0 8.2 5.3 0
87 08 Fiji 5.9 4.0 7.5 6.0 7.5 5.9 8.7 4.4 5.9 7.0 8.2 5.6 0
81 09 Fiji 6.1 4.3 7.3 6.5 7.7 6.3 8.6 5.0 6.1 6.7 8.2 6.0 0
74 10 Fiji 5.9 4.2 7.4 6.6 7.5 6.7 8.9 5.5 6.7 6.8 8.2 6.1 0
68 11 Fiji 5.9 3.9 7.6 6.9 7.7 7.0 8.6 5.5 6.5 7.0 7.9 6.6 0
65 12 Fiji 5.1 3.3 7.6 7.3 7.7 7.0 8.8 5.2 7.0 7.0 7.9 6.6 0
68 13 Fiji 5.2 3.8 7.3 7.0 7.4 7.3 8.8 4.9 7.3 7.0 7.9 6.9 0
175 07 Finland 2.5 1.6 1.0 2.1 1.9 2.2 0.9 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.7 2.0 0
176 08 Finland 2.6 1.6 1.0 2.1 1.9 2.0 0.9 1.2 1.5 0.9 0.7 2.0 0
176 09 Finland 2.5 1.6 1.2 2.1 1.9 2.4 0.9 1.1 1.7 0.9 0.9 2.0 0
176 10 Finland 2.3 1.7 1.2 2.2 1.7 3.0 0.7 1.2 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.8 0
177 11 Finland 2.0 2.1 1.7 2.5 1.3 2.8 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.2 1.5 0
177 12 Finland 2.2 1.9 1.4 2.6 1.3 2.9 0.8 1.8 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 0
178 13 Finland 1.9 1.6 1.4 2.3 1.0 3.2 1.0 1.5 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.0 0
144 06 Finland 3.0 1.5 1.0 2.0 2.0 2.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
129 06 France 4.0 3.8 6.0 2.0 5.0 3.0 1.5 1.0 3.2 1.0 1.8 2.0 0
156 07 France 4.1 3.6 5.8 2.0 4.8 2.9 1.5 1.4 3.2 1.0 1.8 2.0 0
158 08 France 4.1 3.1 6.0 2.0 5.5 3.0 1.7 1.4 3.2 1.0 1.8 2.0 0
158 09 France 3.9 3.0 5.8 2.0 5.5 3.3 1.8 1.5 2.9 1.2 2.0 2.4 0
159 10 France 3.7 3.1 5.6 1.8 5.3 3.6 1.8 1.5 2.7 1.6 2.0 2.2 0
161 11 France 3.3 2.8 5.9 1.8 4.9 3.5 1.6 1.9 2.5 1.9 1.9 2.0 0
162 12 France 3.0 2.5 5.6 1.8 4.6 3.9 1.9 1.8 2.7 2.2 1.9 1.7 0
161 13 France 2.7 2.2 5.9 1.9 4.3 4.0 2.2 1.5 2.4 2.3 1.9 1.4 0
84 06 Gabon 6.0 5.4 3.0 6.0 7.9 5.0 7.9 7.5 6.2 5.5 7.5 5.7 0
98 07 Gabon 6.6 5.7 3.0 6.0 7.8 4.9 7.3 7.0 6.7 5.3 7.2 5.8 0
93 08 Gabon 6.9 6.2 3.0 6.0 8.1 5.2 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.6 7.2 5.8 0
99 09 Gabon 7.2 5.7 3.0 6.0 7.8 5.5 7.3 6.8 6.3 5.9 7.2 5.7 0
98 10 Gabon 7.0 5.9 3.0 6.4 7.9 5.9 7.8 6.6 6.4 5.7 7.2 5.5 0
92 11 Gabon 6.8 6.2 3.3 6.1 7.9 5.5 7.5 6.7 6.7 5.7 7.1 5.8 0
92 12 Gabon 6.5 5.9 3.3 5.8 7.6 5.7 7.8 6.9 6.8 5.7 7.1 5.5 0
100 13 Gabon 6.8 5.6 3.3 5.5 7.3 5.2 7.6 7.0 6.8 5.4 7.1 5.4 0
60 05 Gambia 7 7 5.4 4 9 6.7 8.1 7 7.9 6 8.3 6.0 0
83 06 Gambia 6.0 5.0 4.0 6.0 7.0 8.1 7.5 6.5 6.6 5.5 5.8 6.0 0
85 07 Gambia 6.4 5.2 4.2 6.0 7.0 8.0 7.9 6.6 6.8 5.8 5.9 6.2 0
83 08 Gambia 6.9 5.8 4.2 6.0 7.0 7.5 7.9 6.6 6.8 5.8 5.9 6.5 0
80 09 Gambia 7.2 5.7 4.4 6.4 7.0 7.4 7.8 7.1 6.9 6.0 6.2 6.9 0
75 10 Gambia 7.6 6.0 4.6 6.2 6.8 7.5 7.6 7.2 7.4 5.8 6.2 7.3 0
157
69 11 Gambia 7.9 6.4 4.0 6.5 6.6 7.1 7.5 7.0 7.5 6.1 6.8 7.5 0
63 12 Gambia 7.8 6.1 3.7 6.8 6.5 7.4 7.8 7.2 7.5 5.8 6.8 7.2 0
62 13 Gambia 7.7 6.4 3.7 7.1 6.8 7.8 7.6 7.5 8.0 5.5 6.8 6.9 0
58 07 Georgia 6.3 6.8 7.6 5.7 7.0 5.7 7.9 6.1 5.4 7.8 7.8 8.2 1
56 08 Georgia 6.3 6.8 8.1 5.7 6.9 5.4 8.4 5.9 5.9 7.7 8.3 8.4 1
33 09 Georgia 6.4 8.3 8.5 6.0 7.5 6.0 9.0 6.3 7.5 7.9 8.9 9.5 1
37 10 Georgia 6.2 7.8 8.4 5.8 7.2 6.5 9.0 6.4 7.3 8.0 9.1 8.7 1
47 11 Georgia 5.8 7.5 8.0 5.5 6.9 6.0 8.4 6.0 6.9 7.9 9.0 8.5 1
51 12 Georgia 5.5 7.2 8.3 5.2 6.6 6.3 8.5 5.7 6.7 7.6 9.1 8.2 1
55 13 Georgia 5.2 7.5 8.0 5.2 6.3 6.4 8.6 5.4 6.4 7.9 9.4 7.9 1
60 06 Georgia 6.0 6.8 7.4 6.1 7.0 5.5 7.7 6.3 5.6 8.1 7.1 8.6 0
153 07 Germany 3.9 4.8 4.9 3.0 5.5 3.0 2.3 1.7 2.9 2.5 1.8 2.1 0
155 08 Germany 3.9 4.3 4.9 2.8 5.3 2.8 2.3 1.9 2.7 2.5 1.8 2.1 0
157 09 Germany 3.5 3.9 4.9 2.8 4.9 3.2 2.3 1.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 2.4 0
157 10 Germany 3.3 4.0 4.7 2.6 4.7 3.6 2.1 1.7 2.3 2.2 2.0 2.2 0
162 11 Germany 2.9 4.2 4.7 2.6 4.4 2.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.2 2.1 2.0 0
164 12 Germany 2.5 3.9 4.4 2.5 4.1 2.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.5 2.1 1.7 0
165 13 Germany 2.4 3.6 4.3 2.2 3.9 2.6 1.4 1.8 1.9 2.2 2.0 1.4 0
124 06 Germany 4.0 5.0 4.9 3.0 6.2 3.2 2.3 1.8 2.9 2.5 1.8 2.1 0
124 07 Ghana 6.0 4.5 5.1 8.0 6.8 4.0 5.5 6.9 4.5 2.4 3.5 4.7 0
123 08 Ghana 6.8 5.0 5.1 8.0 6.8 5.0 5.5 6.9 4.5 2.4 3.9 4.7 0
124 09 Ghana 7.0 5.1 5.4 8.1 6.6 5.5 5.3 7.2 4.7 2.4 4.2 4.7 0
122 10 Ghana 7.1 5.3 5.2 7.9 6.4 5.8 5.1 7.6 4.7 2.6 4.2 5.2 0
115 11 Ghana 6.8 5.5 5.5 7.6 6.3 6.1 4.8 7.7 4.5 3.0 4.2 5.6 0
112 12 Ghana 6.7 5.2 5.2 7.6 6.2 6.0 4.8 7.6 4.5 3.3 4.7 5.7 0
110 13 Ghana 6.7 5.5 4.9 7.3 6.5 6.1 5.1 7.6 4.7 3.8 5.0 6.0 0
106 06 Ghana 5.5 4.5 5.0 8.0 6.8 4.0 5.5 6.8 4.4 2.0 3.5 4.5 0
146 07 Greece 4.7 2.0 3.5 5.4 5.0 3.5 4.0 3.1 3.9 3.1 1.6 3.7 0
147 08 Greece 4.9 2.6 4.3 5.0 5.0 3.7 4.0 3.6 3.9 3.1 1.6 3.7 0
147 09 Greece 4.5 2.7 4.4 4.7 4.8 4.0 4.5 3.9 3.6 3.5 2.0 3.5 0
147 10 Greece 4.5 2.8 4.2 4.5 4.6 4.3 4.6 3.7 3.4 3.4 2.4 3.5 0
143 11 Greece 4.1 2.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 5.1 4.9 3.8 3.1 3.8 2.5 4.3 0
138 12 Greece 3.8 2.3 4.8 4.7 4.6 5.9 5.4 4.2 3.3 4.0 2.5 4.8 0
138 13 Greece 4.3 2.0 4.8 4.4 4.3 6.4 5.4 3.9 3.0 3.9 3.0 5.1 0
121 06 Greece 5.0 1.4 3.5 5.5 5.0 3.5 4.0 3.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 3.7 0
104 07 Grenada 5.9 3.6 5.0 7.9 7.1 6.5 6.5 4.1 5.1 5.9 5.7 8.3 0
115 08 Grenada 5.7 3.0 4.9 7.9 7.1 5.8 6.5 4.1 4.9 5.4 5.7 8.0 0
119 09 Grenada 5.9 2.9 4.5 7.8 6.9 5.9 6.3 4.1 4.7 5.5 5.8 7.6 0
123 10 Grenada 5.8 2.9 4.2 7.6 6.7 6.1 6.4 3.9 4.6 5.4 5.8 7.6 0
119 11 Grenada 5.8 3.2 3.9 8.0 6.5 5.7 6.2 4.2 4.3 5.3 5.6 7.7 0
121 12 Grenada 5.5 2.9 3.9 8.2 6.2 6.0 6.2 3.9 4.0 5.3 5.6 7.4 0
120 13 Grenada 5.2 3.2 3.9 8.5 5.9 5.8 6.2 3.6 3.7 5.3 5.6 7.7 0
31 05 Guatemala 9 6 7.4 7.5 9 7.7 9.5 5 8.7 8.1 9.1 4.0 0
51 06 Guatemala 8.7 6.0 7.1 6.7 8.0 7.1 7.5 7.1 7.1 7.5 6.0 5.5 0
60 07 Guatemala 7.0 6.0 7.1 6.7 8.0 7.0 7.4 6.6 7.1 7.3 5.9 5.3 0
66 08 Guatemala 6.8 6.0 6.9 6.7 8.0 6.7 7.2 6.6 7.1 7.3 6.0 5.3 0
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73 09 Guatemala 7.0 5.8 6.7 6.7 8.2 6.6 7.1 6.6 7.0 7.1 6.3 5.5 0
72 10 Guatemala 7.4 5.6 6.8 6.7 8.0 6.9 7.1 6.8 6.9 7.2 6.3 5.5 0
72 11 Guatemala 7.3 5.6 6.9 6.5 7.7 6.5 6.8 6.9 6.9 7.6 6.0 5.3 0
70 12 Guatemala 7.0 5.9 7.1 6.8 7.6 6.1 6.8 6.7 6.7 7.3 6.0 5.4 0
70 13 Guatemala 7.3 6.0 7.3 7.1 8.1 6.1 6.9 6.9 6.6 7.0 6.0 5.4 0
16 05 Guinea 9 6 6.1 10 9 4.5 9.7 7.5 8.1 8.1 9.2 7.5 0
11 06 Guinea 7.5 7.2 8.1 8.4 8.0 8.0 9.1 9.0 8.1 8.1 9.0 8.5 0
9 07 Guinea 7.8 7.4 8.1 8.3 8.5 8.5 9.6 8.9 8.6 8.1 9.0 8.5 0
11 08 Guinea 7.9 7.4 8.5 8.3 8.6 8.6 9.7 9.0 8.9 8.4 8.6 7.9 0
9 09 Guinea 8.5 7.1 8.2 8.6 8.9 8.7 9.8 9.2 9.0 9.4 9.2 8.0 0
9 10 Guinea 8.3 7.5 8.2 8.6 8.7 8.9 9.8 9.0 9.5 9.4 9.3 7.8 0
11 11 Guinea 8.2 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.4 8.6 9.4 8.7 9.2 9.3 9.2 7.6 0
12 12 Guinea 8.3 8.0 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.9 9.5 8.6 8.7 9.4 9.2 7.3 0
14 13 Guinea 8.4 8.2 7.6 7.7 8.2 9.2 9.8 8.9 8.4 9.1 8.9 7.0 0
38 07 Guinea Bissau 7.6 6.5 5.4 7.0 8.6 8.0 7.2 8.5 8.0 8.0 6.8 7.2 0
32 08 Guinea Bissau 8.0 6.5 5.4 7.0 8.6 8.2 7.9 8.5 8.0 8.4 7.1 7.7 0
27 09 Guinea Bissau 8.6 6.5 5.8 7.0 8.5 8.5 8.6 8.7 8.0 8.5 8.0 8.1 0
19 11 Guinea Bissau 8.7 7.2 5.4 7.4 8.1 8.7 9.2 8.4 7.8 9.3 9.2 8.8 0
15 12 Guinea Bissau 8.7 7.5 5.7 7.7 7.8 9.0 9.3 8.5 7.5 9.4 9.2 8.9 0
15 13 Guinea Bissau 8.4 7.8 5.7 8.0 8.1 8.7 9.7 8.8 7.6 9.5 9.7 9.0 0
46 06 Guinea-Bissau 7.0 4.9 5.5 7.0 9.3 7.4 7.8 8.0 7.9 7.5 6.5 6.6 0
22 10 Guinea-Bissau 8.5 6.8 5.8 7.1 8.4 8.3 9.1 8.8 8.1 8.9 8.9 8.5 0
98 07 Guyana 6.9 4.1 5.4 7.9 8.1 6.8 6.4 5.7 5.6 5.9 4.9 5.6 0
105 08 Guyana 6.3 3.6 5.7 7.9 7.8 6.4 6.4 5.7 5.4 6.7 5.1 5.2 0
104 09 Guyana 6.3 3.5 6.1 7.9 7.9 6.6 6.7 5.5 5.4 6.8 5.1 5.2 0
102 10 Guyana 6.1 3.6 6.2 8.0 7.7 6.9 6.8 5.3 5.2 6.6 5.1 5.5 0
99 11 Guyana 6.4 3.6 5.9 8.4 7.4 6.4 6.5 5.5 5.0 6.3 5.1 6.0 0
104 12 Guyana 6.1 3.5 6.2 8.6 7.1 6.1 6.5 5.7 4.7 6.1 5.1 5.7 0
107 13 Guyana 5.8 3.8 5.9 8.5 6.8 6.6 6.2 6.0 4.4 5.8 5.1 5.9 0
10 05 Haiti 8.8 8 7.7 3.4 9 8.1 9.4 9.8 8.7 7.8 8.5 10.0 0
8 06 Haiti 8.8 5.0 8.8 8.0 8.3 8.4 9.4 9.3 9.6 9.4 9.6 10.0 0
11 07 Haiti 8.6 4.2 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.4 9.2 9.0 9.1 9.3 9.3 9.6 0
14 08 Haiti 8.5 4.2 8.0 8.0 8.2 8.3 9.0 8.8 8.9 8.9 8.9 9.6 0
12 09 Haiti 9.3 5.8 7.3 8.6 8.2 8.9 9.2 9.5 8.5 8.4 8.3 9.8 0
11 10 Haiti 9.3 5.6 7.3 8.6 8.3 9.2 9.3 9.5 8.3 8.2 8.4 9.6 0
5 11 Haiti 10.0 9.2 7.3 8.9 8.8 9.2 9.4 10.0 8.0 8.4 8.8 10.0 0
7 12 Haiti 9.5 8.1 7.0 8.8 8.6 9.5 9.3 9.3 7.7 8.2 9.0 9.7 0
8 13 Haiti 9.6 8.6 7.0 9.1 9.1 9.7 8.8 9.6 7.6 7.9 9.0 9.9 0
41 05 Honduras 9 6 5.3 9.7 9 5.4 9.9 3 7.2 8 9.1 6.0 0
75 06 Honduras 8.8 2.1 5.3 6.0 9.0 7.6 7.5 6.9 5.6 6.0 6.4 5.5 0
93 07 Honduras 7.8 2.0 5.3 6.0 8.7 7.6 7.4 6.6 5.8 5.9 6.3 5.4 0
94 08 Honduras 7.2 2.0 5.3 6.5 8.7 7.2 7.4 6.6 6.1 6.2 6.3 5.4 0
90 09 Honduras 7.8 4.0 5.0 6.3 8.5 7.2 7.0 7.1 6.3 6.0 6.1 5.9 0
76 10 Honduras 7.6 4.1 5.0 6.5 8.3 7.5 7.5 6.9 6.3 7.0 6.8 6.5 0
78 11 Honduras 7.6 3.9 5.3 6.6 8.1 7.0 7.3 6.6 6.3 6.5 6.3 6.9 0
75 12 Honduras 7.3 3.6 5.6 6.9 8.1 7.2 7.0 6.7 6.2 7.0 6.3 6.6 0
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75 13 Honduras 7.0 3.9 5.8 6.6 8.1 6.9 6.9 6.8 6.3 6.8 6.3 6.9 0
116 06 Hungary 3.7 3.6 3.0 5.0 6.4 4.0 3.8 4.2 4.0 2.0 3.0 4.0 0
138 07 Hungary 3.7 3.6 3.0 5.0 6.3 4.1 6.0 3.8 4.0 2.1 5.5 4.1 0
140 08 Hungary 3.7 3.4 3.4 5.0 6.1 4.3 5.7 3.8 4.0 1.9 5.3 4.3 0
141 09 Hungary 3.5 3.0 3.4 5.0 6.1 5.0 5.5 3.8 3.5 2.1 5.0 4.8 0
141 10 Hungary 3.3 3.1 3.2 4.8 5.9 5.4 5.7 3.6 3.3 2.2 5.0 4.6 0
142 11 Hungary 3.1 3.1 3.5 4.5 5.5 5.4 5.4 3.7 3.0 2.5 4.7 4.3 0
141 12 Hungary 2.8 2.8 3.8 4.2 5.2 5.9 5.8 3.4 3.2 2.6 4.7 4.0 0
141 13 Hungary 2.5 2.9 4.1 3.9 4.9 6.0 5.9 3.1 3.4 2.3 4.8 3.8 0
170 07 Iceland 1.0 0.9 1.0 3.2 2.5 3.5 1.3 1.3 2.1 1.0 0.8 2.5 0
172 08 Iceland 1.0 0.9 1.0 3.2 2.8 3.0 1.3 1.3 2.1 1.0 0.8 2.5 0
165 09 Iceland 1.0 0.9 1.0 3.2 2.5 6.7 2.2 1.4 2.1 1.0 2.0 5.0 0
165 10 Iceland 0.8 1.1 1.0 3.0 2.3 7.2 2.0 1.5 1.9 1.1 2.0 5.9 0
165 11 Iceland 1.6 1.5 1.0 3.3 2.2 6.2 2.0 1.9 1.6 1.0 1.8 6.0 0
166 12 Iceland 1.9 1.3 1.0 3.1 1.9 5.7 1.7 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.8 5.7 0
171 13 Iceland 1.6 1.6 1.0 2.8 1.7 3.7 1.4 1.6 1.3 1.0 1.8 5.2 0
76 05 India 8 6.2 5.4 6.7 9 5.8 4 5.1 5.9 2.4 6.8 4.2 1
93 06 India 8.8 2.8 6.9 7.1 8.5 5.0 4.8 6.7 5.4 4.5 5.7 4.2 1
109 07 India 8.3 3.2 7.0 7.1 8.9 4.6 4.8 6.7 5.4 5.0 5.6 4.2 1
98 08 India 8.0 3.2 7.0 6.9 8.9 4.6 4.8 6.7 6.0 6.6 6.0 4.2 1
87 09 India 8.3 4.9 7.3 6.7 8.9 5.0 5.5 7.0 6.0 7.1 6.0 5.1 1
79 10 India 8.1 5.2 7.8 6.5 8.7 5.1 5.8 7.2 6.1 7.6 6.2 4.9 1
76 11 India 8.0 5.0 8.2 6.2 8.5 5.4 5.8 7.2 5.9 7.8 6.8 4.5 1
78 12 India 7.3 5.5 7.9 5.9 8.4 5.5 5.5 6.9 5.8 7.5 6.8 5.0 1
79 13 India 7.5 5.2 8.2 5.4 8.1 5.4 5.2 6.7 5.9 7.8 6.8 5.2 1
47 05 Indonesia 8.6 7 6.3 8.9 9 4 9.2 4 8.6 7.6 8.8 5.0 1
32 06 Indonesia 7.5 8.2 6.3 8.3 8.0 6.8 6.7 7.2 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.3 1
55 07 Indonesia 7.0 7.5 6.0 7.5 8.0 6.5 6.5 7.0 7.0 7.3 7.2 6.9 1
60 08 Indonesia 7.0 7.3 5.9 7.5 8.0 6.3 6.8 6.7 6.8 7.1 7.0 6.9 1
61 09 Indonesia 7.3 6.7 6.3 7.2 8.1 6.9 6.7 6.7 6.7 7.3 7.3 6.9 1
61 10 Indonesia 7.2 6.5 6.3 7.3 7.9 6.7 6.9 6.7 6.5 7.3 7.1 6.7 1
64 11 Indonesia 7.4 6.6 6.6 6.9 7.5 6.4 6.7 6.5 6.3 7.1 7.0 6.5 1
63 12 Indonesia 7.4 6.3 7.1 6.6 7.2 6.0 6.7 6.2 6.8 7.1 7.0 6.2 1
77 13 Indonesia 7.5 6.0 7.3 6.3 6.9 5.5 6.4 6.1 6.5 6.8 7.0 5.9 1
57 05 Iran 5 8 7.3 6 9 3.3 9.1 4.8 8.8 7.3 9.1 6.1 1
52 06 Iran 6.5 8.7 6.9 5.0 7.5 3.0 8.1 6.1 9.1 8.0 8.8 6.3 1
57 07 Iran 6.2 8.6 7.1 5.0 7.2 3.3 7.8 5.7 8.7 8.3 8.9 6.0 1
49 08 Iran 6.5 8.7 7.3 5.0 7.4 4.3 8.0 5.8 8.7 8.5 9.0 6.5 1
38 09 Iran 6.5 8.5 7.6 6.8 7.4 5.5 8.3 6.0 8.9 8.6 9.1 6.8 1
32 10 Iran 6.4 8.3 8.1 7.1 7.3 5.5 9.0 5.9 9.4 8.9 9.5 6.8 1
35 11 Iran 6.1 7.9 8.5 6.7 7.0 5.4 9.1 5.6 9.0 8.6 9.2 7.0 1
34 12 Iran 5.8 7.6 8.6 6.4 6.7 6.4 8.8 5.3 8.9 8.3 9.3 7.4 1
37 13 Iran 5.5 7.3 8.8 6.1 6.7 6.5 8.9 5.0 9.4 8.6 9.4 7.5 1
4 05 Iraq 8 9.4 8.3 6.3 8.7 8.2 8.8 8.9 8.2 8.4 10 10.0 1
4 06 Iraq 8.9 8.3 9.8 9.1 8.7 8.2 8.5 8.3 9.7 9.8 9.7 10.0 1
2 07 Iraq 9.0 9.0 10.0 9.5 8.5 8.0 9.4 8.5 9.7 10.0 9.8 10.0 1
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5 08 Iraq 9.0 9.0 9.8 9.3 8.5 7.8 9.4 8.5 9.6 9.9 9.8 10.0 1
6 09 Iraq 8.7 8.9 9.7 9.1 8.6 7.6 9.0 8.4 9.3 9.7 9.6 10.0 1
7 10 Iraq 8.5 8.7 9.3 9.3 8.8 7.6 9.0 8.4 9.1 9.5 9.6 9.5 1
9 11 Iraq 8.3 9.0 9.0 8.9 9.0 7.0 8.7 8.0 8.6 9.5 9.6 9.3 1
9 12 Iraq 8.0 8.5 9.7 8.6 8.7 7.7 8.4 7.8 8.3 9.9 9.6 9.0 1
11 13 Iraq 8.3 8.8 10.0 8.3 8.4 7.3 8.6 7.6 8.6 10.0 9.6 8.5 1
173 07 Ireland 1.6 1.5 1.0 2.1 2.9 2.1 1.5 1.8 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 0
174 08 Ireland 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.0 1.5 2.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 0
173 09 Ireland 1.9 1.5 1.0 2.0 3.0 2.7 1.8 2.3 1.5 1.1 1.3 1.5 0
173 10 Ireland 2.0 1.6 1.0 2.0 2.8 3.3 1.6 2.4 1.5 1.4 1.5 1.3 0
171 11 Ireland 2.3 2.0 1.3 2.4 2.6 3.9 2.0 2.2 1.2 1.6 1.4 2.4 0
170 12 Ireland 2.5 1.7 1.6 3.0 2.7 3.8 2.2 2.2 1.3 1.7 1.4 2.4 0
170 13 Ireland 2.2 1.4 1.6 2.8 2.5 3.9 1.9 1.9 1.3 1.8 1.3 2.2 0
143 06 Ireland 2.0 1.4 1.0 2.0 3.0 1.9 1.5 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
67 06 Israel 7.0 8.5 9.0 3.5 7.0 3.8 7.3 7.0 7.0 4.8 7.5 7.0 1
74 07 Israel 7.0 7.9 9.0 3.5 6.9 3.7 7.3 7.0 7.4 5.3 7.2 7.4 1
58 08 Israel 7.2 8.1 9.0 3.8 7.5 3.9 7.5 7.2 7.9 5.5 8.0 8.0 1
56 09 Israel 7.2 8.0 9.3 4.0 7.5 4.1 7.5 7.0 8.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 1
54 10 Israel 7.0 7.8 9.5 3.8 7.7 4.4 7.3 6.8 7.8 6.5 8.2 7.8 1
53 11 Israel 6.8 7.6 9.6 3.8 7.8 4.3 7.3 6.5 7.9 7.0 8.1 7.8 1
61 12 Israel 6.5 7.3 9.5 3.5 7.8 4.0 7.0 6.2 7.9 6.8 8.1 7.6 1
67 13 Israel 6.2 7.4 9.8 3.2 7.5 3.7 6.7 5.9 7.6 7.1 8.1 7.7 1
155 07 Italy 3.6 3.5 3.5 3.0 4.5 3.8 3.7 2.0 1.8 2.5 3.2 2.0 0
154 08 Italy 3.7 3.5 4.0 3.0 4.5 3.8 3.8 2.5 2.1 3.7 3.3 2.0 0
150 09 Italy 3.8 3.7 4.5 3.0 4.7 4.4 4.3 2.8 2.6 4.0 3.7 2.4 0
149 10 Italy 4.0 3.9 4.8 2.8 4.5 4.7 4.5 3.1 3.0 4.2 4.0 2.2 0
147 11 Italy 3.6 3.5 5.3 3.2 4.1 4.2 4.7 2.8 3.1 4.9 4.4 2.0 0
145 12 Italy 3.3 3.6 5.0 2.9 3.8 4.6 5.0 2.7 3.2 4.9 4.8 2.0 0
147 13 Italy 3.8 3.3 4.7 2.6 3.6 4.8 4.7 2.4 2.9 5.0 4.8 2.0 0
127 06 Italy 3.5 2.8 3.5 3.0 4.5 4.0 3.2 1.5 1.8 2.5 2.8 2.0 0
122 07 Jamaica 6.1 2.4 4.3 6.7 6.7 5.4 7.0 5.8 5.4 5.6 3.7 6.0 0
121 08 Jamaica 6.1 2.4 4.3 6.5 6.5 6.0 6.9 6.0 5.4 5.6 4.0 6.0 0
117 09 Jamaica 6.4 2.7 4.5 6.3 6.7 6.6 7.0 6.4 5.7 6.0 4.0 6.3 0
119 10 Jamaica 6.0 2.8 4.5 6.4 6.5 6.8 6.8 6.2 5.5 5.8 4.0 6.1 0
118 11 Jamaica 6.2 3.4 4.3 6.7 6.2 6.3 6.5 5.9 5.3 6.3 3.7 6.3 0
119 12 Jamaica 5.9 3.1 4.0 7.0 6.2 6.6 6.4 5.6 5.2 6.2 3.7 6.0 0
118 13 Jamaica 5.6 3.4 4.0 7.2 5.9 6.6 6.1 5.7 5.0 6.3 3.7 6.3 0
97 06 Jamaica 6.5 2.5 4.5 6.7 6.5 5.0 7.0 6.5 5.6 6.0 3.9 6.1 0
163 07 Japan 4.1 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 2.6 1.8 1.2 3.5 1.0 1.3 3.6 0
163 08 Japan 4.3 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 2.3 1.8 1.2 3.4 2.0 1.7 3.6 0
164 09 Japan 4.2 1.1 3.8 2.0 2.5 3.1 2.0 1.2 3.4 2.0 2.0 3.9 0
164 10 Japan 4.0 1.2 3.6 2.1 2.6 3.5 1.8 1.3 3.2 2.1 2.2 3.7 0
164 11 Japan 3.6 1.1 3.9 1.8 2.3 3.5 2.0 1.7 3.0 2.0 2.6 3.5 0
151 12 Japan 8.3 4.0 3.8 2.1 2.0 4.0 2.5 5.0 3.2 2.0 2.6 4.0 0
156 13 Japan 5.4 3.7 3.8 2.0 1.8 3.7 2.2 2.5 3.0 1.7 2.6 3.7 0
135 06 Japan 4.0 1.0 3.8 2.0 2.5 2.6 1.8 1.0 3.0 1.0 1.3 4.0 0
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81 07 Jordan 6.2 6.8 6.5 5.0 7.7 6.6 6.2 5.6 6.2 6.4 6.5 6.9 0
82 08 Jordan 6.7 7.8 6.5 4.7 7.5 6.6 6.0 5.6 6.7 6.0 6.5 6.7 0
86 09 Jordan 6.7 7.9 6.8 5.0 7.4 6.5 6.0 5.4 6.9 6.0 6.5 6.8 0
90 10 Jordan 6.8 7.9 6.9 4.8 7.2 6.2 5.9 5.2 7.0 5.9 6.5 6.7 0
95 11 Jordan 6.4 7.6 6.7 4.7 6.9 5.8 5.7 4.9 6.8 6.0 6.3 6.8 0
90 12 Jordan 6.5 7.3 7.0 4.4 6.8 6.4 6.3 4.6 7.1 5.7 6.3 6.5 0
87 13 Jordan 6.7 7.8 7.1 4.2 6.5 6.5 6.5 4.3 7.4 5.8 6.8 6.2 0
74 06 Jordan 6.0 6.8 6.0 5.0 7.6 6.5 6.8 5.8 6.1 6.8 6.6 7.0 0
68 05 Kazakhstan 9 5 7.2 3.8 9 2.5 9.1 5 8.1 6 9.6 4.0 0
88 06 Kazakhstan 5.0 2.9 5.1 4.0 6.2 6.5 7.5 6.7 7.0 6.7 7.7 6.6 0
102 07 Kazakhstan 5.7 3.0 5.2 4.0 6.2 6.6 7.5 6.1 7.0 6.7 7.7 6.6 0
101 08 Kazakhstan 6.2 3.6 5.2 4.0 6.5 6.0 7.7 5.5 6.8 6.5 7.8 6.6 0
105 09 Kazakhstan 6.0 3.9 5.5 4.0 6.4 6.4 7.7 5.3 6.8 6.5 7.6 6.4 0
103 10 Kazakhstan 5.8 4.0 5.7 4.1 6.2 6.7 7.5 5.5 7.1 6.3 7.6 6.2 0
107 11 Kazakhstan 5.5 3.8 6.0 3.8 5.9 6.2 7.2 5.1 6.9 6.2 7.7 5.9 0
107 12 Kazakhstan 5.6 3.5 6.5 3.5 5.6 6.5 7.5 5.4 7.1 6.3 7.7 5.6 0
109 13 Kazakhstan 5.3 3.8 6.2 3.6 5.3 6.2 7.8 5.1 7.1 6.4 7.7 5.3 0
25 05 Kenya 9 8 6.7 8.3 8.8 6.3 8.9 7.4 8.5 8.4 8.4 4.0 0
33 06 Kenya 9.0 7.1 6.7 8.0 8.0 6.8 7.3 7.2 6.9 7.0 7.6 7.0 0
31 07 Kenya 8.4 8.0 6.9 8.0 8.1 7.0 8.0 7.4 7.0 7.1 8.2 7.2 0
26 08 Kenya 8.7 8.5 7.6 8.0 8.1 6.9 8.2 7.4 7.2 7.1 8.4 7.3 0
14 09 Kenya 9.0 9.0 8.6 8.3 8.8 7.5 9.0 8.0 8.2 8.0 8.8 8.2 0
13 10 Kenya 9.1 8.7 8.9 7.9 8.7 7.4 9.3 8.1 8.0 7.5 8.7 8.4 0
16 11 Kenya 8.8 8.5 8.7 7.6 8.5 7.0 8.9 7.8 7.7 7.9 8.8 8.5 0
16 12 Kenya 8.9 8.4 8.9 7.7 8.2 7.3 8.6 8.1 7.4 7.6 9.0 8.4 0
17 13 Kenya 9.1 8.7 9.0 7.8 8.3 7.6 8.3 8.1 7.1 8.1 9.0 8.5 0
123 07 Kuwait 5.9 4.8 4.5 4.1 6.1 3.1 6.9 3.3 6.5 5.3 7.6 4.0 0
126 08 Kuwait 5.5 4.4 4.7 4.1 6.1 2.9 6.7 3.3 7.0 5.1 6.9 5.3 0
125 09 Kuwait 5.7 4.2 5.1 4.3 6.1 3.5 6.5 3.5 6.9 5.1 7.2 5.3 0
125 10 Kuwait 5.5 4.1 5.1 4.1 6.1 3.8 6.0 3.1 6.5 4.9 7.2 5.1 0
128 11 Kuwait 5.1 3.8 4.9 4.3 5.9 4.0 5.7 2.9 6.2 4.5 7.2 5.0 0
128 12 Kuwait 4.9 3.5 4.6 4.0 5.6 3.7 6.5 2.9 6.5 4.7 7.2 4.7 0
127 13 Kuwait 5.1 3.8 4.6 3.7 5.3 3.4 7.6 2.6 6.8 4.4 7.9 4.4 0
105 06 Kuwait 5.7 4.5 4.5 4.0 6.0 2.8 6.8 3.0 6.5 5.5 7.5 4.0 0
65 05 Kyrgyzstan 8 5 5.4 4.3 9 5.8 8.9 5.7 7.9 5 9.7 5.7 0
28 06 Kyrgyzstan 8.0 6.6 7.0 7.5 8.0 7.5 8.3 7.3 7.9 8.3 7.9 6.0 0
41 07 Kyrgyzstan 7.5 6.2 6.8 7.4 8.0 7.5 8.2 6.3 7.9 7.9 7.5 7.0 0
39 08 Kyrgyzstan 7.5 5.8 6.8 7.4 8.0 7.5 8.4 6.5 7.9 8.1 7.5 7.4 0
42 09 Kyrgyzstan 8.0 5.3 7.2 7.5 8.3 7.6 8.3 6.5 7.6 7.7 7.3 7.8 0
45 10 Kyrgyzstan 7.8 5.2 7.4 7.3 7.9 7.9 8.4 6.3 7.6 7.6 7.4 7.6 0
31 11 Kyrgyzstan 7.6 6.5 8.3 7.0 7.6 7.6 9.0 6.0 8.0 8.0 8.3 7.9 0
41 12 Kyrgyzstan 6.5 5.3 8.4 6.7 7.3 7.9 8.7 5.4 7.8 7.4 8.3 7.6 0
48 13 Kyrgyzstan 6.2 5.6 8.4 6.4 7.0 7.6 8.4 5.9 7.6 7.4 8.0 7.3 0
28 05 Laos 9 6.7 6.3 8.8 9 6.5 7.9 2.5 9.4 9 9.7 6.7 0
39 06 Laos 8.0 5.9 6.3 6.6 5.9 6.5 7.9 8.0 8.2 9.0 8.9 6.7 0
44 07 Laos 8.0 5.5 6.5 6.6 5.7 7.1 7.9 8.0 8.5 8.2 8.6 6.6 0
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40 08 Laos 8.0 5.7 6.8 6.6 5.7 7.1 8.2 8.0 8.9 8.2 8.6 6.9 0
43 09 Laos 8.2 5.9 7.0 6.6 6.0 7.5 8.2 8.0 8.5 7.6 8.3 7.2 0
40 10 Laos 7.9 5.9 6.8 6.7 5.8 7.3 8.3 8.1 8.7 7.4 8.5 7.3 0
46 11 Laos 7.6 5.8 6.5 6.8 5.7 7.2 8.0 7.7 8.5 7.1 8.6 7.2 0
48 12 Laos 7.8 5.5 6.3 7.1 5.8 6.7 8.3 7.4 8.2 6.9 8.6 6.9 0
58 13 Laos 7.5 5.8 6.1 6.8 6.1 5.7 8.6 7.3 8.3 6.6 8.3 6.6 0
109 06 Latvia 5.7 5.9 4.5 5.0 7.0 5.5 4.8 4.0 3.7 2.0 4.1 4.0 0
134 07 Latvia 5.2 5.7 4.6 5.0 7.0 5.8 4.7 4.0 3.8 2.2 4.4 4.3 0
136 08 Latvia 4.9 4.9 4.6 5.0 6.0 5.0 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.0 4.4 4.0 0
136 09 Latvia 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 6.2 5.5 5.1 4.4 3.7 2.9 4.3 4.0 0
135 10 Latvia 4.3 4.3 4.6 5.0 6.0 6.3 5.4 4.2 3.5 3.0 4.3 4.5 0
135 11 Latvia 4.2 3.9 4.9 4.8 5.7 5.8 5.3 3.9 3.6 3.3 4.3 4.4 0
136 12 Latvia 3.9 3.6 5.2 4.5 5.4 5.3 4.8 3.7 3.5 3.6 4.3 4.1 0
140 13 Latvia 3.6 3.3 5.4 4.2 4.9 4.0 4.5 3.4 3.2 3.3 4.3 3.8 0
37 05 Lebanon 8 8 7.5 7.1 7 4.7 8.7 4.3 7.3 8.1 9.2 9.0 0
65 06 Lebanon 6.8 4.3 7.8 7.0 6.8 5.3 6.4 5.0 6.8 7.5 8.3 8.5 0
28 07 Lebanon 6.9 8.6 9.0 7.0 7.1 6.3 7.3 6.4 7.0 9.0 8.8 9.0 0
18 08 Lebanon 7.2 9.0 9.4 7.1 7.4 6.3 8.0 6.7 7.0 9.3 9.4 8.9 0
29 09 Lebanon 7.0 9.0 9.2 7.2 7.4 6.3 7.8 6.2 6.9 9.1 9.1 8.3 0
34 10 Lebanon 6.8 8.9 9.0 7.0 7.2 6.1 7.3 6.0 6.8 8.9 8.8 8.1 0
43 11 Lebanon 6.5 8.5 8.7 6.6 6.8 5.7 7.0 5.8 6.6 8.7 8.8 8.0 0
45 12 Lebanon 6.2 8.2 8.4 6.3 6.5 5.5 7.5 5.5 6.5 8.4 9.1 7.7 0
46 13 Lebanon 6.3 8.5 8.5 6.0 6.2 5.3 7.2 5.6 6.8 8.5 9.2 8.2 0
62 07 Lesotho 9.0 4.5 5.5 5.4 5.5 9.1 7.5 8.9 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.2 0
61 08 Lesotho 9.1 4.6 5.6 6.0 5.6 8.2 7.6 8.5 6.8 6.3 6.9 6.5 0
67 09 Lesotho 9.4 4.7 5.2 6.5 5.6 8.4 7.4 8.7 6.5 5.5 6.9 7.0 0
67 10 Lesotho 9.2 4.8 5.2 6.7 5.7 8.7 7.2 8.5 6.3 5.9 7.2 6.8 0
71 11 Lesotho 9.0 4.6 5.0 6.8 6.1 8.1 6.9 8.2 6.0 5.5 7.0 7.2 0
72 12 Lesotho 8.7 4.6 4.7 6.5 6.4 8.6 6.3 8.0 5.7 5.5 7.0 6.9 0
71 13 Lesotho 8.8 4.9 4.7 6.8 6.7 8.5 6.0 8.2 5.4 5.2 7.0 7.2 0
9 05 Liberia 9 7.8 7.3 8.1 9 10 7.5 8.2 8.2 6.5 7.9 10.0 0
11 06 Liberia 8.0 9.3 7.0 7.1 8.6 8.9 7.8 9.0 7.2 7.3 8.8 10.0 0
27 07 Liberia 8.1 8.5 6.5 6.8 8.3 8.4 7.0 8.6 6.7 6.9 8.1 9.0 0
34 08 Liberia 8.1 8.4 6.0 6.5 8.3 8.3 7.0 8.5 6.7 6.7 7.9 8.6 0
33 09 Liberia 8.6 8.0 6.1 6.8 8.5 8.2 7.0 8.5 6.7 6.9 7.9 8.6 0
33 10 Liberia 8.4 8.2 6.3 6.7 8.3 8.0 7.1 8.5 6.5 6.7 8.1 8.9 0
26 11 Liberia 8.3 8.6 6.8 7.0 8.0 8.4 7.0 8.8 6.3 7.3 8.1 9.3 0
25 12 Liberia 8.4 8.9 6.5 6.7 7.7 8.6 6.9 8.8 6.1 7.0 8.4 9.3 0
24 13 Liberia 8.8 9.2 6.5 7.0 8.0 8.3 6.6 9.1 6.4 7.1 8.3 9.8 0
63 05 Libya 7 8 6.7 7.1 9 3.1 8.7 3 8.7 8 8.4 3.0 1
95 06 Libya 6.0 2.1 5.5 4.0 7.3 5.1 7.5 4.5 8.1 5.5 7.9 5.0 1
114 07 Libya 6.2 2.6 5.6 4.0 7.3 5.3 7.4 4.5 8.1 5.3 8.0 5.0 1
111 08 Libya 6.2 4.0 5.6 4.0 7.3 5.3 7.4 4.5 8.1 5.6 7.0 5.0 1
112 09 Libya 5.9 4.2 5.8 4.0 7.1 5.5 7.1 4.2 8.1 5.4 7.1 5.0 1
111 10 Libya 5.7 4.3 5.8 4.2 6.9 5.3 7.3 4.2 8.3 5.2 7.1 4.8 1
111 11 Libya 5.5 4.6 6.0 3.9 6.9 4.6 7.3 4.3 8.3 5.9 7.0 4.4 1
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50 12 Libya 5.8 5.1 7.0 3.9 7.0 5.5 8.1 7.6 9.0 9.0 8.0 9.0 1
54 13 Libya 5.5 5.4 7.4 4.2 6.7 5.0 8.4 7.3 9.0 8.9 8.0 8.8 1
113 06 Lithuania 5.7 3.5 3.5 5.5 6.1 4.5 4.1 4.1 3.7 2.0 3.0 4.0 0
142 07 Lithuania 5.4 3.4 3.5 5.4 6.2 4.5 4.2 3.7 3.7 2.0 3.0 4.0 0
143 08 Lithuania 4.9 3.1 3.9 5.4 6.2 4.5 4.4 3.5 3.5 2.0 3.0 4.3 0
145 09 Lithuania 4.5 2.8 4.2 5.2 6.2 4.7 4.1 3.4 3.5 2.1 3.0 4.3 0
146 10 Lithuania 4.3 2.9 4.0 5.0 6.0 5.7 3.9 3.2 3.3 2.2 3.2 4.1 0
149 11 Lithuania 4.1 3.2 3.7 4.6 5.7 5.3 3.6 2.9 3.1 2.5 2.8 3.8 0
149 12 Lithuania 3.8 2.9 4.0 4.4 5.4 5.0 3.5 3.1 2.9 2.8 2.8 3.5 0
150 13 Lithuania 3.8 2.9 3.7 4.1 5.2 4.5 3.8 3.4 2.9 2.5 3.0 3.2 0
164 07 Luxembourg 2.1 1.8 3.7 1.2 2.5 2.0 3.3 2.6 1.6 2.0 3.0 2.3 0
165 08 Luxembourg 2.1 1.8 3.7 1.2 2.5 1.8 3.3 2.6 1.6 2.0 3.0 2.3 0
167 09 Luxembourg 2.1 1.5 3.2 1.2 2.5 2.2 2.9 2.4 1.5 2.0 3.6 2.5 0
168 10 Luxembourg 1.9 1.7 3.2 1.2 2.3 2.8 2.7 2.2 1.3 2.1 3.6 2.3 0
170 11 Luxembourg 1.7 2.1 2.8 1.5 2.0 2.3 2.5 1.9 1.0 2.3 3.4 2.6 0
172 12 Luxembourg 2.0 2.1 2.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.2 1.6 1.3 2.3 3.4 2.3 0
172 13 Luxembourg 1.7 1.8 2.8 2.1 1.5 1.5 1.9 1.3 1.0 2.3 3.4 2.0 0
94 07 Macedonia 5.4 4.7 7.1 7.0 7.4 5.9 7.3 5.1 5.3 6.1 6.4 6.4 0
95 08 Macedonia 5.4 4.6 7.4 7.0 7.4 6.0 7.6 5.1 5.3 5.8 6.6 6.4 0
99 09 Macedonia 5.0 4.6 7.5 6.9 7.3 6.3 7.4 4.8 5.3 5.8 6.7 6.8 0
103 10 Macedonia 4.8 4.6 7.6 6.7 7.1 6.6 6.9 4.6 5.1 5.6 6.5 6.6 0
106 11 Macedonia 4.5 4.6 7.4 6.7 6.8 6.2 6.7 4.2 5.0 6.0 6.7 6.2 0
109 12 Macedonia 4.2 4.9 7.6 6.4 6.5 5.9 6.4 4.2 4.6 5.7 6.7 5.9 0
112 13 Macedonia 3.9 5.2 7.8 6.1 6.2 5.9 6.1 3.9 4.3 6.0 7.0 5.6 0
78 06 Macedonia 5.7 5.1 7.1 7.0 7.5 6.0 7.2 5.6 5.3 6.1 6.2 6.3 0
82 07 Madagascar 8.5 3.0 5.1 5.0 7.0 7.5 5.7 8.7 5.7 6.1 6.7 7.5 0
86 08 Madagascar 8.5 2.5 5.1 5.0 7.2 7.4 6.0 8.7 6.0 5.8 7.0 7.5 0
68 09 Madagascar 8.9 5.0 5.6 5.0 7.6 7.4 6.6 8.8 5.9 5.9 7.1 7.8 0
64 10 Madagascar 8.6 4.8 5.4 5.3 7.7 7.2 7.1 8.6 5.8 6.4 7.7 8.0 0
58 11 Madagascar 8.3 4.6 5.2 4.9 7.8 7.6 7.1 8.6 6.0 6.8 8.0 8.3 0
58 12 Madagascar 8.0 4.4 5.2 5.2 7.6 7.9 7.3 8.3 6.0 6.9 7.8 8.0 0
61 13 Madagascar 8.1 4.3 4.9 5.5 7.9 8.2 7.2 8.6 5.9 7.0 7.5 7.7 0
29 06 Malawi 9.0 6.0 6.0 7.0 8.8 8.8 8.0 9.0 8.0 5.5 6.7 7.0 0
29 07 Malawi 9.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 8.8 9.2 7.9 9.0 8.0 5.4 7.5 7.4 0
29 08 Malawi 9.0 6.2 6.0 8.2 8.8 9.1 8.0 9.0 7.8 5.4 7.6 7.8 0
28 09 Malawi 9.3 6.3 5.9 8.3 8.5 9.1 8.3 8.8 7.5 5.6 7.8 8.4 0
28 10 Malawi 9.2 6.5 6.2 8.4 8.3 9.2 8.1 8.6 7.3 5.4 7.8 8.6 0
33 11 Malawi 9.1 6.5 6.0 8.1 8.0 8.8 7.9 8.2 7.0 5.2 7.6 8.7 0
36 12 Malawi 8.8 6.2 5.7 7.8 7.7 8.5 8.0 7.9 7.1 5.1 7.6 8.4 0
40 13 Malawi 8.9 6.5 5.7 8.1 8.0 8.4 7.5 8.2 6.8 5.0 7.6 8.4 0
74 05 Malaysia 7 5 5.9 5 9 1.3 8 7.7 8.6 6 8.3 1.8 1
98 06 Malaysia 6.5 4.1 5.5 3.5 6.6 4.3 5.9 5.8 6.5 6.2 5.5 5.7 1
119 07 Malaysia 6.3 4.1 5.5 3.6 6.6 4.6 5.9 5.4 6.5 6.3 5.3 5.8 1
118 08 Malaysia 6.3 5.0 5.9 3.6 6.9 4.2 5.9 5.1 6.5 6.3 5.7 5.8 1
114 09 Malaysia 6.5 5.2 6.2 3.8 6.9 4.7 6.1 5.2 6.5 6.1 6.1 5.6 1
110 10 Malaysia 6.3 5.0 6.6 3.9 7.0 5.1 5.9 5.0 6.8 5.9 6.3 5.4 1
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112 11 Malaysia 6.0 4.8 6.7 4.2 6.7 4.9 6.0 5.1 6.9 6.0 6.4 5.0 1
110 12 Malaysia 5.7 4.5 6.4 4.4 6.4 4.6 6.5 4.8 7.4 6.3 6.8 4.7 1
116 13 Malaysia 5.6 4.6 6.1 4.8 5.9 4.1 6.2 4.5 7.1 6.0 6.8 4.4 1
66 07 Maldives 8.0 7.0 4.9 7.0 4.9 7.3 7.9 7.1 7.7 6.1 7.2 6.0 0
67 08 Maldives 7.7 6.5 4.9 7.0 4.9 7.1 7.6 7.1 7.7 6.3 7.6 6.0 0
81 09 Maldives 6.5 6.5 5.2 7.0 5.2 6.7 7.2 7.3 7.5 6.3 7.4 6.0 0
84 10 Maldives 6.3 6.4 5.2 7.1 5.3 7.0 7.3 7.1 7.3 6.1 7.4 5.8 0
90 11 Maldives 6.0 5.9 4.9 6.8 5.0 6.7 7.4 6.9 7.0 5.7 7.6 5.8 0
88 12 Maldives 5.7 5.6 4.9 6.5 4.7 6.4 7.9 6.6 7.5 5.7 7.6 6.1 0
88 13 Maldives 5.4 5.3 4.9 6.2 4.4 6.5 8.3 6.7 7.6 5.8 8.0 6.4 0
90 07 Mali 8.5 4.4 6.1 7.9 6.6 8.7 4.7 8.6 4.6 4.8 3.7 6.9 1
89 08 Mali 8.5 4.4 6.1 7.4 6.6 8.5 4.7 8.6 4.6 5.9 3.7 6.6 1
83 09 Mali 8.7 4.6 6.5 7.4 6.9 8.3 5.3 8.4 5.2 6.5 4.0 6.9 1
78 10 Mali 8.7 4.8 6.3 7.5 7.0 8.1 5.4 8.5 5.0 7.0 4.0 7.0 1
77 11 Mali 8.8 5.3 6.0 7.3 6.7 7.8 5.5 8.2 4.9 7.1 4.5 7.2 1
79 12 Mali 8.8 5.5 6.0 7.3 6.4 7.5 5.3 8.0 4.6 7.1 4.5 7.0 1
38 13 Mali 9.3 7.6 7.6 7.8 6.8 8.1 6.0 8.5 6.5 8.1 5.0 8.0 1
81 06 Mali 8.5 4.2 6.0 8.0 6.8 8.5 4.6 8.6 4.7 4.5 3.5 6.7 0
143 07 Malta 3.8 6.1 3.9 4.8 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.3 3.5 4.5 1.6 4.5 0
144 08 Malta 3.8 6.1 3.9 4.6 4.5 3.5 4.3 3.4 3.5 4.3 1.6 4.8 0
143 09 Malta 3.9 6.0 4.0 4.3 4.6 3.9 4.3 3.5 3.6 4.0 1.7 5.0 0
145 10 Malta 3.7 5.8 4.2 4.1 4.4 4.2 4.1 3.2 3.7 4.0 2.0 4.8 0
148 11 Malta 3.4 5.4 4.0 4.4 4.1 4.1 3.7 2.9 3.4 3.7 2.0 4.4 0
150 12 Malta 3.1 5.1 4.0 4.4 3.8 3.8 4.0 2.6 3.2 3.7 2.0 4.1 0
151 13 Malta 2.8 5.2 4.0 4.1 3.5 3.6 4.1 2.3 3.3 3.7 2.0 3.8 0
41 06 Mauritania 9.0 5.9 8.5 5.0 7.0 7.8 7.1 8.2 7.1 7.6 7.9 6.7 1
45 07 Mauritania 8.7 6.2 8.0 5.0 7.0 7.8 6.8 8.1 7.1 7.4 7.9 6.7 1
47 08 Mauritania 8.4 6.2 8.0 5.0 7.0 7.8 6.6 8.1 6.9 7.2 7.6 7.3 1
46 09 Mauritania 8.7 6.2 8.2 5.0 7.0 7.8 7.0 8.5 7.1 7.9 8.0 7.3 1
39 10 Mauritania 8.5 6.4 8.0 5.2 6.8 7.7 7.5 8.3 7.3 7.9 7.9 7.6 1
40 11 Mauritania 8.2 6.8 7.8 5.5 6.5 7.3 7.3 7.9 7.0 7.9 7.9 7.9 1
38 12 Mauritania 8.0 6.5 7.5 5.4 6.3 7.6 7.6 7.9 7.3 7.7 8.1 7.6 1
31 13 Mauritania 8.5 8.3 7.2 5.7 6.5 8.0 7.7 8.4 7.4 7.8 8.2 7.9 1
147 07 Mauritius 3.6 1.1 3.5 2.1 5.9 3.8 5.1 4.4 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.8 0
148 08 Mauritius 3.6 1.1 3.5 2.1 5.9 3.8 5.1 4.1 3.9 3.5 3.0 2.8 0
148 09 Mauritius 3.9 1.0 3.5 2.4 5.9 4.3 5.3 4.4 3.9 3.6 3.3 3.2 0
150 10 Mauritius 3.7 1.2 3.5 2.6 5.7 4.1 5.1 4.2 3.7 3.7 3.3 3.6 0
150 11 Mauritius 3.3 1.6 3.5 3.0 5.4 4.5 4.7 3.9 3.5 3.6 3.2 4.0 0
147 12 Mauritius 3.6 1.9 3.5 3.3 5.1 4.2 4.4 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.2 4.3 0
148 13 Mauritius 3.8 2.2 3.5 3.6 4.8 4.1 4.1 3.8 3.5 3.3 3.2 4.6 0
118 06 Mauritius 3.0 1.0 3.5 2.0 6.0 3.1 5.1 4.5 4.7 4.0 3.0 2.0 0
73 05 Mexico 7.1 5 6.8 9.2 8.9 2 7.7 7.9 7.3 2.3 8.4 2.0 0
85 06 Mexico 7.2 4.3 6.1 7.0 8.3 6.3 5.9 6.0 5.1 6.0 4.7 6.2 0
101 07 Mexico 6.9 4.0 6.1 7.0 8.4 6.2 6.1 5.7 5.1 6.1 4.8 6.2 0
105 08 Mexico 7.0 4.0 5.8 7.0 8.4 6.0 6.1 5.7 5.1 5.8 4.8 6.5 0
98 09 Mexico 7.0 4.3 5.9 7.0 8.2 6.1 6.8 6.0 5.5 7.0 5.0 6.6 0
165
96 10 Mexico 6.8 4.1 5.8 6.8 8.0 6.5 6.6 5.8 5.8 7.5 5.5 6.9 0
93 11 Mexico 6.5 4.2 6.1 6.5 7.7 6.0 6.6 5.8 5.9 7.9 5.2 6.7 0
98 12 Mexico 6.0 4.2 5.8 6.2 7.5 5.7 6.6 6.1 6.2 7.7 5.2 6.4 0
97 13 Mexico 6.5 4.0 6.1 5.9 7.2 5.2 6.1 6.6 6.3 7.9 5.2 6.1 0
97 07 Micronesia 7.7 3.2 5.0 8.1 7.1 6.5 6.9 7.1 2.5 6.0 5.4 8.0 0
97 08 Micronesia 7.7 2.9 5.0 8.6 7.3 6.6 6.9 7.2 2.5 5.7 5.4 8.2 0
107 09 Micronesia 7.2 3.1 4.5 8.3 7.0 6.6 6.6 6.8 3.0 5.3 5.5 8.0 0
108 10 Micronesia 7.0 3.1 4.5 8.1 6.8 6.4 6.6 6.6 2.8 5.1 5.5 8.1 0
102 11 Micronesia 7.1 3.5 4.2 8.0 7.2 6.7 6.3 6.9 2.5 5.4 5.6 8.5 0
103 12 Micronesia 6.8 3.4 4.2 8.1 7.5 7.0 6.3 6.6 2.8 5.4 5.6 8.2 0
99 13 Micronesia 7.1 3.1 4.2 8.4 8.0 7.5 6.3 6.3 3.1 5.4 5.6 7.9 0
57 06 Moldova 7.0 4.7 7.3 8.0 7.5 7.5 7.4 7.0 6.8 5.5 6.8 7.0 0
48 07 Moldova 7.0 4.7 7.3 8.4 7.5 7.5 7.9 7.1 6.8 6.3 7.5 7.7 0
49 08 Moldova 7.0 4.7 7.3 8.4 7.2 7.2 8.3 7.0 7.1 6.5 7.7 7.3 0
54 09 Moldova 6.6 4.2 7.1 8.0 7.0 6.8 8.1 6.7 7.0 8.0 8.0 7.6 0
58 10 Moldova 6.4 4.3 6.9 7.8 6.8 7.0 7.9 6.7 6.8 7.8 8.0 7.4 0
65 11 Moldova 6.1 4.4 6.6 7.5 6.5 6.7 7.6 6.3 6.5 7.8 8.0 7.2 0
73 12 Moldova 5.8 4.7 6.3 7.2 6.2 6.2 7.4 6.0 6.2 7.5 8.0 7.2 0
84 13 Moldova 5.9 5.0 6.0 6.9 5.9 6.4 6.9 5.7 6.0 7.2 7.7 6.9 0
131 07 Mongolia 6.0 1.0 4.1 2.1 5.4 5.2 6.0 5.3 6.7 4.8 4.9 6.9 0
133 08 Mongolia 5.8 1.0 4.1 2.1 5.4 5.5 6.0 5.3 6.2 4.8 4.7 6.9 0
127 09 Mongolia 5.8 1.2 4.3 2.3 5.8 5.9 6.7 5.5 6.6 5.0 5.7 7.1 0
129 10 Mongolia 5.6 1.4 4.3 2.3 5.9 5.7 6.2 5.3 6.4 4.8 5.3 6.9 0
127 11 Mongolia 5.5 1.6 4.0 1.9 6.2 5.3 5.9 5.6 6.0 5.0 5.5 7.1 0
129 12 Mongolia 5.8 1.9 3.7 2.2 6.0 5.2 5.6 5.6 5.7 4.7 5.5 6.8 0
129 13 Mongolia 5.5 2.2 3.7 2.5 6.3 4.7 5.3 5.7 5.4 4.4 5.5 6.5 0
108 06 Mongolia 6.0 1.0 4.1 2.0 5.7 4.5 6.2 5.3 6.7 4.7 5.0 7.2 0
135 07 Montenegro 5.4 4.1 5.8 2.5 4.3 4.0 4.5 3.6 5.6 4.8 6.0 5.0 0
135 08 Montenegro 5.4 4.1 6.1 2.5 4.3 4.0 4.3 3.6 5.6 4.6 6.0 5.3 0
134 09 Montenegro 5.1 4.1 6.4 2.5 4.6 4.6 4.7 4.0 5.5 4.7 6.0 5.8 0
134 10 Montenegro 4.9 4.2 6.6 2.7 4.4 4.9 4.5 3.8 5.3 4.5 5.9 5.6 0
134 11 Montenegro 4.5 4.5 6.4 2.4 4.1 5.2 4.3 3.6 5.0 4.8 6.2 5.3 0
133 12 Montenegro 4.2 4.2 6.5 2.7 3.8 4.9 4.5 3.9 4.7 4.9 6.2 5.0 0
134 13 Montenegro 3.9 4.5 6.5 3.0 3.5 4.6 4.2 3.6 4.4 4.6 6.2 5.3 0
67 05 Morocco 6 8 5.9 8 9 5.7 8.5 1.8 6.3 9 8.2 2.5 0
76 06 Morocco 6.5 8.0 6.9 6.2 7.0 6.5 8.0 5.7 6.6 5.6 5.5 4.0 0
85 07 Morocco 6.6 7.5 6.8 6.2 7.3 6.6 7.8 6.0 6.6 5.2 5.4 4.0 0
88 08 Morocco 6.6 7.1 6.8 6.2 7.6 6.6 7.3 6.0 6.6 5.1 5.7 4.2 0
92 09 Morocco 7.0 6.7 6.8 6.2 7.8 6.5 7.4 6.5 6.7 5.1 6.2 4.2 0
90 10 Morocco 6.8 6.6 6.6 6.4 7.6 6.5 7.2 6.6 6.8 5.4 6.2 4.3 0
87 11 Morocco 6.4 6.5 6.4 6.4 7.5 6.0 6.9 6.6 6.4 5.9 6.3 4.9 0
87 12 Morocco 6.1 6.2 6.8 6.7 7.2 5.6 6.6 6.2 6.4 6.6 6.6 5.2 0
93 13 Morocco 5.8 5.9 6.5 7.0 6.9 5.3 6.7 5.9 6.6 6.3 6.6 4.9 0
42 05 Mozambique 9 8 5.7 9 8.8 7.8 8.1 6.7 7.4 3.8 8.2 5.0 1
80 06 Mozambique 7.0 2.0 4.5 8.1 7.1 7.0 7.4 8.0 6.7 5.5 5.5 6.0 1
80 07 Mozambique 7.5 2.2 4.7 8.0 7.2 7.5 7.4 8.0 7.0 5.9 5.6 5.9 1
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85 08 Mozambique 7.8 2.2 4.7 7.8 7.2 7.4 7.3 8.0 7.0 5.8 5.6 6.0 1
72 09 Mozambique 8.7 3.2 4.8 7.6 7.4 8.0 7.3 8.9 7.2 6.0 5.6 6.0 1
69 10 Mozambique 8.8 3.5 4.8 7.8 7.5 7.8 7.5 8.9 7.3 6.2 5.4 6.2 1
56 11 Mozambique 9.0 4.0 4.6 7.7 7.4 8.2 7.6 8.6 7.0 7.1 5.6 6.7 1
59 12 Mozambique 8.9 4.3 4.9 7.5 7.7 7.9 7.3 8.3 6.7 6.8 5.6 6.5 1
59 13 Mozambique 9.2 4.6 4.9 7.2 8.0 8.0 7.0 8.5 6.4 6.5 5.6 6.8 1
23 05 Myanmar 8.9 8 6.3 8 9 6.9 9.2 8 9.6 9 7.5 3.0 1
18 06 Myanmar 8.9 8.8 9.0 6.0 9.0 7.1 9.2 8.2 9.8 9.0 8.0 3.5 1
14 07 Myanmar 8.5 8.5 9.1 6.0 8.9 7.6 9.1 8.3 9.8 9.0 8.2 4.0 1
12 08 Myanmar 8.5 8.5 9.5 6.0 9.0 7.6 9.5 8.3 9.9 9.3 8.7 5.5 1
13 09 Myanmar 9.0 8.8 8.9 6.0 9.5 8.2 9.5 9.0 9.0 8.4 8.7 6.5 1
16 10 Myanmar 8.5 8.3 8.7 6.3 9.3 8.2 9.6 8.5 9.1 8.2 8.2 6.5 1
18 11 Myanmar 8.2 8.0 8.7 6.0 9.0 7.9 9.7 8.3 9.0 8.5 8.3 6.7 1
21 12 Myanmar 7.9 8.2 8.7 5.7 8.7 7.6 9.4 8.4 8.6 7.5 8.6 6.9 1
26 13 Myanmar 7.6 8.5 9.0 5.4 8.4 7.3 9.0 8.1 8.3 7.8 8.6 6.6 1
106 07 Namibia 6.5 5.1 5.4 7.9 8.2 5.9 4.4 7.5 5.7 5.5 3.2 6.0 0
98 08 Namibia 7.2 5.0 5.4 7.6 8.9 6.0 4.7 7.1 6.0 5.5 3.2 6.3 0
96 09 Namibia 7.7 5.5 5.8 7.7 9.1 6.1 5.0 7.1 6.0 5.8 3.6 6.2 0
100 10 Namibia 7.5 5.7 5.6 7.5 8.9 6.5 4.8 6.9 5.8 5.6 3.7 6.0 0
103 11 Namibia 7.2 5.6 5.3 7.1 8.5 6.3 4.4 6.7 5.5 5.5 3.5 6.2 0
106 12 Namibia 7.1 5.3 5.6 6.8 8.5 6.4 4.4 6.6 5.2 5.2 3.5 6.3 0
108 13 Namibia 6.9 5.6 5.3 6.5 8.7 6.7 4.1 6.7 4.9 4.9 3.5 6.5 0
91 06 Namibia 5.7 4.9 5.5 8.0 8.0 5.5 4.5 7.8 5.8 5.5 3.5 6.0 0
35 05 Nepal 9 8 5.6 4 9 7.1 8.9 6 9.1 7.6 8 6.7 1
20 06 Nepal 8.5 4.8 9.2 6.0 9.2 8.5 9.2 6.2 9.1 9.0 9.0 6.7 1
21 07 Nepal 8.1 5.2 8.9 6.1 9.2 8.2 8.5 6.6 8.8 8.3 8.5 7.2 1
23 08 Nepal 8.1 5.5 9.0 6.1 9.2 8.2 8.3 7.0 8.8 8.5 8.3 7.2 1
25 09 Nepal 8.3 6.8 8.7 6.0 9.3 8.5 8.0 7.4 8.7 8.1 8.4 7.2 1
26 10 Nepal 8.1 7.0 9.2 6.2 9.0 8.3 8.1 7.6 8.7 7.7 8.5 7.0 1
26 11 Nepal 7.8 7.4 9.0 5.9 8.7 7.9 7.9 7.7 8.5 7.8 8.0 7.1 1
27 12 Nepal 7.9 7.7 9.0 5.6 8.4 7.6 8.0 7.4 8.2 7.5 8.2 7.4 1
30 13 Nepal 7.6 7.7 9.0 5.9 8.1 7.3 8.1 7.3 7.9 7.6 8.2 7.1 1
162 07 Netherlands 3.2 4.0 4.8 2.5 4.0 2.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 2.0 0
166 08 Netherlands 3.4 3.0 4.9 2.2 3.7 2.0 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.0 1.0 2.0 0
169 09 Netherlands 2.9 3.1 4.7 2.1 3.3 2.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.0 1.4 2.0 0
166 10 Netherlands 2.7 3.2 4.7 1.9 3.2 3.0 1.2 1.5 1.3 1.1 1.7 2.4 0
166 11 Netherlands 3.0 3.0 4.4 2.2 2.9 3.2 1.1 1.7 1.0 1.4 2.4 2.1 0
167 12 Netherlands 2.9 2.7 4.1 2.5 2.6 3.3 1.0 1.8 1.3 1.7 2.4 1.8 0
167 13 Netherlands 3.0 2.4 4.1 2.2 2.3 3.5 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.8 2.6 1.5 0
134 06 Netherlands 3.0 4.1 4.8 2.5 4.0 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 0
171 07 New Zealand 1.1 1.2 2.0 2.1 4.0 3.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 0
171 08 New Zealand 1.1 1.2 2.9 2.1 4.0 3.0 1.1 1.4 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.1 0
171 09 New Zealand 1.3 1.2 3.2 2.3 4.2 3.6 1.1 1.4 1.7 1.0 1.2 1.1 0
171 10 New Zealand 1.5 1.4 3.3 2.1 4.3 4.0 1.0 1.6 1.5 1.1 1.2 0.9 0
172 11 New Zealand 2.0 1.7 3.5 2.4 4.0 3.8 1.1 1.9 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.1 0
171 12 New Zealand 2.4 1.4 3.8 2.7 3.7 3.9 0.8 2.1 1.5 1.4 1.1 0.8 0
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173 13 New Zealand 2.1 1.1 3.5 2.4 3.4 3.6 0.5 1.8 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0
141 06 New Zealand 1.0 1.0 2.0 2.0 4.0 2.9 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
71 07 Nicaragua 6.7 5.1 6.4 7.1 8.6 7.8 6.5 7.0 5.4 6.5 7.2 5.7 0
61 08 Nicaragua 7.5 5.7 6.5 6.8 8.4 7.5 6.3 7.5 5.4 6.5 7.1 6.5 0
64 09 Nicaragua 7.4 5.2 6.3 6.9 8.1 7.7 7.1 7.8 5.8 6.5 7.2 6.6 0
65 10 Nicaragua 6.8 5.0 6.3 6.9 7.9 7.9 7.6 7.6 6.2 6.5 7.0 6.8 0
67 11 Nicaragua 6.9 4.9 6.0 7.2 8.2 7.3 7.3 7.3 6.0 6.2 6.8 7.1 0
69 12 Nicaragua 6.5 4.3 6.2 7.5 8.2 6.9 7.4 7.0 5.7 5.9 6.8 7.0 0
72 13 Nicaragua 6.6 4.8 5.9 7.8 7.9 6.8 7.5 6.8 5.4 5.6 6.8 7.3 0
59 06 Nicaragua 6.5 5.5 6.4 7.1 9.0 8.5 7.3 7.2 5.7 6.5 7.0 5.7 0
32 07 Niger 9.2 5.9 8.9 6.0 7.2 9.2 8.2 8.8 7.1 6.7 6.0 8.0 1
22 08 Niger 9.5 6.0 9.2 6.0 7.2 9.2 8.4 9.1 7.9 7.5 6.7 7.8 1
23 09 Niger 9.5 6.4 8.5 6.3 7.6 9.2 8.7 9.5 8.2 7.4 7.1 8.1 1
19 10 Niger 9.6 6.5 8.0 6.5 7.8 9.2 8.9 9.7 8.5 7.3 7.6 8.2 1
15 11 Niger 9.8 6.6 7.8 6.2 7.9 8.9 8.9 9.5 8.2 8.0 8.6 8.7 1
18 12 Niger 9.3 6.9 7.7 6.0 7.6 8.6 8.4 9.2 7.9 8.2 8.6 8.4 1
18 13 Niger 9.8 7.9 7.8 6.3 7.9 8.4 8.1 9.5 7.6 8.3 8.9 8.5 1
44 06 Niger 9.4 4.3 8.5 6.0 7.2 9.0 7.9 8.5 6.5 6.7 6.0 7.0 0
54 05 Nigeria 7.2 3 6.5 8.7 8.9 5.8 8.8 6.9 6.7 9 8.3 4.5 1
22 06 Nigeria 8.0 5.9 9.1 8.5 9.0 5.4 9.0 8.3 7.1 9.2 9.0 5.9 1
17 07 Nigeria 8.2 5.6 9.5 8.5 9.1 5.4 9.1 8.7 7.1 9.2 9.5 5.7 1
18 08 Nigeria 8.2 5.1 9.4 8.2 9.2 5.9 8.9 8.7 7.5 9.2 9.3 6.1 1
15 09 Nigeria 8.5 5.3 9.7 8.3 9.5 6.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 9.4 9.6 6.1 1
14 10 Nigeria 8.4 5.8 9.5 8.1 9.3 6.9 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.3 9.4 6.2 1
14 11 Nigeria 8.3 6.0 9.6 7.7 9.0 7.3 9.0 9.0 8.6 9.1 9.5 6.9 1
14 12 Nigeria 8.4 6.5 9.7 7.6 8.9 7.5 9.1 9.1 8.6 9.2 9.8 6.6 1
16 13 Nigeria 8.5 6.6 9.8 7.3 9.2 7.5 8.8 9.3 8.6 9.5 9.4 6.3 1
13 05 North Korea 8 6 7.2 8.1 9 9.6 9.8 9.7 9 8.3 8 3.0 0
14 06 North Korea 8.0 6.0 7.2 5.0 9.0 9.5 9.8 9.5 9.5 8.3 8.0 7.5 0
13 07 North Korea 8.0 6.0 7.2 5.0 8.8 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.7 8.3 7.9 7.9 0
15 08 North Korea 8.2 6.0 7.2 5.0 8.8 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.7 8.3 7.6 7.9 0
17 09 North Korea 8.5 6.0 7.2 5.0 8.8 9.6 9.8 9.6 9.5 8.3 7.8 8.2 0
19 10 North Korea 8.5 5.6 7.2 5.0 8.8 9.6 9.9 9.6 9.5 8.1 7.8 8.2 0
22 11 North Korea 8.2 5.3 6.9 4.7 8.5 9.2 9.9 9.3 9.5 8.1 7.4 8.6 0
22 12 North Korea 7.9 5.3 6.6 4.4 8.6 9.3 9.9 9.4 9.6 8.1 7.7 8.7 0
23 13 North Korea 8.0 5.0 6.6 4.4 8.3 9.3 9.8 9.5 9.7 8.4 7.7 8.4 0
176 07 Norway 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.1 2.0 2.1 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 0
177 08 Norway 2.0 1.6 1.0 1.1 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.5 0
177 09 Norway 1.9 1.6 1.3 1.1 2.2 2.3 1.0 1.3 1.5 1.1 1.1 1.9 0
177 10 Norway 1.7 1.6 1.3 1.2 2.4 2.6 0.8 1.1 1.6 1.2 1.1 2.1 0
176 11 Norway 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.5 2.1 2.9 1.0 1.4 1.9 1.2 1.2 1.9 0
173 12 Norway 2.3 1.8 3.6 1.5 1.8 2.4 0.8 1.7 2.2 3.0 1.2 1.6 0
176 13 Norway 2.0 1.9 3.6 1.6 1.5 1.9 0.5 1.4 1.9 2.7 1.1 1.3 0
146 06 Norway 3.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 2.0 1.8 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
145 07 Oman 3.1 1.1 3.0 1.1 2.0 3.7 6.3 4.2 6.6 5.3 7.1 2.0 0
146 08 Oman 4.6 1.3 3.0 1.1 2.0 3.9 6.3 4.4 6.6 5.3 6.9 2.0 0
168
146 09 Oman 4.5 1.0 3.0 1.3 2.3 4.4 6.0 4.5 6.4 5.0 6.6 2.2 0
144 10 Oman 4.7 1.1 3.0 1.7 2.7 4.5 6.0 4.5 6.7 5.2 6.6 2.0 0
141 11 Oman 5.1 1.5 3.0 1.5 3.0 3.8 5.9 4.4 6.9 5.3 6.3 2.4 0
137 12 Oman 5.1 1.8 2.7 1.5 3.3 4.3 6.2 4.7 7.2 5.6 6.6 2.7 0
136 13 Oman 5.0 2.0 2.7 1.8 3.6 4.5 6.1 4.4 7.5 5.3 6.6 2.4 0
117 06 Oman 2.0 1.0 3.0 1.0 2.0 3.5 6.3 3.5 6.5 5.5 7.5 2.0 0
34 05 Pakistan 5 5 6.9 8 9 3.3 9.8 7.5 8.1 9 9.3 8.5 1
9 06 Pakistan 9.3 9.3 8.6 8.1 8.9 7.0 8.5 7.5 8.5 9.1 9.1 9.2 1
12 07 Pakistan 8.2 8.5 9.0 8.1 8.5 5.8 8.7 7.1 8.7 9.5 9.5 8.5 1
9 08 Pakistan 8.0 8.6 9.5 8.1 8.8 6.2 9.5 7.1 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.1 1
10 09 Pakistan 8.3 8.6 9.6 8.3 8.8 6.4 9.1 7.5 8.9 9.5 9.6 9.5 1
10 10 Pakistan 8.1 8.9 9.4 7.9 8.4 6.2 8.9 7.3 8.9 9.7 9.5 9.3 1
12 11 Pakistan 8.8 9.2 9.3 7.5 8.5 6.6 8.6 7.3 8.7 9.4 9.1 9.3 1
13 12 Pakistan 8.5 9.0 9.6 7.2 8.2 7.2 8.3 7.0 8.6 9.3 9.1 9.4 1
13 13 Pakistan 8.9 9.1 9.7 6.9 7.9 7.5 8.4 7.3 8.7 9.8 9.2 9.6 1
130 07 Panama 6.6 3.1 4.4 5.0 7.5 5.8 4.8 5.6 4.7 5.0 2.9 4.0 0
130 08 Panama 6.4 3.1 4.4 5.0 7.5 5.6 4.6 5.4 4.7 5.0 2.9 4.0 0
132 09 Panama 6.6 3.4 4.6 5.0 7.3 5.6 4.7 5.5 4.7 5.1 3.0 4.2 0
130 10 Panama 6.3 3.5 4.4 5.0 7.5 5.6 4.8 5.5 4.5 5.2 3.0 4.0 0
131 11 Panama 6.0 3.9 4.6 4.9 7.4 4.9 4.6 5.2 4.5 5.7 2.5 3.6 0
132 12 Panama 5.8 3.6 4.9 4.8 7.5 4.3 4.6 5.1 4.4 5.4 2.5 3.3 0
131 13 Panama 5.9 3.7 5.0 4.5 7.9 3.8 4.7 5.0 4.4 5.1 2.5 3.3 0
107 06 Panama 6.5 2.6 4.5 5.0 7.5 5.7 4.9 5.8 4.8 5.3 3.0 4.0 0
52 07 Papua New Guinea 7.5 3.5 8.0 7.9 9.0 7.3 7.8 7.8 6.1 7.0 6.7 6.5 0
52 08 Papua New Guinea 7.5 3.5 8.0 7.9 9.0 7.3 7.8 7.8 6.1 7.0 6.7 6.0 0
61 09 Papua New Guinea 7.5 4.0 7.3 7.6 8.9 6.8 7.7 8.1 6.5 6.7 7.1 5.9 0
56 10 Papua New Guinea 7.5 4.2 7.1 7.7 9.0 6.3 7.8 8.3 6.3 6.5 7.1 6.1 0
54 11 Papua New Guinea 7.4 4.5 6.9 7.4 9.1 6.4 7.5 8.7 6.3 6.6 7.1 6.4 0
54 12 Papua New Guinea 7.4 4.8 6.9 7.2 8.8 6.6 7.6 8.6 6.1 6.3 7.1 6.1 0
53 13 Papua New Guinea 7.6 5.0 6.6 7.5 9.1 6.9 7.1 8.9 6.2 6.6 7.1 6.3 0
49 06 Papua New Guinea 8.0 2.5 8.0 8.0 9.0 7.0 7.8 8.0 6.1 7.0 6.7 6.5 0
36 05 Paraguay 4 5 6.9 8.3 9 7.8 9.9 7 8.3 8 8.7 6.0 0
87 06 Paraguay 5.0 1.5 6.2 6.0 7.5 6.6 8.0 6.8 8.0 4.5 7.5 4.4 0
100 07 Paraguay 6.5 1.6 6.2 6.0 7.4 6.7 8.1 6.5 7.9 4.3 7.5 4.2 0
104 08 Paraguay 6.6 1.3 6.2 6.0 7.7 6.2 8.3 6.0 7.1 5.0 7.7 4.2 0
106 09 Paraguay 6.4 1.3 6.5 6.0 7.9 5.9 7.9 6.0 6.9 5.3 7.5 4.4 0
106 10 Paraguay 6.2 1.5 6.3 5.8 8.0 6.2 8.3 5.8 6.7 5.9 7.5 3.9 0
100 11 Paraguay 5.9 1.9 6.5 5.5 8.3 5.9 7.9 5.5 6.4 6.4 7.7 4.5 0
107 12 Paraguay 6.0 2.2 6.2 5.2 8.3 5.6 7.6 5.8 6.1 6.1 7.7 4.2 0
104 13 Paraguay 6.1 2.4 6.5 4.9 8.6 5.1 7.9 6.1 6.1 6.1 7.9 4.2 0
40 05 Peru 6 7 6.6 9 8.5 5 9.6 4.4 7.1 9 8.9 7.0 1
68 06 Peru 6.5 4.6 7.0 7.6 8.0 5.4 6.8 6.4 6.8 8.0 7.1 5.0 1
84 07 Peru 6.6 4.0 6.9 7.5 8.1 5.6 6.6 6.2 5.2 7.7 7.0 5.0 1
81 08 Peru 6.9 4.2 6.9 7.5 8.1 5.7 6.4 6.4 5.5 7.4 7.0 5.5 1
92 09 Peru 6.6 4.5 6.4 7.3 8.2 5.6 6.9 6.3 5.5 7.2 6.9 5.7 1
92 10 Peru 6.4 4.5 6.7 7.0 8.0 5.6 6.9 6.5 5.5 7.4 6.9 5.5 1
169
98 11 Peru 6.1 4.1 6.8 6.7 8.0 5.1 6.6 6.1 5.2 7.2 6.6 5.1 1
99 12 Peru 6.1 4.4 7.1 6.4 8.0 4.6 7.1 6.6 4.9 6.9 6.6 4.8 1
103 13 Peru 5.9 4.7 7.0 6.1 7.8 4.1 7.1 6.4 5.0 7.0 6.7 4.5 1
56 05 Philippines 7 7 6.5 8.2 9 4.7 9.3 3.8 8.2 7 9.2 4.0 1
68 06 Philippines 7.0 5.5 7.2 5.7 7.5 5.3 7.8 6.0 6.1 7.0 7.2 6.9 1
56 07 Philippines 7.0 5.7 7.2 6.7 7.6 5.8 8.2 5.9 6.8 7.6 7.8 6.9 1
59 08 Philippines 6.9 5.7 7.0 7.2 7.6 5.9 8.3 5.9 6.8 7.4 7.8 6.9 1
53 09 Philippines 7.2 6.3 7.5 7.2 7.6 6.0 8.5 6.1 7.0 7.7 7.9 6.8 1
51 10 Philippines 7.7 6.7 7.6 7.0 7.4 5.8 8.6 6.3 7.5 7.9 8.0 6.6 1
51 11 Philippines 7.3 6.5 7.2 6.7 7.1 5.6 8.3 6.1 7.3 8.3 8.5 6.1 1
56 12 Philippines 7.3 6.2 7.6 6.5 6.8 5.3 7.9 6.3 7.0 8.4 8.0 5.8 1
60 13 Philippines 7.1 6.5 7.9 6.2 6.5 5.6 7.6 6.4 6.7 8.7 8.0 5.5 1
115 06 Poland 5.0 3.2 3.2 6.5 4.7 4.3 4.2 4.3 3.5 2.0 3.0 4.0 0
144 07 Poland 4.9 3.0 3.2 6.5 4.8 4.3 4.2 4.2 3.5 2.0 3.0 4.0 0
145 08 Poland 4.8 3.0 3.2 6.4 4.8 4.3 4.2 3.8 3.8 2.0 3.3 4.0 0
142 09 Poland 4.9 3.0 3.2 6.1 4.9 4.8 4.4 3.9 4.0 2.3 3.7 4.4 0
142 10 Poland 4.7 3.2 3.3 5.9 4.8 5.0 4.5 3.7 3.8 2.4 3.7 4.0 0
146 11 Poland 4.3 3.5 3.5 5.6 4.7 4.3 4.2 3.3 3.5 2.5 3.6 3.9 0
148 12 Poland 3.8 3.0 3.8 5.3 4.4 4.0 3.7 3.1 3.2 2.8 3.6 3.6 0
153 13 Poland 3.5 2.8 3.8 5.0 3.9 3.5 3.4 2.8 2.9 2.5 3.6 3.3 0
161 07 Portugal 4.8 1.1 2.5 2.1 3.9 3.7 1.5 3.7 3.3 1.0 1.3 3.5 0
162 08 Portugal 4.3 1.0 2.5 2.1 3.6 3.8 1.5 4.0 3.5 1.0 1.3 3.2 0
163 09 Portugal 3.9 1.4 2.6 2.3 3.9 4.2 1.6 3.8 3.7 1.1 1.2 3.0 0
162 10 Portugal 3.7 1.8 2.6 2.2 3.7 4.7 1.9 3.6 3.5 1.4 1.2 2.8 0
163 11 Portugal 3.3 2.0 2.5 2.5 3.6 4.8 1.6 3.3 3.3 1.6 1.4 2.5 0
160 12 Portugal 3.1 1.8 2.3 2.9 3.7 5.3 2.0 3.8 3.0 1.9 1.4 3.0 0
162 13 Portugal 2.8 1.6 2.3 2.6 3.4 5.4 2.1 3.5 2.7 1.6 1.3 3.3 0
131 06 Portugal 5.0 1.0 2.5 2.0 4.0 3.7 1.5 3.8 3.3 1.0 1.4 3.5 0
136 07 Qatar 5.0 3.6 5.6 3.6 4.8 4.9 7.0 2.6 4.7 2.5 4.7 4.6 0
137 08 Qatar 4.7 3.3 5.3 3.3 5.0 4.6 6.8 2.6 5.0 2.3 4.9 4.9 0
138 09 Qatar 4.7 3.2 5.2 3.3 5.3 4.4 6.5 2.6 4.5 2.5 5.0 4.7 0
139 10 Qatar 4.5 3.0 5.2 3.4 5.3 4.1 6.3 2.6 4.7 2.7 5.0 5.0 0
139 11 Qatar 4.2 2.7 4.9 3.1 5.0 3.7 6.0 2.3 5.0 3.0 5.0 4.6 0
142 12 Qatar 4.2 2.4 4.9 2.8 4.8 3.2 5.9 2.3 5.3 2.8 5.0 4.3 0
143 13 Qatar 4.3 2.1 4.9 3.1 4.8 2.9 5.9 2.0 5.6 2.5 5.0 4.0 0
125 07 Romania 5.5 3.8 5.2 5.2 6.1 5.7 6.1 5.2 4.8 3.4 4.5 5.4 0
128 08 Romania 5.3 3.5 5.2 5.2 6.1 5.2 5.9 5.2 4.8 3.4 4.7 5.4 0
129 09 Romania 5.6 3.4 5.5 5.1 5.8 5.3 6.2 5.0 4.5 4.3 5.1 5.5 0
128 10 Romania 5.4 3.2 5.6 4.9 5.6 5.6 6.0 4.8 4.3 4.1 5.2 5.5 0
126 11 Romania 5.1 3.2 6.0 5.0 5.8 5.8 5.9 4.5 4.0 4.1 5.2 5.2 0
126 12 Romania 4.6 2.9 6.0 5.0 5.6 6.0 6.3 4.4 4.2 4.4 5.2 4.9 0
130 13 Romania 4.3 2.7 6.3 4.7 5.3 5.7 6.4 4.3 3.9 4.1 5.2 4.6 0
102 06 Romania 6.5 3.9 5.4 5.5 6.0 5.9 6.2 5.3 4.8 3.5 4.1 5.5 0
59 05 Russia 9 6 7.5 2.3 9 3.8 9.4 6.7 9 7.6 9.2 4.0 1
43 06 Russia 8.0 7.2 8.0 7.0 8.0 3.7 8.2 6.9 9.1 7.5 9.0 4.5 1
62 07 Russia 7.5 5.9 7.7 6.5 8.2 3.9 7.6 6.2 8.5 6.8 8.5 3.9 1
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73 08 Russia 7.0 5.4 7.5 6.5 7.9 3.7 7.9 5.9 8.7 7.0 8.0 4.2 1
71 09 Russia 7.0 5.9 7.5 6.2 8.1 4.6 8.0 5.7 8.3 6.9 8.0 4.6 1
80 10 Russia 6.7 5.4 7.1 6.0 7.9 5.1 8.1 5.5 8.0 6.8 7.6 4.8 1
82 11 Russia 6.3 5.1 7.6 5.7 7.6 4.6 7.8 5.3 8.1 7.2 7.8 4.6 1
83 12 Russia 6.0 5.0 7.9 5.4 7.3 4.0 7.9 5.0 8.1 8.2 8.0 4.3 1
80 13 Russia 5.7 5.3 8.2 5.1 7.0 3.5 8.1 5.1 8.6 8.5 8.0 4.0 1
12 05 Rwanda 9 7.8 8 8.6 9 9.2 9.5 5 8.3 5 8.9 8.2 1
24 06 Rwanda 9.5 7.0 9.0 8.2 7.2 8.0 8.7 6.9 7.7 5.0 8.9 6.8 1
36 07 Rwanda 9.1 7.0 8.7 7.6 7.1 7.5 8.5 6.9 7.4 4.6 8.2 6.6 1
42 08 Rwanda 9.1 7.0 8.5 7.5 7.4 7.3 8.2 6.8 7.3 4.6 7.8 6.5 1
43 09 Rwanda 9.3 6.9 8.7 7.2 7.3 7.5 7.9 7.3 7.3 4.6 8.0 7.0 1
40 10 Rwanda 9.1 7.0 8.5 7.0 7.2 7.0 7.5 7.4 7.5 5.0 8.0 7.5 1
34 11 Rwanda 8.9 7.3 8.2 6.8 7.4 7.0 7.1 7.8 8.2 5.8 8.4 8.0 1
35 12 Rwanda 8.6 7.6 8.5 7.0 7.4 6.8 6.8 7.5 8.0 5.5 7.9 7.7 1
39 13 Rwanda 8.4 7.9 8.2 6.9 7.7 6.7 6.5 7.6 7.7 5.5 8.2 8.0 1
96 07 Samoa 6.8 3.8 5.0 7.9 7.2 6.3 6.7 4.7 4.9 6.7 5.4 8.4 0
101 08 Samoa 6.8 3.2 5.0 8.2 6.9 6.1 6.7 4.8 4.6 6.3 5.4 8.4 0
108 09 Samoa 6.5 3.0 5.2 8.2 6.8 5.8 6.6 5.0 4.7 6.0 5.5 8.1 0
107 10 Samoa 6.9 3.1 5.1 8.0 6.6 6.2 6.4 5.1 4.5 5.8 5.3 8.1 0
109 11 Samoa 7.0 2.7 4.8 8.3 6.6 5.9 6.2 4.7 4.2 5.5 5.1 8.6 0
110 12 Samoa 6.7 2.6 4.8 8.6 6.3 5.4 6.0 4.8 4.4 5.5 5.1 8.3 0
111 13 Samoa 6.8 2.5 4.8 8.8 6.0 5.9 6.0 4.8 4.5 5.5 5.1 8.0 0
78 08 Sao Tome 7.9 4.5 5.1 7.4 6.1 8.3 7.4 7.9 5.3 5.8 6.2 6.4 0
95 09 Sao Tome 8.0 4.0 5.0 7.3 6.1 7.9 7.3 7.5 5.3 5.6 6.3 6.4 0
97 10 Sao Tome 7.5 4.1 5.1 7.0 5.9 7.3 7.3 7.3 5.1 6.0 6.7 6.5 0
96 11 Sao Tome 7.1 4.3 4.8 7.3 6.2 6.9 6.9 7.0 4.9 5.8 6.3 6.9 0
97 12 Sao Tome 6.8 4.0 4.8 7.6 6.1 7.4 6.7 6.7 4.6 5.8 6.3 7.0 0
91 13 Sao Tome 6.6 4.3 4.8 7.9 6.3 7.9 6.6 6.4 4.3 5.8 6.3 7.3 0
76 07 Sao Tome 7.9 4.8 5.1 7.4 6.1 8.5 7.3 8.1 5.3 5.8 5.9 6.4 0
45 05 Saudi Arabia 7.6 6.3 7.8 8.8 9 2.2 9.8 4.3 8.6 9 8.3 5.4 0
73 06 Saudi Arabia 6.0 6.9 7.9 3.5 7.0 2.0 8.5 4.1 8.5 7.8 7.5 7.5 0
82 07 Saudi Arabia 5.9 7.2 7.7 3.6 6.5 2.3 8.8 4.3 8.8 7.3 7.6 6.5 0
83 08 Saudi Arabia 6.3 6.2 7.7 3.4 7.0 2.3 8.8 4.3 9.1 7.3 7.7 6.8 0
89 09 Saudi Arabia 6.5 6.0 8.0 3.4 7.0 2.7 8.4 4.3 8.9 8.0 7.8 6.5 0
87 10 Saudi Arabia 6.3 6.2 7.8 3.5 7.3 3.1 8.2 4.1 9.1 7.8 7.8 6.3 0
93 11 Saudi Arabia 6.0 5.8 7.5 3.2 7.0 3.4 7.9 4.2 8.9 7.5 7.9 5.9 0
100 12 Saudi Arabia 5.8 5.5 7.7 2.9 6.7 3.4 7.6 4.3 8.6 7.2 7.9 5.9 0
102 13 Saudi Arabia 5.5 5.2 7.4 3.1 6.4 3.6 7.8 4.0 8.9 7.2 8.0 5.6 0
116 07 Senegal 7.0 4.5 5.2 5.1 6.9 5.7 5.7 6.7 5.6 5.2 3.8 5.5 1
107 08 Senegal 7.0 5.5 6.0 5.1 7.1 6.0 5.7 7.0 6.0 6.0 4.0 5.5 1
102 09 Senegal 7.4 6.0 6.3 5.6 7.5 6.5 6.0 7.3 6.0 5.9 4.0 5.7 1
99 10 Senegal 7.6 6.2 6.1 5.8 7.0 6.2 5.9 7.4 6.0 6.3 4.2 5.9 1
85 11 Senegal 7.6 6.4 6.3 6.0 7.2 6.5 5.9 7.8 6.2 6.3 4.5 6.1 1
71 12 Senegal 7.8 6.7 6.0 6.3 6.9 6.9 6.0 7.5 6.5 6.3 6.3 6.0 1
64 13 Senegal 8.3 7.0 6.3 6.8 6.8 7.2 5.9 7.8 6.2 6.2 6.6 6.3 1
98 06 Senegal 6.8 4.3 5.2 5.0 6.8 5.2 5.8 6.5 6.0 5.5 3.5 5.5 0
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66 05 Serbia 7 6 7.5 4.3 9 7.5 6.9 5 6.2 6 9.6 5.0 0
55 06 Serbia 5.7 8.5 8.6 5.5 8.0 6.5 7.8 5.0 5.6 6.5 8.6 7.5 0
70 08 Serbia 6.0 7.3 7.9 5.5 7.5 6.5 7.4 5.0 6.1 6.3 8.0 6.6 0
78 09 Serbia 5.8 7.3 7.9 5.5 7.4 5.9 7.3 5.2 5.8 6.3 7.9 6.9 0
86 10 Serbia 5.6 6.9 7.8 5.3 6.9 6.2 6.8 5.2 5.6 6.5 8.0 7.0 0
97 11 Serbia 5.3 6.4 7.5 5.0 6.5 5.7 6.5 4.9 5.3 6.5 8.0 6.8 0
89 12 Serbia 5.0 6.3 7.9 4.7 6.2 6.2 6.6 4.6 5.8 6.4 8.0 7.3 0
92 13 Serbia 4.7 6.6 8.0 4.7 5.9 6.5 6.3 4.7 5.5 6.5 8.0 7.0 0
66 07 Serbia  6.0 8.0 7.7 5.5 7.7 6.5 7.5 5.0 6.1 6.3 8.0 6.8 0
106 07 Seychelles 6.9 5.0 5.5 4.7 6.9 4.0 7.9 4.1 6.7 6.2 6.7 6.7 0
114 08 Seychelles 6.7 4.8 5.4 4.7 6.8 3.9 7.6 4.1 6.3 6.0 6.5 6.7 0
120 09 Seychelles 6.3 4.4 5.0 4.7 6.8 4.8 7.1 4.6 5.9 5.6 6.0 6.5 0
115 10 Seychelles 6.1 4.3 5.0 4.5 6.9 5.8 7.0 4.5 5.9 5.6 6.0 6.3 0
119 11 Seychelles 5.8 3.9 4.8 4.9 6.6 5.4 6.8 4.1 5.8 6.1 5.7 7.1 0
120 12 Seychelles 5.5 3.6 4.8 5.2 6.9 4.9 6.3 3.8 5.5 6.1 5.7 6.8 0
121 13 Seychelles 5.2 3.3 4.8 4.9 6.6 5.2 6.3 3.5 5.2 6.4 5.7 6.9 0
6 05 Sierra Leone 9 8 7.5 8.9 8.7 10 7.5 9.1 8.7 6.3 8.6 9.8 0
16 06 Sierra Leone 8.5 7.9 7.1 8.9 8.7 9.0 8.0 8.0 7.0 7.0 7.7 8.8 0
23 07 Sierra Leone 8.6 7.4 7.1 8.7 8.7 8.7 8.0 8.0 7.0 6.5 7.7 7.0 0
31 08 Sierra Leone 8.6 7.4 6.9 8.4 8.2 8.7 7.7 8.2 7.0 6.4 7.5 7.3 0
32 09 Sierra Leone 8.9 6.9 6.6 8.5 8.4 8.6 7.4 8.7 7.0 6.1 7.7 7.3 0
28 10 Sierra Leone 9.1 7.1 6.7 8.3 8.8 8.6 7.7 9.1 6.8 5.9 7.8 7.7 0
30 11 Sierra Leone 8.9 7.5 6.5 8.0 8.5 8.0 7.7 8.8 6.7 6.0 7.9 7.6 0
31 12 Sierra Leone 8.9 7.8 6.2 7.7 8.2 8.3 7.6 8.7 6.4 5.7 7.9 7.1 0
33 13 Sierra Leone 9.0 8.1 5.9 8.0 8.5 8.6 7.3 9.0 6.1 5.4 7.9 7.4 0
160 07 Singapore 2.9 1.1 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.4 3.6 1.5 4.0 1.0 4.0 3.0 0
159 08 Singapore 2.9 1.1 3.0 2.7 2.9 3.1 4.0 1.5 4.3 1.0 4.0 2.8 0
160 09 Singapore 3.0 1.1 3.1 2.7 3.0 3.2 4.0 1.5 4.3 1.0 4.1 2.8 0
160 10 Singapore 2.8 0.9 2.9 2.5 3.1 3.7 4.2 1.7 4.4 1.5 4.1 3.0 0
157 11 Singapore 2.5 0.9 3.0 2.8 3.4 3.6 3.9 2.0 4.7 1.5 4.0 2.8 0
157 12 Singapore 2.6 0.9 3.0 3.1 3.7 3.3 3.5 2.2 5.0 1.8 4.0 2.5 0
158 13 Singapore 2.5 1.1 2.7 3.3 3.7 3.0 3.2 1.9 4.9 1.5 4.0 2.2 0
133 06 Singapore 2.0 1.0 3.0 3.0 2.5 3.3 3.5 1.0 3.5 1.0 4.0 3.0 0
112 06 Slovakia 4.5 1.8 4.4 5.5 6.5 4.5 3.8 4.3 4.6 2.0 4.0 4.0 0
141 07 Slovakia 4.3 1.8 4.4 5.5 6.5 4.5 4.2 4.1 3.9 2.0 4.2 3.9 0
142 08 Slovakia 4.3 1.8 4.2 5.3 6.2 4.2 4.0 4.1 4.3 2.0 4.2 4.2 0
144 09 Slovakia 4.3 2.0 4.3 5.4 5.8 4.6 3.9 4.0 4.0 2.0 3.9 4.4 0
143 10 Slovakia 4.1 2.2 4.8 5.2 5.6 5.0 4.1 3.8 3.8 2.1 3.9 4.2 0
144 11 Slovakia 3.8 2.3 5.0 5.1 5.2 4.6 3.9 3.6 3.6 2.3 3.7 3.9 0
144 12 Slovakia 3.5 2.0 5.3 4.8 4.9 5.1 4.2 3.8 3.3 2.6 3.7 4.2 0
146 13 Slovakia 3.2 2.0 5.0 4.5 4.6 5.2 4.3 3.5 3.0 2.3 3.7 3.9 0
154 07 Slovenia 4.0 1.7 3.4 3.5 5.4 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.0 1.1 2.0 0
156 08 Slovenia 4.0 1.7 3.4 3.5 5.2 3.0 3.2 3.5 3.5 3.0 1.1 2.0 0
156 09 Slovenia 3.6 1.3 3.4 3.5 5.2 3.6 3.0 3.2 3.2 2.7 1.3 2.3 0
156 10 Slovenia 3.4 1.4 3.4 3.3 5.0 4.0 2.8 3.0 3.0 2.8 1.3 2.6 0
156 11 Slovenia 3.1 1.7 3.1 3.6 4.7 3.7 3.0 2.8 2.8 3.0 1.1 2.9 0
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161 12 Slovenia 2.8 1.5 3.3 3.5 4.4 3.5 2.7 2.4 2.8 2.8 1.6 2.6 0
163 13 Slovenia 2.5 1.4 3.3 3.2 4.5 3.6 2.8 2.1 2.5 2.5 1.6 2.3 0
126 06 Slovenia 4.0 1.5 3.5 3.5 5.5 3.2 3.2 3.5 3.7 3.0 1.2 1.0 0
30 07 Solomon Islands 8.5 4.8 8.0 5.1 8.0 8.0 8.5 8.5 7.1 7.7 8.8 9.0 0
30 08 Solomon Islands 8.7 4.8 8.0 5.1 8.0 8.0 8.7 8.5 7.1 7.7 8.8 9.0 0
40 09 Solomon Islands 8.0 5.0 7.5 5.0 8.0 8.3 8.3 8.4 7.0 7.2 8.0 8.9 0
43 10 Solomon Islands 8.3 4.8 7.0 5.4 7.9 8.0 8.1 8.2 6.8 7.0 8.0 9.1 0
49 11 Solomon Islands 7.9 4.5 6.8 5.1 8.0 7.6 7.9 8.1 6.5 6.7 8.0 8.8 0
47 12 Solomon Islands 7.6 4.8 6.8 5.4 8.3 7.9 7.6 7.8 6.2 6.7 8.0 8.5 0
52 13 Solomon Islands 7.7 4.9 6.8 5.7 8.3 7.8 7.3 8.0 5.9 6.7 8.0 8.2 0
5 05 Somalia 9 8 7.4 6.3 9 8.3 9.8 10 7.8 10 8.7 8.0 1
6 06 Somalia 9.0 8.1 8.0 7.0 7.5 8.5 10.0 10.0 9.5 10.0 9.8 8.5 1
3 07 Somalia 9.2 9.0 8.5 8.0 7.5 9.2 10.0 10.0 9.7 10.0 10.0 10.0 1
1 08 Somalia 9.8 9.8 9.5 8.3 7.5 9.4 10.0 10.0 9.9 10.0 10.0 10.0 1
1 09 Somalia 9.8 9.9 9.7 8.5 7.7 9.5 10.0 9.9 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.8 1
1 10 Somalia 9.6 10.0 9.7 8.3 8.0 9.6 10.0 9.6 9.9 10.0 10.0 9.6 1
1 11 Somalia 9.7 10.0 9.5 8.2 8.4 9.3 9.8 9.4 9.7 10.0 9.8 9.7 1
1 12 Somalia 9.8 10.0 9.6 8.6 8.1 9.7 9.9 9.8 9.9 10.0 9.8 9.8 1
1 13 Somalia 9.5 10.0 9.3 8.9 8.4 9.4 9.5 9.8 10.0 9.7 10.0 9.4 1
132 07 South Africa 8.2 6.0 4.7 4.0 8.5 2.8 4.3 5.7 4.1 3.2 3.9 2.0 0
125 08 South Africa 8.4 7.0 4.9 4.0 8.5 4.2 5.0 5.7 4.2 3.9 4.4 2.5 0
122 09 South Africa 8.4 7.4 5.3 4.3 8.5 4.6 5.5 5.7 4.5 4.3 5.9 3.0 0
115 10 South Africa 8.4 7.0 5.6 4.4 8.5 5.0 5.8 5.5 4.7 4.1 5.9 3.0 0
117 11 South Africa 8.4 6.7 5.9 4.1 8.2 5.3 5.5 5.5 4.6 4.5 5.9 3.0 0
115 12 South Africa 8.1 6.4 5.6 4.0 8.2 5.6 5.2 5.8 4.5 4.8 5.9 2.8 0
113 13 South Africa 7.8 6.5 5.7 4.3 8.0 5.9 5.3 6.3 4.2 5.1 5.6 2.9 0
110 06 South Africa 7.7 5.8 4.5 4.0 8.0 2.2 4.1 6.0 4.0 3.4 4.0 2.0 0
123 06 South Korea 4.0 4.2 3.5 5.5 2.5 1.0 3.9 1.5 2.8 1.0 3.0 7.0 0
151 07 South Korea 4.0 3.9 3.5 5.5 2.4 1.4 3.9 2.0 2.7 1.0 2.9 6.5 0
153 08 South Korea 4.0 3.9 4.0 5.3 2.4 1.6 3.9 2.0 2.7 1.0 3.3 6.5 0
153 09 South Korea 4.0 3.5 4.1 5.0 2.4 2.1 4.1 2.2 2.7 1.4 3.6 6.5 0
153 10 South Korea 3.6 3.3 3.9 4.8 2.5 2.8 3.9 2.3 2.8 1.5 3.6 6.3 0
155 11 South Korea 3.3 3.0 3.7 4.5 2.3 2.2 3.7 2.2 2.6 1.7 3.6 6.0 0
156 12 South Korea 3.0 2.5 3.4 4.2 2.6 2.3 3.2 2.2 2.8 2.0 3.6 5.7 0
157 13 South Korea 3.0 2.0 3.1 3.9 2.9 2.0 2.9 1.9 2.6 2.1 3.6 5.4 0
152 07 Spain 3.7 1.8 5.7 1.6 5.0 3.4 1.4 1.9 2.8 4.3 5.6 2.0 0
150 08 Spain 3.9 2.1 6.2 1.6 5.0 3.4 1.4 2.4 2.8 5.2 5.6 2.0 0
151 09 Spain 3.9 2.6 6.2 1.7 5.2 4.0 1.3 2.6 2.7 5.2 5.7 2.2 0
151 10 Spain 3.7 2.8 6.3 1.8 5.0 4.4 1.6 2.4 2.5 5.3 5.7 2.0 0
151 11 Spain 3.3 2.9 6.0 1.9 4.7 4.5 2.1 2.4 2.6 4.9 5.6 2.2 0
153 12 Spain 3.1 2.6 5.7 2.3 4.4 5.0 2.6 2.9 2.5 4.4 5.6 1.7 0
149 13 Spain 2.8 2.3 5.8 3.0 4.1 5.5 3.3 3.3 2.2 4.1 6.0 2.0 0
125 06 Spain 3.2 1.8 5.8 1.5 5.0 3.3 1.5 1.5 2.9 3.2 5.7 2.0 0
25 07 Sri Lanka 7.0 8.6 9.5 6.9 8.2 6.0 8.9 6.5 7.5 8.7 9.2 6.1 1
20 08 Sri Lanka 7.0 9.0 9.8 6.9 8.2 6.0 9.2 6.6 8.0 9.3 9.5 6.1 1
22 09 Sri Lanka 7.5 9.3 9.8 6.9 8.5 6.1 9.0 6.6 8.5 9.2 9.2 6.1 1
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25 10 Sri Lanka 7.3 9.4 9.6 6.7 8.7 5.9 8.6 6.4 8.8 8.5 9.4 6.4 1
28 11 Sri Lanka 7.0 8.6 9.4 6.9 8.4 5.3 8.5 6.1 8.6 8.0 9.5 6.8 1
29 12 Sri Lanka 7.1 8.7 9.1 7.1 8.1 5.6 8.1 5.8 8.7 8.2 9.2 6.5 1
28 13 Sri Lanka 6.8 8.4 9.5 7.3 7.8 5.9 8.2 5.5 9.0 8.5 9.3 6.8 1
25 06 Sri Lanka 8.0 8.2 9.1 6.7 8.0 5.7 8.6 7.0 7.2 8.5 8.9 6.5 0
3 05 Sudan 8.6 9.4 7.8 9.1 9 8.5 9.2 8.7 8 9.8 8.7 7.3 1
1 06 Sudan 9.6 9.7 9.7 9.1 9.2 7.5 9.5 9.5 9.8 9.8 9.1 9.8 1
1 07 Sudan 9.2 9.8 10.0 9.0 9.1 7.7 10.0 9.5 10.0 9.9 9.7 9.8 1
2 08 Sudan 9.0 9.6 10.0 8.8 9.3 7.3 10.0 9.5 9.9 9.8 9.9 9.9 1
3 09 Sudan 9.0 9.8 9.9 9.0 9.6 7.0 9.8 9.5 9.8 9.7 9.5 9.8 1
3 10 Sudan 8.8 9.8 9.9 8.7 9.5 6.7 9.9 9.3 9.9 9.8 9.9 9.6 1
3 11 Sudan 8.5 9.6 9.9 8.2 9.1 6.4 9.4 9.0 9.7 9.6 9.9 9.5 1
3 12 Sudan 8.4 9.9 10.0 8.3 8.8 7.3 9.5 8.5 9.4 9.7 9.9 9.5 1
3 13 Sudan 8.8 10.0 10.0 8.4 8.5 7.8 9.6 8.8 9.3 9.8 10.0 10.0 1
95 07 Suriname 7.1 4.2 6.1 6.7 8.3 6.9 6.4 4.9 5.7 6.2 5.1 6.3 0
101 08 Suriname 6.5 3.9 6.1 6.7 8.3 6.2 6.4 4.9 6.0 6.0 5.4 6.0 0
103 09 Suriname 6.2 3.9 6.2 6.9 7.9 6.3 6.7 5.0 6.0 6.2 5.8 6.1 0
105 10 Suriname 6.0 3.7 6.4 6.7 7.7 6.6 6.5 5.1 5.8 6.0 5.8 6.2 0
105 11 Suriname 6.0 3.5 6.1 7.0 7.5 6.1 6.1 4.9 5.6 5.8 5.8 6.7 0
105 12 Suriname 5.8 3.2 6.1 7.3 7.5 6.6 6.4 5.0 5.3 5.8 5.8 6.4 0
106 13 Suriname 5.7 3.0 6.1 7.6 7.0 7.1 6.1 5.3 5.4 5.8 5.8 6.3 0
61 07 Swaziland 8.7 4.0 4.0 5.3 6.0 7.7 8.8 8.1 7.5 7.1 7.1 7.0 0
71 08 Swaziland 8.8 4.0 4.0 5.5 6.1 7.8 8.5 7.5 7.5 6.5 6.9 6.9 0
65 09 Swaziland 9.2 4.0 4.0 6.0 6.0 8.0 8.8 7.8 7.5 6.8 6.9 7.4 0
63 10 Swaziland 9.1 4.2 4.2 6.2 6.2 8.2 8.6 7.6 7.7 6.6 6.9 7.3 0
61 11 Swaziland 9.2 4.6 3.9 5.9 6.5 7.8 8.5 7.5 8.2 6.6 7.0 6.9 0
55 12 Swaziland 8.9 4.6 3.6 5.8 7.0 8.3 8.6 7.7 8.3 6.3 7.0 7.4 0
49 13 Swaziland 9.0 4.9 3.6 6.3 7.5 8.9 8.7 7.8 8.3 6.0 7.0 7.5 0
174 07 Sweden 3.2 2.8 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.3 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.5 0
175 08 Sweden 3.2 3.0 1.3 2.0 2.1 1.2 1.0 1.2 1.4 0.9 1.0 1.5 0
175 09 Sweden 2.8 2.6 1.3 2.0 2.3 1.6 1.0 1.2 1.6 1.1 1.3 1.8 0
175 10 Sweden 2.7 2.7 1.3 1.8 2.1 2.2 0.8 1.3 1.8 1.3 1.3 1.6 0
175 11 Sweden 2.8 2.9 1.3 2.0 2.2 1.9 0.9 1.5 1.6 2.3 1.8 1.6 0
176 12 Sweden 2.6 2.6 1.0 1.8 1.9 1.6 0.8 1.8 1.6 2.5 1.8 1.3 0
177 13 Sweden 2.5 2.4 1.0 1.7 1.7 1.7 0.5 1.9 1.3 2.2 1.8 1.0 0
144 06 Sweden 3.0 2.5 1.0 2.0 2.0 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
172 07 Switzerland 3.3 1.7 2.1 2.0 2.6 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0
173 08 Switzerland 2.9 1.7 2.6 2.0 2.6 1.5 1.0 1.4 1.7 1.0 1.0 0.9 0
174 09 Switzerland 2.6 1.3 2.9 2.0 2.6 2.1 1.2 1.6 1.7 1.0 1.0 1.2 0
174 10 Switzerland 2.4 1.5 3.3 1.8 2.6 2.4 1.0 1.4 2.2 1.2 1.0 1.0 0
174 11 Switzerland 2.1 1.9 3.5 2.1 2.8 2.4 1.0 1.6 2.0 1.4 1.0 1.4 0
174 12 Switzerland 2.4 1.8 3.2 2.2 2.6 2.2 0.9 1.7 2.0 1.7 1.0 1.7 0
175 13 Switzerland 2.1 1.5 3.5 2.1 2.3 2.3 0.8 1.4 1.7 1.4 1.0 1.4 0
142 06 Switzerland 3.0 1.5 2.0 2.0 2.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1.0 1.0 0
29 05 Syria 9 8 7.5 6.8 9 5 9 5 7.6 9 8.2 7.4 1
33 06 Syria 7.0 7.1 8.0 6.8 8.9 6.5 9.0 5.5 9.0 7.5 7.1 6.2 1
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40 07 Syria 6.5 8.9 8.0 6.8 8.1 6.8 8.5 5.3 8.5 7.4 7.5 6.3 1
35 08 Syria 6.5 9.0 8.0 6.8 8.1 6.8 8.8 5.7 8.8 7.6 7.7 6.3 1
39 09 Syria 6.1 9.2 8.2 6.8 8.0 6.8 8.8 5.7 8.6 7.8 7.8 6.0 1
48 10 Syria 5.9 8.9 8.3 6.6 7.8 6.3 8.6 5.5 8.8 7.6 7.8 5.8 1
48 11 Syria 5.6 8.5 8.7 6.3 7.4 5.8 8.3 5.8 8.6 7.5 7.9 5.5 1
23 12 Syria 5.5 9.0 9.2 6.0 7.5 6.3 9.5 7.0 9.4 8.5 8.7 7.9 1
21 13 Syria 5.6 9.5 9.3 6.2 7.2 6.4 9.6 7.0 9.5 9.8 9.2 8.1 1
49 05 Tajikistan 9 5 6.2 6.7 9 5.3 8.6 5 9.4 8 9.5 5.0 1
42 06 Tajikistan 7.0 6.6 6.2 6.5 7.4 6.8 8.9 7.5 8.6 7.5 8.7 6.0 1
39 07 Tajikistan 7.7 6.1 6.3 6.4 7.3 7.3 9.0 7.3 8.6 7.8 8.8 6.1 1
38 08 Tajikistan 7.9 6.1 6.5 6.4 7.3 7.0 9.2 7.1 8.8 7.8 8.6 6.2 1
36 09 Tajikistan 8.2 6.4 6.9 6.5 7.3 7.5 8.9 7.6 8.6 7.5 8.4 6.5 1
38 10 Tajikistan 8.0 6.2 6.9 6.3 7.1 7.5 8.9 7.3 8.7 7.3 8.4 6.6 1
39 11 Tajikistan 7.7 5.9 7.2 6.0 6.8 7.4 8.9 6.9 8.5 7.4 8.6 7.0 1
46 12 Tajikistan 7.3 5.6 6.9 5.7 6.5 7.7 8.8 6.6 8.5 7.1 8.3 6.7 1
51 13 Tajikistan 7.4 5.3 6.7 5.9 6.2 8.0 9.1 6.3 8.2 7.4 8.3 6.4 1
32 05 Tanzania 9 7.2 7.6 6.7 8.9 4.5 8.2 7.8 8.6 7.9 7.5 7.1 0
71 06 Tanzania 7.0 6.8 6.0 6.0 7.0 7.0 6.5 7.8 6.0 6.0 5.2 7.0 0
75 07 Tanzania 7.4 7.1 6.2 6.0 6.9 7.4 6.3 7.8 6.0 5.7 5.5 7.0 0
75 08 Tanzania 7.4 7.0 6.4 6.0 6.9 7.2 6.3 7.6 5.8 5.7 5.8 7.0 0
70 09 Tanzania 8.0 7.1 6.6 6.0 6.9 7.5 6.7 8.0 5.8 5.4 6.3 6.8 0
72 10 Tanzania 8.2 7.3 6.4 6.1 6.7 7.2 6.5 8.3 5.9 5.6 6.0 7.0 0
65 11 Tanzania 8.1 7.4 6.1 5.8 6.3 7.4 6.5 8.6 6.2 5.5 6.0 7.4 0
66 12 Tanzania 8.2 7.1 5.8 6.1 5.9 6.9 6.5 8.5 6.5 5.8 5.7 7.4 0
65 13 Tanzania 8.6 6.8 6.0 6.4 6.4 6.8 6.2 8.8 6.2 5.5 5.7 7.7 0
69 05 Thailand 9 5 6.3 4 9 0.9 8.5 3.5 7 9 9.2 6.0 1
79 06 Thailand 7.5 5.7 8.1 4.3 7.5 2.0 6.8 6.0 6.5 6.8 7.2 6.5 1
85 07 Thailand 7.0 5.8 7.8 4.4 7.5 3.0 8.0 5.5 6.3 7.2 8.0 5.5 1
89 08 Thailand 6.8 6.0 7.7 4.4 7.5 3.6 7.7 5.5 6.2 7.0 7.7 5.5 1
78 09 Thailand 6.9 6.5 8.0 4.5 7.7 3.8 8.2 5.4 6.9 7.5 8.0 5.8 1
81 10 Thailand 6.7 6.7 7.8 4.7 7.5 4.3 8.0 5.4 7.0 7.4 8.0 5.3 1
79 11 Thailand 6.4 6.6 8.0 4.4 7.2 4.0 8.4 5.0 7.3 7.6 8.5 4.9 1
84 12 Thailand 8.2 6.7 7.8 4.0 6.9 4.0 6.5 4.7 7.2 7.3 8.8 4.9 1
90 13 Thailand 7.9 6.4 8.1 3.5 6.4 3.5 6.2 4.6 7.3 7.8 8.8 4.6 1
20 07 Timor-Leste 8.1 8.5 7.1 5.3 6.5 8.5 9.5 7.9 6.9 9.0 8.8 8.8 0
25 08 Timor-Leste 8.1 8.6 7.1 5.3 6.5 8.2 9.0 8.0 6.9 8.8 8.5 8.8 0
20 09 Timor-Leste 8.4 9.0 7.3 5.7 6.8 8.4 9.4 8.4 7.0 9.0 8.8 9.0 0
18 10 Timor-Leste 8.6 9.1 7.5 6.1 7.0 8.4 9.1 8.7 7.0 8.8 8.7 9.2 0
23 11 Timor-Leste 8.5 8.0 7.1 5.8 7.3 7.9 8.8 8.7 6.8 8.3 8.3 9.3 0
28 12 Timor-Leste 8.4 7.7 6.8 6.1 7.0 8.0 8.5 8.4 6.3 8.3 8.3 8.9 0
32 13 Timor-Leste 8.7 7.4 6.8 6.4 6.7 7.9 8.0 8.5 6.0 8.3 8.3 8.5 0
64 05 Togo 5 6 7 6 9 3 8.9 10 7.6 5 7.9 5.0 0
37 06 Togo 7.0 5.8 6.0 6.5 7.5 8.0 8.7 8.1 8.1 8.1 7.8 6.7 0
46 07 Togo 7.5 5.4 6.0 6.5 7.5 8.2 7.7 8.0 7.8 7.8 7.6 6.6 0
45 08 Togo 7.7 5.6 6.0 6.5 7.5 8.2 7.2 8.0 7.9 7.8 7.5 6.9 0
50 09 Togo 7.9 6.0 5.8 6.9 7.5 8.2 7.5 8.3 7.6 7.4 7.3 6.8 0
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47 10 Togo 8.0 6.2 5.6 7.0 7.6 8.0 7.5 8.4 7.7 7.6 7.6 6.9 0
36 11 Togo 8.1 6.5 5.4 7.0 7.9 8.0 8.0 8.5 7.7 7.3 7.8 7.1 0
39 12 Togo 8.1 6.8 5.1 6.9 7.6 7.7 8.2 8.2 7.4 7.3 7.5 6.8 0
42 13 Togo 8.2 7.1 4.8 6.8 7.6 7.4 8.3 8.3 7.8 7.4 7.5 6.5 0
115 07 Trinidad 5.9 3.8 5.2 6.4 8.1 3.8 6.4 5.8 5.4 5.7 5.7 5.4 0
119 08 Trinidad 5.5 3.6 5.2 6.7 7.7 4.0 6.4 5.5 5.4 5.7 5.9 5.4 0
123 09 Trinidad 5.8 3.1 4.9 7.1 7.6 4.5 6.1 5.4 5.6 5.7 5.6 5.3 0
124 10 Trinidad 5.6 3.1 4.9 7.3 7.2 4.8 5.9 5.2 5.4 6.0 5.6 5.1 0
124 11 Trinidad 5.3 3.2 4.7 7.7 6.9 4.5 5.5 4.9 5.1 5.5 5.6 4.8 0
122 12 Trinidad 5.5 2.9 4.4 7.7 6.6 4.7 5.9 5.1 5.5 6.0 5.6 4.5 0
125 13 Trinidad 5.3 3.0 4.4 7.8 6.1 4.6 5.6 5.2 5.2 5.7 5.6 4.2 0
71 05 Tunisia 6 8 6.2 7.1 9 3.6 7.8 4 7.3 6 8.3 3.0 0
100 06 Tunisia 5.7 3.6 5.0 5.0 7.5 3.6 6.5 6.0 7.5 6.0 6.0 3.0 0
121 07 Tunisia 5.6 3.4 5.1 5.1 7.4 4.3 6.4 5.9 7.3 5.9 6.2 3.0 0
122 08 Tunisia 5.6 3.4 5.1 5.1 7.2 4.3 6.6 5.9 7.3 5.9 6.2 3.0 0
121 09 Tunisia 5.9 3.2 5.4 5.3 7.2 4.9 6.6 6.1 7.4 6.2 6.0 3.4 0
118 10 Tunisia 5.7 3.4 5.4 5.2 7.0 5.0 6.4 5.7 7.5 6.5 6.0 3.7 0
108 11 Tunisia 5.5 3.4 5.6 5.2 6.6 5.0 7.2 5.3 7.7 7.0 6.8 4.8 0
94 12 Tunisia 5.2 4.0 5.6 5.2 6.3 5.5 7.8 5.0 8.3 7.5 7.8 6.0 0
85 13 Tunisia 4.9 4.2 7.8 5.0 6.0 6.0 7.9 5.0 8.4 7.2 7.8 6.3 0
48 05 Turkey 9 8 7.3 5 9 4.2 9.7 4.8 5 8 9.1 7.0 1
82 06 Turkey 7.2 6.1 7.3 5.0 8.6 4.1 6.1 5.7 5.0 6.4 6.9 6.0 1
91 07 Turkey 6.9 5.8 7.4 5.0 8.7 4.7 6.1 5.4 5.1 6.7 7.1 6.0 1
92 08 Turkey 6.7 6.2 7.6 5.0 8.2 4.6 6.0 5.2 5.5 6.7 7.5 6.2 1
85 09 Turkey 6.8 6.6 7.7 5.0 8.0 5.3 6.5 5.3 6.0 7.0 7.8 6.2 1
89 10 Turkey 6.3 6.3 8.0 4.8 7.8 5.8 6.0 5.4 5.5 7.4 7.8 6.0 1
103 11 Turkey 5.9 6.0 8.3 4.5 7.4 5.5 5.9 5.7 5.2 4.0 7.5 5.6 1
85 12 Turkey 6.0 6.5 8.6 4.2 7.1 5.6 6.2 6.0 5.3 7.7 7.5 5.9 1
86 13 Turkey 5.7 7.4 9.0 3.9 6.8 5.3 5.9 5.5 5.5 7.9 7.3 5.6 1
70 05 Turkmenistan 8 5 4.9 4.3 9 3.1 9.8 6 7.6 5 9.8 4.0 0
45 06 Turkmenistan 7.0 4.2 5.2 6.0 7.2 8.0 9.1 7.2 9.7 8.5 8.0 6.0 0
43 07 Turkmenistan 7.0 4.5 6.2 5.6 7.3 7.4 9.0 7.7 9.6 8.5 8.2 6.5 0
46 08 Turkmenistan 7.0 4.5 6.2 5.6 7.3 7.1 8.7 7.7 9.6 8.3 7.9 6.3 0
59 09 Turkmenistan 7.0 4.8 6.5 5.6 7.6 6.9 8.5 7.2 8.9 7.6 7.7 6.0 0
65 10 Turkmenistan 6.8 4.6 6.3 5.4 7.4 6.6 8.4 7.0 9.0 7.7 7.7 5.6 0
75 11 Turkmenistan 6.5 4.2 6.6 5.1 7.1 6.0 8.4 6.7 8.7 7.5 7.7 5.2 0
81 12 Turkmenistan 6.2 3.9 6.4 4.8 6.8 5.7 9.0 6.4 8.4 7.2 7.7 4.9 0
81 13 Turkmenistan 5.9 3.9 6.7 4.9 6.5 5.4 9.3 6.1 8.7 7.1 7.7 4.6 0
27 05 Uganda 9 7.6 6.9 5.7 8.4 6 8 8.4 8.3 8 8.1 7.3 1
21 06 Uganda 8.0 9.2 7.8 5.7 8.4 7.5 8.0 8.0 8.0 8.5 7.9 7.5 1
15 07 Uganda 8.1 9.4 8.5 6.0 8.5 7.5 8.5 8.2 8.2 8.3 7.8 7.4 1
16 08 Uganda 8.7 9.3 8.3 6.0 8.5 7.6 8.3 7.9 7.9 8.1 7.8 7.7 1
21 09 Uganda 8.7 9.3 8.0 6.5 8.7 7.6 8.0 8.0 7.7 8.2 8.2 8.0 1
21 10 Uganda 8.7 8.9 8.5 6.9 8.4 7.2 7.9 8.2 7.6 8.7 8.6 7.9 1
20 12 Uganda 8.8 8.2 7.7 6.9 8.1 7.5 8.0 8.6 7.8 8.3 8.7 7.9 1
22 13 Uganda 9.1 8.4 8.0 6.7 7.8 7.4 8.1 8.3 7.9 8.2 8.6 8.2 1
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21 11 Uganda 8.8 8.0 8.0 6.6 8.4 7.5 7.7 8.3 7.5 8.6 8.6 8.2 0
39 05 Ukraine 9 7 6.9 8.8 9 7.3 8.9 5.5 8.5 2 9.1 6.8 0
86 06 Ukraine 7.0 3.8 7.2 7.5 7.0 4.5 7.0 5.5 5.9 3.0 7.5 7.0 0
105 07 Ukraine 6.5 3.6 7.0 7.5 7.0 5.0 7.5 4.5 5.9 3.0 7.9 6.0 0
108 08 Ukraine 6.5 3.2 7.2 7.3 6.7 5.0 7.3 4.5 5.9 3.0 7.9 6.3 0
110 09 Ukraine 6.1 3.0 6.9 7.1 6.4 5.5 7.2 4.2 5.5 3.3 7.9 6.6 0
109 10 Ukraine 5.6 3.1 6.9 6.6 6.2 6.3 7.2 4.0 5.3 3.8 7.9 6.6 0
110 11 Ukraine 5.3 3.1 6.5 6.3 5.9 6.0 7.4 4.1 5.5 4.0 8.0 6.8 0
113 12 Ukraine 5.0 2.9 6.2 6.0 5.6 5.7 7.7 3.9 5.4 4.3 8.0 6.5 0
117 13 Ukraine 4.7 3.2 5.9 5.7 5.3 5.4 7.8 3.6 5.7 4.4 8.0 6.2 0
137 07 United Arab Emirates 5.6 3.6 4.0 3.7 5.2 2.6 7.0 4.1 6.1 2.1 3.6 4.0 0
138 08 United Arab Emirates 5.0 3.6 4.3 3.4 5.5 2.6 7.0 3.9 5.9 1.9 3.8 4.3 0
139 09 United Arab Emirates 4.6 3.4 4.7 3.3 5.7 3.2 6.7 3.6 5.8 2.3 4.0 4.5 0
137 10 United Arab Emirates 4.4 3.2 4.7 3.3 5.7 3.9 6.7 3.4 5.9 2.7 4.0 4.5 0
138 11 United Arab Emirates 4.1 2.8 4.6 3.0 5.4 4.2 6.5 3.3 5.7 3.0 3.6 4.1 0
140 12 United Arab Emirates 4.1 2.8 4.3 2.7 5.1 3.9 6.4 3.1 5.9 3.2 3.6 3.8 0
142 13 United Arab Emirates 3.9 2.5 4.3 2.4 4.8 3.5 6.5 2.9 6.4 2.9 3.6 3.5 0
130 06 United Kingdom 3.5 3.9 5.0 2.0 5.0 1.0 2.5 1.8 2.0 2.5 3.0 2.0 0
156 07 United Kingdom 3.4 4.0 4.2 2.0 4.7 1.4 2.2 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.1 0
160 08 United Kingdom 3.0 3.0 4.5 2.0 4.5 1.7 2.0 1.8 2.6 3.0 2.7 2.1 0
161 09 United Kingdom 3.2 2.8 4.3 1.9 4.7 2.5 1.8 2.2 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.4 0
161 10 United Kingdom 3.2 3.0 4.1 1.8 4.5 3.0 1.6 2.3 2.3 2.7 3.2 2.2 0
159 11 United Kingdom 2.9 3.3 4.4 2.1 4.2 3.3 1.4 2.2 2.0 2.7 3.6 1.9 0
158 12 United Kingdom 2.8 3.0 4.7 2.4 3.9 3.7 1.9 2.6 2.1 3.0 3.6 1.6 0
160 13 United Kingdom 2.5 2.7 5.0 2.1 3.6 4.1 1.6 2.3 1.8 2.7 3.5 1.3 0
128 06 United States of America 5.0 6.0 3.0 1.0 6.0 1.5 2.5 1.0 5.0 1.0 1.5 1.0 1
159 07 United States of America 3.5 5.5 3.2 1.0 5.8 1.8 2.8 1.4 4.6 1.3 1.7 1.0 1
161 08 United States of America 3.5 4.0 3.2 1.0 5.5 2.3 3.0 1.8 4.2 1.3 2.0 1.0 1
159 09 United States of America 3.1 3.7 3.3 1.0 5.3 2.9 3.0 2.3 4.0 1.4 2.5 1.5 1
158 10 United States of America 3.1 3.2 3.4 1.1 5.4 4.0 2.5 2.5 3.7 1.6 3.3 1.5 1
158 11 United States of America 3.4 2.9 3.6 1.1 5.4 3.7 2.2 2.7 3.3 1.6 3.6 1.3 1
159 12 United States of America 3.3 2.6 3.9 1.3 5.1 3.4 2.6 2.7 3.5 1.9 3.6 1.0 1
159 13 United States of America 3.0 2.3 4.2 1.0 4.8 3.2 2.3 2.4 3.2 2.2 3.9 1.0 1
150 07 Uruguay 5.1 1.1 2.0 5.9 5.1 3.5 2.9 4.0 2.5 3.0 2.3 3.5 0
151 08 Uruguay 5.1 1.1 2.0 5.9 5.1 3.7 2.9 4.0 2.5 3.0 2.3 3.8 0
154 09 Uruguay 4.7 1.0 2.0 5.8 5.2 4.1 2.8 3.6 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.7 0
153 10 Uruguay 4.3 1.3 2.0 5.6 5.0 4.0 2.6 3.4 2.5 3.4 3.0 4.2 0
154 12 Uruguay 4.1 1.8 2.7 5.0 4.6 3.8 2.2 3.4 2.6 4.0 2.7 3.7 0
155 13 Uruguay 3.8 1.9 2.8 4.7 4.4 3.6 1.7 3.4 2.3 3.7 2.7 3.5 0
120 06 Uruguay 5.0 1.0 2.0 6.0 5.0 3.5 3.0 4.0 2.5 3.0 2.5 3.7 0
153 11 Uruguay 3.9 1.7 2.4 5.3 4.7 3.8 2.5 3.3 2.5 3.7 2.7 3.9 0
24 05 Uzbekistan 6.5 8 6.8 6.8 9 6 9.1 5 9.6 9 9.4 8.0 0
22 06 Uzbekistan 7.7 5.8 7.5 7.5 8.1 7.0 9.3 7.0 9.3 9.1 9.1 7.0 0
22 07 Uzbekistan 7.7 5.4 7.1 7.1 8.6 7.5 9.2 6.8 9.0 8.9 9.2 7.0 0
26 08 Uzbekistan 7.7 5.4 7.1 7.1 8.6 7.7 9.3 6.8 9.2 9.0 9.2 6.3 0
31 09 Uzbekistan 7.9 5.3 7.4 7.0 8.7 7.2 9.0 6.6 9.2 9.0 9.0 6.5 0
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36 10 Uzbekistan 7.7 5.1 7.4 6.6 8.5 7.0 8.5 6.4 9.3 8.8 9.0 6.2 0
40 11 Uzbekistan 7.3 5.7 7.4 6.3 8.2 6.8 8.4 6.0 9.0 8.5 8.7 6.0 0
39 12 Uzbekistan 7.0 5.7 7.7 6.0 7.9 7.1 8.7 5.7 9.1 8.2 8.7 5.7 0
44 13 Uzbekistan 6.7 6.0 7.5 6.3 7.6 7.2 9.0 5.4 9.2 7.9 8.7 5.4 0
21 05 Venezuela 8 8 6.8 7.6 9 4.5 9.8 8.2 9.1 7.8 7.2 7.5 0
63 06 Venezuela 7.5 4.8 6.8 7.0 8.0 4.0 7.5 7.0 7.8 7.5 7.3 6.0 0
73 07 Venezuela 6.9 5.2 6.8 6.9 8.2 4.0 7.5 6.3 7.9 6.9 7.5 5.7 0
79 08 Venezuela 6.5 5.0 6.8 6.9 8.0 4.6 7.1 6.3 7.4 6.6 7.5 5.2 0
77 09 Venezuela 6.8 5.0 7.0 6.9 8.0 5.3 7.2 5.9 7.3 6.9 7.7 5.5 0
82 10 Venezuela 6.3 5.1 6.8 6.7 7.6 5.8 7.2 6.1 7.2 6.7 7.5 5.7 0
80 11 Venezuela 6.0 4.8 7.0 6.4 7.3 6.1 7.5 5.8 7.4 7.0 7.3 5.5 0
82 12 Venezuela 5.7 4.5 6.7 6.1 7.2 5.9 7.9 6.3 7.7 6.7 7.3 5.2 0
89 13 Venezuela 5.4 4.8 6.4 5.8 6.9 5.4 7.6 6.5 7.7 6.5 7.3 4.9 0
52 05 Vietnam 8.6 8 5.6 8.5 8.9 3.4 7.6 4.3 8.4 8 6.4 7.2 0
70 06 Vietnam 7.0 6.5 5.3 7.0 6.2 5.6 7.0 6.6 7.0 7.5 7.0 5.9 0
78 07 Vietnam 6.5 5.9 5.3 7.0 6.2 6.2 7.0 6.5 6.9 7.4 7.0 5.9 0
95 08 Vietnam 6.6 5.0 5.3 6.0 6.2 6.1 7.2 6.0 7.0 6.4 6.9 5.9 0
94 09 Vietnam 6.8 5.3 5.5 6.0 6.5 6.7 7.3 6.3 7.2 6.2 7.1 6.0 0
95 10 Vietnam 6.9 5.2 5.3 5.9 6.5 6.6 7.3 6.4 7.3 6.0 7.0 6.2 0
88 11 Vietnam 6.7 5.0 5.7 5.7 6.2 6.1 7.5 6.4 7.7 6.0 6.9 6.1 0
96 12 Vietnam 6.1 4.4 6.0 6.0 5.9 6.1 7.5 6.1 7.4 5.7 6.9 5.9 0
98 13 Vietnam 5.9 4.7 5.7 5.7 5.8 6.2 7.8 5.8 7.5 5.4 6.9 5.6 0
8 05 Yemen 7.8 8 6.4 8.2 9 8.8 9.8 9.3 6.4 9 9.4 7.6 1
16 06 Yemen 7.8 6.7 7.0 8.2 9.0 7.8 8.8 8.2 7.2 9.0 9.4 7.5 1
24 07 Yemen 8.0 6.7 7.3 7.2 8.7 8.0 7.8 8.1 7.2 8.0 9.0 7.2 1
21 08 Yemen 8.6 7.2 7.3 7.2 8.8 8.2 8.0 8.3 7.5 8.2 8.9 7.2 1
18 09 Yemen 8.8 7.9 7.7 7.4 8.9 8.2 8.3 8.5 7.7 8.4 9.0 7.3 1
15 10 Yemen 8.6 8.3 8.2 7.2 8.6 7.9 8.7 8.6 8.0 8.9 9.2 7.8 1
13 11 Yemen 8.7 8.4 8.6 6.9 8.3 7.7 8.6 8.7 7.7 9.3 9.3 8.2 1
8 12 Yemen 8.8 8.7 9.0 7.0 8.4 8.7 9.1 9.0 8.4 9.7 9.8 8.3 1
6 13 Yemen 9.3 9.2 9.0 7.4 8.1 9.2 9.3 8.7 8.7 9.8 9.5 8.7 1
66 06 Zambia 9.2 5.2 5.2 6.7 7.3 7.6 7.5 7.8 5.8 6.0 5.2 6.1 0
69 07 Zambia 9.1 6.2 5.2 6.7 7.4 7.9 7.6 7.9 5.8 5.5 5.2 6.1 0
63 08 Zambia 8.8 6.4 5.2 6.7 7.4 8.1 7.8 7.9 5.8 5.5 5.5 6.5 0
60 09 Zambia 9.0 7.1 5.3 7.0 7.1 8.5 7.8 8.4 5.6 5.2 5.7 7.5 0
56 10 Zambia 9.0 7.3 5.4 7.1 7.3 8.0 7.5 8.0 5.9 5.0 6.1 7.3 0
55 11 Zambia 8.9 7.6 5.7 6.8 7.3 7.7 7.6 7.8 6.1 5.3 5.8 7.3 0
44 12 Zambia 9.1 7.3 6.3 7.1 7.7 8.1 8.0 7.7 6.4 5.3 6.0 7.0 0
45 13 Zambia 9.3 7.4 6.0 7.4 8.0 8.3 8.0 7.6 6.7 5.0 5.7 7.2 0
15 05 Zimbabwe 9 8 6.4 7.7 9 7.3 7.9 8.5 7.5 9 7.9 6.7 0
5 06 Zimbabwe 9.7 8.9 8.5 9.0 9.2 9.8 8.9 9.5 9.5 9.4 8.5 8.0 0
4 07 Zimbabwe 9.7 8.7 8.8 9.1 9.5 10.0 9.5 9.6 9.7 9.5 9.0 7.0 0
3 08 Zimbabwe 9.7 9.0 9.5 10.0 9.6 10.0 9.5 9.6 9.8 9.5 9.3 7.0 0
2 09 Zimbabwe 9.8 9.1 9.1 10.0 9.7 10.0 9.8 9.8 9.9 9.7 9.5 7.6 0
4 10 Zimbabwe 9.4 8.6 8.8 9.7 9.4 9.6 9.6 9.4 9.5 9.2 9.5 7.5 0
6 11 Zimbabwe 9.3 8.2 9.0 9.3 9.2 9.0 9.3 9.0 9.2 9.0 9.6 7.8 0
178
5 12 Zimbabwe 9.0 8.4 8.7 9.0 8.9 8.9 9.4 9.1 8.9 8.7 9.8 7.5 0
10 13 Zimbabwe 9.2 8.7 8.4 8.6 8.6 8.6 9.2 9.1 8.9 8.4 9.7 7.8 0
Table 31: Master FSI with Conflict
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APPENDIX 3
Composite 
reliability:
Latent 
variable Dimensions
Cronbach's 
alpha D.G. rho (PCA)
Condition 
number
Critical 
value
Eigen
values
PastConflict01 1      
PastConflict02 1      
PastConflict 2 0.953 0.977 4.628 1.000 1.911
  0.089
People 3 0.875 0.923 3.498 1.000 2.401
  0.403
  0.196
Rage 3 0.938 0.960 5.798 1.000 2.670
  0.251
  0.079
Prosperity 2 0.796 0.908 2.215 1.000 1.661
  0.339
Governance 3 0.936 0.959 5.248 1.000 2.659
  0.245
  0.097
Externals 1      
Resilience 14 0.963 0.969 14.766 1.000 9.770
  1.797
  0.598
  0.381
  0.340
  0.317
  0.174
  0.151
  0.112
  0.099
  0.088
  0.078
  0.049
  0.045
Current
Conflict 1      
Future
Conflict 4 0.934 0.953 5.246 1.000 3.341
  0.383
  0.155
      0.121
Table 32: PLS SEM CY 2009 Composite Reliability
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